

ERICH KERN

RAT TO GERMANY

Spies and sabotage against the own fatherland

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"What we in the German resistance did not really want to understand during the war, we have fully learned afterwards: that the war was ultimately not waged against Hitler, but against Germany."

Eugen Gerstenmaier, resistance fighter and former president of the German Bundestag
1954/1969 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 21, 1975)

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FOREWORD

Julius Caesar's saying, "I love treason, but hate the traitor," was set off course in Germany after 1945; in many cases it was even turned into its opposite. The traitor is honored and heroized, the betrayed is hated or at least scorned and ridiculed.

This has its deep reason. Betrayal is logically loved only by the enemy and only in war. In peace, a different morality applies, in which betrayal finds no place. For Germany, however, total surrender, not peace, was announced in 1945. In the underground, a relentless war raged on. It is only fought out with other weapons. That is why traitors and betrayals of Germany still stand untouchable.

It is time to make a clear break here, so that those who come after us will have the opportunity for a fair assessment of one of the most shattering chapters of our epoch. This undertaking is not easy. Unfortunately, there are too many who do not remember anything, and also those who bear false witness. The purpose-bound propaganda fairy tales, in the sense of psychological warfare against Germany, invented by the communist agitator Willy Münzenberg, the British lie-boss Denis Sefton Delmer and the agit-prop of the Soviet "National Committee Free Germany" and spread by the millions, survived the struggle and often even their inventors. The lie proved to be more tenacious than the truth.

Complete confusion therefore arose, including over the concept of treason. While the late Attorney General Dr. Fritz Bauer, in a lecture on "State Injustice and Resistance" to professors and students at the University of Göttingen at the end of 1962, demanded that Europe should erect a monument to General Hans Oster, because he had wanted to bring about a quick end to the Second World War by transmitting the attack data, the former Bavarian Minister of the Interior Junker declared in Schrobenhausen at about the same time: "We, who have taken the rap for years at the front, would be very stupid if we now entrusted our sons to a Bundeswehr in whose highest offices treason can be committed."

Thus, while in the Federal Republic there is no unambiguous clarity about the concept of treason, since 1945 certain circles have attempted to systematically conflate the concepts of treason and high treason.

This is most clearly expressed by Günther Weisenborn, who blatantly simplifies things in his work "The Silent Resistance." For Weisenborn, anyone who was against the German Reich in World War II, even if they were actively on the sidelines of the Allies, is an admirable "resister"; even the communist spies, agents, radio operators and traitors of the "Red Chapel" who worked for the Red Army. In the case of Günther Weisenborn, however, one can understand this trouble: As is well known, he himself belonged to the staff of the traitorous First Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen, the most important man of the "Red Chapel".

In the interest of the high traitors of the German resistance, who rejected Adolf Hitler and National Socialism out of ideological or religious motives and fought them politically - and in the interest of historical truth as well as an honest reappraisal of our past - we must draw a very clear line between high treason and treason against the country. It is not acceptable that obvious traitors to the country, who have endangered the lives of German

soldiers and the

The German people's security was put at risk or even sacrificed, disguising themselves as "resistance fighters". Adolf Hitler acknowledged the right to domestic resistance, that is, treason, on page 104 of his book *Mein Kampf* when he wrote: "When, through the instrumentality of governmental power, a nation is being led toward ruin, the rebellion of every member of such a nation is not only a right but a duty."

Former German Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer spoke unequivocally about treason before 700 journalists and guests of the National Press Club in Washington on November 15, 1962. His verdict was broadcast verbatim from the lips of Adenauer by German television in the "Panorama" program at 7 p.m. on November 18, 1962. He declared, "Treason is a crime against one's own people."

Finally, in addition to these evaluations, there is the factual judgment of a man who knows the atmosphere of treason in the Second World War like hardly anyone else: retired General Judge Dr. Manfred Roeder, who both played a leading role in the investigations against Department 2 of the German Abwehr and who, as Chief Judge of the German Air Force, had to represent the prosecution against the "Red Chapel" before the Reichsgericht.

Dr. Manfred Roeder explained to me: "The majority of the employees of the "Red Chapel" were subversively active for Soviet military espionage within the AM apparatus long before the Third Reich. Even if [6]

some of the people had been temporarily put on hold by their Soviet clients, they were suddenly activated with the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. Some of them were even paid as professional spies. None of them had offered any serious resistance to National Socialism before the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union." In October 1963, the Higher Administrative Court of Berlin, under the case number OVG VI B 7.62, handed down a judgment that is extremely significant in clarifying the difference between treason and resistance. A 70-year-old pensioner, who had been held in a concentration camp from 1941 until his liberation by the Allies in 1945, had applied for recognition as a political persecutee of the Nazi system. The court ruled that the legal requirements for recognition were not met in the case of the plaintiff, despite years of concentration camp imprisonment. The plaintiff had worked as a confidant for the Polish intelligence service in 1928/29.

The Higher Administrative Court of Berlin stated in its verdict: "The betrayal of military secrets committed out of self-interest is not political resistance, but an offense worthy of punishment everywhere." With that, everything has been clarified in a thankful way regarding this partly planned propagated contemporary confusion of terms. But from clarification to publication is a very long way. Everywhere, the dissemination of this truth is confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties. In all institutes of public opinion-forming, the version is held on ironcladly that even a national treason, which had to be paid for with hundreds of thousands of guiltless victims, is a praiseworthy thing, if this treason was committed only in the time of the Second World War against Germany. Any attempt to set the record straight about these things, which are being twisted according to plan, is stifled almost with brute force. The burial of the truth requires many shovels. And they are at work everywhere: on television, on the radio, in the large licensed press, in the magazines and in those bodies and institutes which would have the task of working out an objective picture of our time.

Ever since the buzzword "stab in the back" came into being after the First World War and was mocked without measure, one has had to be careful in dealing with the problem of treason. It is too easy to fall under the suspicion of wanting to dig up old, "outdated" things and rehash them.

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An exact and very careful study of all sources accessible to me - publications, files as well as testimonies - let me come to a frightening conclusion: The stab in the back of the First World War pales before the gigantic betrayal that took place in our own ranks during the Second World War.

The Second World War, in which soldiers of all participating nations fought death-defyingly, the German armies made unprecedented sacrifices in the most grueling of all previous battles, and the civilian population had to suffer unspeakable things in the hell of the bombing raids, will therefore nevertheless not go down in history as the most heroic war to date.

Not only because, in the meantime, in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, completely new global dangers destroyed the illusion of a life of freedom and without fear, but because the prominent representatives of this gigantic struggle were not the heroes and the victims, but - the traitors.

Immediately after 1945, systematic attempts began everywhere to trivialize the betrayals that had been committed in so many places during the Second World War and had claimed such appallingly heavy victims. How far this goes could be gathered from the "Information für die Truppe" (Information for the troops), issue 1957/4, a publication issued by the subdivision Personnel and Internal Leadership of the German Armed Forces Command Staff. There it says word for word about the Abwehrroberst Hans Oster, who demonstrably had betrayed the attack dates of the Western Army to the Allies: "He did this in the right knowledge ..." or: "It is certain today that Oster's conduct remained without effect on the military fighting."

Consider this: a German officer reveals to the enemy, sometimes weeks in advance, sometimes hours in advance, the attack targets and the attack dates of the German army. The enemy general staffs alerted their troops many hours before the attacks took place and expected the German attack. Every recruit, indeed every civilian, understands what disastrous consequences, for example, only this information must have had for the attacking troops.

But not only the so-called bourgeois traitors are officially exonerated, but even the communist espionage organization, which was given the name "Red Chapel". The same commentary on the troops states: "However, there can be no question of a decisive effect on the outcome of the Eastern campaign. Nor can it be proven at all, [8]

that 200,000 German soldiers died as a result of the treachery of the "Red Chapel" . . ."

No less a person than Admiral Canaris, not only the German defense chief during the war, but also a key player in the German resistance, stated in 1943 as a witness before the Reich Military Court at Lietzensee, when asked what losses the German army had suffered as a result of the "Red Band": "Of course, it is difficult to give exact figures here. This is especially true with regard to material damage. According to the results and documents available to me so far, it can be assumed with certainty that the treachery of the "Red Chapel" claimed 220-280,000 victims."

In 1959, the Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst (Federal Center for Homeland Service) in Bonn distributed an eight-page illustrated pamphlet free of charge in a mass circulation, in which it eagerly endeavored to downplay and trivialize the treason against the country. As the purpose of this very transparent action, the Federal Center for Homeland Service stated that it was concerned with refuting "the fairy tale of the invincible front." The "legend of betrayal" had to be clarified.

This pamphlet stated, among other things;

About the "Red Chapel": "So, at most, one can speak of temporally and spatially limited consequences of acts of treason during World War II."

It continues in this style.

Dr. Peter Kleist wrote on February 14, 1959, about this attempt of the Federal Center for Homeland Service in the weekly magazine "Das Neue Reich":

"Anyone who even cursorily reads the reports of experts on the "Red Chapel", on the activities of the resistance in the Canaris office - that is, in the very heart of the German headquarters for counterintelligence and sabotage -, on the Sorge case and the Seydlitz case, on Oster and von Scheliha, Treskow or Boesselager and all the others, is seized with cold horror. It seems like a fairy tale that with this extent of treachery any offensive could succeed at all. For: so many undertakings, so much treachery, whether in Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, the Eastern campaign, the African campaign or the defense against the invasion. What tremendous strength must have been in this Germany, that it even got beyond its borders,

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let alone that it could penetrate - from the North Cape to the Sahara, from the Atlantic coast to the Volga and the Caucasus."

The publishing house "Das andere Deutschlands Hannover" published a brochure by a resistance fighter, Wolfgang Müller, entitled "Gegen eine neue Dolchstoßlüge". It, too, written by a certainly "unsuspicious" man, gives the reader the same devastating impression: That this war could be held out for even one day with so much "resistance" seems like a miracle."

The question remains open why in many places the attempt is made to trivialize or even deny the verifiable treason of the country during the Second World War.

There is only one answer to this: Because in no epoch of German history has so much been betrayed as in this Second World War!

The most shocking thing about it is the fact that this betrayal, which is spoken of here, is by no means the result of enemy espionage. German men and women, including high-ranking officers, betrayed their fatherland because of their opposition to the ruling National Socialist regime, regardless of the fact that this meant death and destruction for numerous German soldiers and ultimately also for the civilian population.

This betrayal has basically nothing to do with the enemy espionage, that the enemy espionage used the betrayal and the traitors is self-evident. The Allied espionage officers thus only fulfilled their duty against their fatherland, while these Germans betrayed their own.

Nor shall the betrayal of non-German allies, such as the circles around Marshal Pietro Badoglio (Italy), around the Reichsverweser and Admiral Nikolaus Horthy (Hungary), around King Michael (Romania) or those around the Minister of War Ivan Marinoff (Bulgaria) to their German allies be examined. In the shadow of the impending collapse, they hoped to gain advantages for their peoples by betraying them. That they were ultimately disappointed or even cruelly betrayed by their enemy partners is another matter. Here, only the betrayal committed by Germans against Germans is of interest.

If someone dares to broach this delicate subject, there is immediately a loud clamor all around: this is, they say, a clumsy attempt to bring a second stab-in-the-back legend into being. But can one speak of

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Legends speak where hard shattering facts prove what one tries in vain to deny?

The repeated effort to trivialize betrayal in principle and to minimize its consequences is not new. Time and again in history, friends or at least friends of the traitors have made this attempt. And grotesquely, not only they. Affected departments or superiors have often denied or covered up betrayals and even exonerated traitors in order to avoid responsibility and embarrassment in public.

Today, it is historically unquestionable that the traitors and the traitor groups had a strong, partly even decisive influence on the course of the fateful struggle from 1939 to 1945. In the following, this event will be reported factually and dispassionately.

The author

Preface to the 4th edition

In the seven years since the publication of the first edition of this documentation, I as the author have been continuously confirmed in essential representations by the course of events.

In mid-April 1965, Moscow Radio and some Moscow newspapers called on the German defectors, Sergeant and Airman Hans Herrmann of Breslau, Sergeant and Observer Hans Kratz of Frankfurt, Sniper Adolf Appel of Brunn, Radio Operator Wilhelm Schmidt of Regensburg, and Infantry Corporal Alfred Liskow of Bremen to report (see page 36). The intention was to thank and honor the deserters who had betrayed the German attack on Russia at the great victory celebration in Red Square 20 years after the end of the war. But the celebration had to take place without the German deserters. They perished in Soviet captivity, and not even the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army was able to determine where their bones were rotting.

The betrayals did not go well with the traitors. When Stalin was notified of Liskov's warning, he ordered Liskov, whom he considered a provocateur, to be shot immediately. Then, at dawn on June 22, 1941, Liskov was to be shot. The German attack alone saved him. Now Liskov was hurriedly flown to Moscow, his picture appeared in "Pravda", and he was used in communist propaganda. But then every trace of him was lost, just as of his [11]

Desertion comrades. Neither Liskow's mother in Bremen nor father Kratz in Frankfurt (Main) ever received information about the fate of their sons. Their inquiries to Moscow were not even answered.

On September 4, 1964, in a lengthy memorial article in "Pravda," the official organ of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Union finally acknowledged its master spy, Dr. Richard Sorge. "Many circumstances," "Pravda" elaborated, "have hitherto prevented the truth about the immortal exploits of the spy Sorge and his comrades from being published." The importance of the work of this Communist master spy was confirmed by "Pravda" with the eulogy: "His name will be a symbol of devotion to the great cause of the peace struggle, a

symbol of bravery and heroism for generations to come."

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Sorge was declared a "Hero of the Soviet Union" for his "outstanding services to the homeland, bravery and heroism," according to TASS on November 5, 1964.

In East Berlin, in November 1964, Communist State Security Minister Mielke awarded Max Christiansen-Klausen, the former Sorge radio operator (see page 38), and his wife Anna the "Gold Medal of Merit of the National People's Army" for their "courageous and self-sacrificing commitment in the anti-fascist struggle." In Moscow again, at the end of January 1965, President Mikoyan presented the widow and son of Branco Voukelich (see page 38) with the "Order of the Great Patriotic War, First Class," which had been awarded posthumously to Voukelich by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

This probably removes the last doubts about the disastrous effect of the betrayal of Dr. Richard Sorge and his associates on the German Eastern Front.

At the beginning of 1972, the Soviet agent leader of the "Red Three", Sandor Alexander Rado, broke his silence and published his memoirs in Hungarian under the title "Dora reports" in the Budapest Kossuth publishing house. In the book, of course from a communist point of view, all the important things about this dangerous spy group against Germany are confirmed. However, Comrade Rado is silent about the essential German information.

The Swiss Abwehr Major Hans Hausamann, who shielded the Soviet spy Rudolf Rößler, alias Lucie, in Switzerland and worked closely with him, also never wants to have learned the names of the German traitors. In 1963, Hausamann probably sold the copies of some

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25,000 treason reports supplied by his office to the Swiss High Command during the war as confidential files to the German military archives in Koblenz. He did not supply a key book from which the sources, i.e. the informants, would be visible. The material irrefutably proves the betrayal, but without any indication of the traitors.

Meanwhile, Hausamann's superior, Major Max Waibel, then head of the Intelligence Collection Unit I of the Swiss Intelligence and Security Service during World War II, took his own life due to the bankruptcy of a private bank in Lucerne, of which he had been president of the board. The book he had planned never appeared. If he had known the German Great Traitor, he took the secret with him to the grave.

In April/May 1972 German television made an attempt to trivialize the Red Army agent group "The Red Chapel" into a "Little Red Chapel". Just at the same time a grotesque went over the world stage. Leopold Trepper, alias Leiba Domb, alias Jean Gilbert, the "Grand Chef" of the "Red Chapel", who was arrested as a traitor by the Soviets after the war and sat in the notorious Moscow Lubyanka prison until Stalin's death, has been living in his homeland, in Poland, since 1957. There the former Soviet chief agent worked for some time as chairman of the Jewish cultural association in Warsaw. For years Trepper now tries to emigrate to Israel, where some of his children are. The Soviet Poles did not grant the now seriously ill "Grand Chef" permission to leave the country. In vain, his son Eduard Trepper in Jerusalem and his son Michael Brojde in Copenhagen went on hunger strike to show solidarity with the fate of the old Soviet spy. So far in vain. Moscow still considers the "Grand Chef" a security risk.

While in the East the treason against Germany and its traitors and agents is still very carefully shielded today, in Germany the attempt to trivialize the gigantic betrayal in the Second World War continues. Unaffected by all the facts that have now already become historical, the historian Alfred Schickel wrote in the "Rheinischer Merkur" on July 9, 1971: "The war events as a whole, however, were hardly influenced by it [by the betrayal] to any appreciable extent, certainly not the outcome of the war."

Exactly the opposite is the case! In view of the - now long since historically proven - betrayal, one has to wonder that the German soldier and his leadership nevertheless managed to hold their own against an overpowering world for six years before they were defeated in the end.

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The case of Colonel Oster

The role of the Dutch military attaché Sas - attack dates in the

West betrayed - The fateful 400 dollars - Bernd Gisevius
began 2u chat - The betrayal never became known

Hans Oster was the influential head of Department Z (Zentrale) in the German Abwehr. The motives that moved him were political. Oster was neither deviously inclined nor venal. The Fritsch crisis had made him a bitter opponent of National Socialism, and out of this hostility to Adolf Hitler and especially to the SS, he defied all conventional notions of soldiering and the concept of officer honor. This enmity was so strong that he sacrificed to it everything that is sacred to a soldier: the oath, the security of the Reich and that of his comrades.

His personal friend and co-conspirator Fabrian von Schlabrendorff openly confessed in the first edition of his book *Officers Against Hitler*, published Zurich 1946:

"To prevent this success of Hitler at all costs and by all means, even at the cost of a severe defeat of the Third Reich, was our most urgent task."

Von Schlabrendorff himself was not petty in his choice of means. In the work already cited, he reports unreservedly on part of his own activity:

"I myself went to England shortly before the outbreak of war. There I sought out Lord Lloyd, to whom I had access thanks to a new connection spun by our group. I was able to inform him that the outbreak of war was imminent and was to be initiated by an attack on Poland, whatever mediation proposals might be made. Furthermore, I was able to tell him that the British efforts for Russia would be thwarted because the conclusion of a treaty between Hitler and Stalin was imminent. Hitler wanted to keep his back free by means of this treaty.

Lord Lloyd asked me to authorize him to pass on both communications to Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary at the time. I had no reservations. At the same time, I had a meeting of similar content with Winston Churchill. It took place at Churchill's country residence. When I introduced my remarks with the sentence, "I am not a Nazi, but I am a good patriot," Churchill smiled across his broad face and said, "So am I."

"Worldview antagonisms, like religious enmities, are fought out with a fanaticism that often crosses the line that lies quite clearly between treason and treason against the country. Margret Boveri, in her interesting work *"Treason in the XXth Century"*, endeavors to

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shed light on this dark chapter of our times in a paragraph she calls "The Betrayal as an Everyday Concept of Our Lives." She writes:

"The bearer of betrayal used to be an individual. Today the individual is not eliminated, but next to him, against him, behind him stands the group: fifth column, remote-controlled cell community or underground movement.

"This analysis is problematic. The objective of an ideologically opposing conviction never relieves an officer of his oath of allegiance as long as the oath-bearer is alive, and certainly not if the action harms the fatherland and endangers the lives of his comrades.

In addition, in the case of Oster, the small group of opponents of Hitler and his movement did not yet have a recognizable political program and an ideological principle did not exist at all in the time period in which his betrayal took place. There was only an emotional rejection. The spiritual basis on which Hans Oster stood was very thin in those days in which he became a traitor.

When he was arrested four years later in connection with July 20, he tried to define the mental situation of this small clique of professional officers to which he belonged by rank. In Annex I of the current report on the July 20 group of persons, which the Obergruppenführer and General of the Police, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, prepared as Chief of the Security Police, it is stated on August 25, 1944, under B. No. 57536/ 44g.Rs.(h):

Oster told the interrogators: "At the time, we became officers out of a still childlike passion for soldiering in the monarchy. It was inconceivable to us that this form of government could one day collapse. Politics did not exist for us. We wore the king's skirt, and that was enough for us. Reading the *"Berliner Tageblatt"* or the *"Frankfurter Zeitung"* in the casino was frowned upon ... The collapse of 1918, the transformation of the monarchy in the Wilhelmine era into a fragile party state, was like a blow to the head with a hammer.... Under the education in the 100,000-man army, we were raised in the decisive years of our development to be apolitical soldiers and

learned to obey the head of state of this state. . . . We were all convinced that, under the political conditions of the time, this was the only path that could lead to our goal, i.e., to a well-disciplined, capable force that would form the basis and prerequisite for a later further development of our country.

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.....The word "party" and "politicizing" had a bad ring to it. The word "party" and "politicizing" had a bad ring with us. The return to a strong national policy, the rearmament, the introduction of general conscription meant for the officer a return to earlier traditions." While the soldier had only dutifully fulfilled his duties during the system era, he had also embraced these points of National Socialist reconstruction with his heart.

In the years since 1933 and even today, Oster believes, there has been a complete lack of understanding in certain circles of the officer corps about National Socialism as a worldview that encompasses all of life. ... "We were not born into the political movement, we are not fanatical political fighters of a party for power in the state, we have not learned that. We did not march en masse to the Feldherrnhalle in November 1923, but instead I had to disband troop units, a Reichswehr brigade, which had defected to Kapp, with a heavy heart under the command of my general. ... "

Colonel Hans Oster, by virtue of his official position, already had contact with the numerous military attaches of the embassies accredited in Berlin. One of the most important tasks of a military attaché in a foreign country is to have bright "eyes and a watchful ear for the military institutions. He must have great skill for his task, and he must be favored by good fortune. For if the efforts to obtain information go awry, he is expelled from the country as "persona non grata."

Colonel Gijsbertus Jacobus Sas, who was serving as a military attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Berlin, was very lucky. He became so friendly with Colonel Hans Oster that the latter finally trusted him completely. Now Sas learned through Oster practically everything that was brought to his attention as head of Department Z of the Abwehr. Oster thus became the most important informant of the Dutch military attaché. The eerie thing about this macabre affair is that neither the High Command of the Wehrmacht nor the Reich Government ever learned of this gigantic betrayal.

Oster was executed in connection with the July 20 assassination attempt without his military treason being known to the judges or the Gestapo.

If it were not for the fact that Major General Sas, who was later to appear before a Dutch Commission of Inquiry held in The Hague on March 16, 1948, under the

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If de Beerenbrouck's chairman (assessors Algiers and Korthals) had himself testified about his relations with the then Colonel Oster and expressly confirmed Oster's treason, probably nothing would have become known about it until today. Thus, if the Dutch had not cleared up the Oster affair themselves, Germany would never have learned the shameful fact that an active German officer had betrayed the attack dates of his own army to the enemy.

According to the account of the Dutch General Sas, the then Colonel Oster had told the Dutch military attaché all the dates of planned German actions that he could learn. Since Oster was almost overzealous in his reports to Sas, it happened repeatedly that he revealed dates of plans that later did not take place at all.

On November 7, 1939, Oster excitedly informed the Dutch military attaché, "There will be an attack on November 12. Go to Holland immediately and warn your government!"

Sas, who was well aware of Oster's hatred of National Socialism and knew that he could trust his treasonous statements implicitly, immediately passed the message on to The Hague.

But at that time the planned military operations did not take place, mainly because of the bad weather that had occurred. This fact and the natural contempt of the soldiers for traitors led to the fact that especially the commander-in-chief of the Dutch land and sea forces, General Reynders, distrusted the whole Easter reports. This was all the more the case since the new Easter warning for November 24 was also not fulfilled. General Reynders expressed himself so brusquely about the German traitor that Colonel Sas, deeply offended, addressed a petition to Queen Wilhelmine asking to be relieved of his post in Berlin.

Before this request was decided, General Reynders was relieved of his post on February 9, 1940, and Sas remained in Berlin. The new commander-in-chief of the Dutch forces, General Winkelmann, however, had no better opinion of Colonel Oster than his predecessor. When Sas once again relayed messages from Oster to the general personally, the latter expressed contempt for the German colonel: "I actually think the newsman is a pathetic fellow."

The chief of the Dutch defense, Vice Admiral Furstner, did not believe in the authenticity of Oster's information at all. Furstner gruffly declared, "A German general staff officer does not commit treason!"

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On April 3, 1940, shortly before 5 p.m., Oster urgently requested a visit from Colonel Sas. Sas immediately drove to his Berlin apartment. There Oster informed him that the German Wehrmacht was planning an invasion against Norway and Denmark. Preparations were underway under the camouflage designation "Weser Exercise." In all probability it would start on April 9.

Sas, who left Oster immediately, could not reach his ambassador and therefore could not use the numerical code, which was reserved exclusively for the ambassador. Sas therefore called Captain Kruls in The Hague, with whom he had arranged a private code with a time shift. Invasion meant dinner, the appointed time: one month earlier than the specified date. So Sas said, "I'm coming to Holland in a little while, and then I'd like to have dinner with you. And it will be on May 9."

Thus, Sas had informed The Hague that on April 9 there was great danger from the possibility of an invasion.

At the same time, he warned the Danish naval attaché Kjolsen and the Norwegian legation councilor Stang. The Danish envoy, Chamberlain Herluf Zahle, immediately passed the message on to Copenhagen, and the Danish government immediately informed the British government. Soldiers' leave was blocked at lightning speed, leave was recalled and units were hastily brought into combat readiness. The advantage of surprise was lost to the German troops in both Norway and Denmark. If their operations nevertheless succeeded, they owed it in Narvik to the soldiers' luck, which allowed the German ships to land before the British, and generally to their boldness, bravery and willingness to make sacrifices.

A few weeks later, Oster informed Sas again that the invasion against Holland had been prepared. While Sas was still considering whether to pass on the message immediately, in view of General Winkelmann's negative attitude toward the traitor, the Dutch Foreign Ministry dispatched from The Hague. In a codetelegram, it informed that the Vatican had warned the Dutch government of an imminent German attack. Oster had also conveyed the news of the impending invasion to the Vatican through his Munich agents.

In the evening hours of May 9, 1940, Oster and Sas had dinner together. Oster told Sas that if no counter-order came by 9:30 p.m., Holland would also be attacked in the west the next day.

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Sas was feverish with excitement. After 9:30 p.m., he accompanied Colonel Oster to the OKW.

Oster told the Dutchman to wait outside in the dark. He went to the high command of the Wehrmacht. Already after 29 minutes he returned excitedly and informed Sas that the attack had not been stopped.

Sas now hastily said goodbye, raced to his embassy and first informed his Belgian colleague. Meanwhile, it had become 10:20 p.m. when he finally reached the War Ministry in The Hague. Lieutenant Post Uitweer was on telephone duty.

"Post, you know my voice, don't you? I am Sas in Berlin. I can tell you only one thing: tomorrow morning at dawn ears stiff. You do understand me, don't you? Do you want to repeat it just now?"

The sea lieutenant did it. Only then did Sas hang up. He knew very well that this conversation had certainly been intercepted by the German services. And he had not been mistaken.

Around midnight, Sas was called by the head of the "News Abroad" department in the Dutch War Ministry, Colonel van de Plassche: "I have such bad news from you about an operation on your wife. How sorry I am! Have you also consulted all the doctors?"

Colonel Sas, who had long since been sitting on pins and needles, became furious: "Yes, I don't understand why you are still bothering me under these circumstances. I have spoken to everyone. Tomorrow morning at dawn it

will take place." Then he hung up.
The Dutch army, however, alerted its units.

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These indisputable facts are also explicitly confirmed by the European representative of the American intelligence service, OSS (Office of Strategy Service), Allen Weish Dulles, in his report "Germany's Underground" (published in German under the title "Verschwörung in Deutschland").

The U.S. intelligence chief writes:

"What Gisevius and Schlabrendorff were later able to describe to me about these efforts was confirmed in full detail by Colonel G. J. Sas, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin at the time.

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Colonel Sas knew General Oster well and had his full confidence. The two spent November 6 together, and Oster informed Sas that the invasion would take place on November 12. Sas went to The Hague to deliver this news in person."

And:

"In January, Colonel Sas was again warned by Oster. He passed the warning on to his government. But the fact that the predicted invasion did not really take place either in November or in January gave occasion to weaken the effect of his timely warning a few months later."

Further:

"Again, Colonel Sas was warned by Oster. The two met frequently, which was easier than one might suppose. For such purposes, the blackout was a pure blessing, as I experienced myself in Switzerland. The Dutch military attaché usually visited General Oster in the dark at his home in a remote suburb of Berlin. Ten days before April 9, 1940, the date of the attack on Norway and Denmark, Oster gave Sas some of the details of the invasion plan. Colonel Sas told me that he relayed this communication to the Danish naval attaché that same night. But the Danes simply would not believe it. There was little or nothing they could do to beat back the invasion anyway. The Germans, however, Colonel Sas recounted, learned that the Danes had been warned and launched a thorough investigation. Fortunately, neither Sas nor Oster was found out. For some unknown reason, suspicion fell on the Belgian embassy."

Finally:

"Colonel Sas told me. Oster had informed him on May 3 that the attack was scheduled for May 10. On May 4, Sas received a request from his government asking him to confirm a warning that the Dutch representative at the Vatican had received.

On the Sunday before the attack, the wife of a German police officer called Sas to tell him that her husband intended to travel to Holland in a few days. Sas reported to his government that, as far as he could learn, the attack was scheduled for Friday. The Dutch suspicions were confirmed when it became known that the same officials who had played a dubious role immediately before the invasion of Poland were seeking entry visas to Holland.

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On Thursday, May 9, there was a tense atmosphere in Berlin's government district. Sas and Oster met for the last time in their lives. Oster confirmed once again that the order to invade the West had been given. They ate together. "It was like a funeral meal," Sas recounted.

After dinner, Oster went to the War Office in Bendlerstrasse to see if anything had changed. But nothing new had come in. "The pig (Oster's usual term for his Führer) has gone to the Western Front said Oster. "I hope to see you after the war. " But that was not to be. Oster was unstoppable in his desire to destroy Hitler, Sas told me, and he probably suspected that he would be killed in the process. Like his boss, Canaris, he was a fatalist and, like Canaris, was executed by the Nazis. Colonel Sas remembered Oster telling his family, "Children, children, what a sunny youth you have had. What more can you expect from life?"

Leaving Oster, Sas went to warn his own minister and the Belgian military attaché. To his great astonishment, he managed to reach The Hague by telephone and reported in cipher: "Tomorrow, at dawn, hold almost!""

Finally, the verdict of the most prominent biographer of the German resistance, who himself had been arrested in connection with July 20, should be cited: Gerhard Ritter. In his work "Carl Goerdeler and the German Resistance" he writes, among other things:

"General Oster used his old intimate friendship with the Dutch military attaché, Colonel J. G. Sas (he already knew him from his Münster service and met with him almost regularly in Berlin- Zehlendorf), not only to let general warnings of Hitler's intentions to attack reach Holland through him (they were flocking there from all sides anyway), but also to inform him of the exact dates of the attack, and had been doing so since November 6. By the same means, news of the imminent invasion of Scandinavia had reached the Nordic capitals as early as April 4, and late in the evening of May 9, Sas was able to report to his government by telephone (in transparent camouflage) that the storm would break at dawn the next day. One may assume that an indirect warning from Rome, which reached The Hague in early May (but without an exact date), was also ultimately based on the same source (allegedly via Dr. Josef Müller), and that Oster even later kept his hand in the [23]

game when a similar prediction arrived in Belgrade (April 1941).

In all these cases it is quite obviously a betrayal of military secrets to the national enemy, committed in full awareness of their formal illegality as treason - not a mere game of military defense and seduction of the enemy, as some have tried to gloss over it; for what good would such a game have done?"

Elsewhere, Gerhard Ritter, on behalf of the resistance, distances himself very clearly from Oster's treason:

"That Oster did not want to harm but to benefit his Germany needs no discussion. But did he not knowingly harm the German Wehrmacht by putting it in considerably increased danger? Did not the next duty, that against one's own people, one's own comrades, precede that against foreign nations? That it must not be violated, under any circumstances, was indeed the unanimous conviction of most resistance fighters outside the communist groups. That is why they never wanted to know anything about sabotage of weapons and gave their best for the success of the German Wehrmacht - although they knew that every victory on the battlefields and in the air meant a new strengthening of the authority and power of the tyrant. Oster's deed met with the strongest condemnation from many of them when they heard of it."

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The extent to which Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the German Abwehr and Oster's immediate superior, had prior knowledge of Oster's betrayal of Colonel Sas and approved of it was not clarified even in the later court proceedings against Canaris, because Oster's betrayal was unknown to the authorities at the time.

Even K. H. Abshagen, Canaris' biographer, is ambiguous about this when he writes:

"In the long run, no member of the Abwehr could fail to notice that Canaris was hostile to the National Socialist system. To this end, he occasionally gave free rein to his bitterness in the column and also in other conversations. Most of them also knew that Oster's activity, at least in the sense of the Third Reich, meant high treason."

Elsewhere, K. H. Abshagen tries to explain Admiral Canaris, whose image is

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swayed in history to defend himself against accusations of treason by writing:

"It was necessary to go into some detail on the instances of presumed or proven warnings to the war opponents cited here, because they are instructive for the knowledge of Canaris' character and methods. First of all, they confirm what is emphatically emphasized by all reliable witnesses in his immediate vicinity, namely, that Canaris personally never assisted in the transmission of military secrets to the opposing side. If such possibilities were even hypothetically mentioned in familiar circles, he clearly waved them off with the remark: "That would be treason."

One can see that among the representatives of the German resistance there is a sure sense of the moral difference between treason and high treason. A sense that the reappraisers of our past visibly lack.

How shamelessly the men of the German resistance were rushed forward and to their doom by the psychological warfare of the Allies with deceptive news and lie reports is confirmed, by the way, with unsurpassable cynicism by Denis Sefton Delmer in his book "The Germans and I":

"When I spoke to Otto John in September 1944, the only survivor of the General Conspiracy who had managed to escape abroad, I learned from him that the conspirators had indeed heard our broadcasts and had interpreted them in exactly the sense I had hoped. I am sorry that the generals had to forfeit their lives on Hitler's meat hook. But I could not say that I felt any remorse because I had awakened false hopes in them. For these men and their kind had been the first patrons and promoters of Hitler's movement. They were the beneficiaries of his Third Reich. And they rose up against him only when it became clear that his war of conquest was doomed to failure." Because hatred against Hitler prevailed within the Abwehr, Germany's highest military espionage center, Hans Oster's betrayal of 1940 also remained undiscovered. The two officers of the wiretap office in the Abwehr, Bürkner and Pieckenbrock, immediately combined on the basis of the wiretap results that it could not have been anyone else but Oster who leaked the information to Sas. But they remained silent.

Even when an officer of Division III of the Abwehr spoke out of the mouth of a

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diplomats in a private company heard insinuations that Oster was the man who had warned Sas, this report was also shelved. At least here, Canaris had decided to cover for Oster by hook or by crook.

When Reinhard Heydrich learned from two radio messages from the Belgian envoy to the Vatican to his government in Brussels, which were intercepted, that the beginning of the Western offensive had been betrayed beforehand, he immediately reported this to Adolf Hitler. The latter became over-excited and gave orders to bring out the source of the betrayal at all costs. Hitler, who was completely unaware of the interaction of part of the Abwehr with the enemy, gave this order not only to Heydrich, but also to Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.

Canaris immediately intervened and unconditionally covered for Colonel Oster. Walter Schellenberg, who was commissioned by Heydrich to investigate, reported on this in his memoirs as follows:

"The following day I met with the admiral. We first talked about all sorts of incidental things, then Canaris took up the delicate subject on his own initiative: "Did Heydrich actually tell you about the great thing - I mean about the betrayal of the Western Offensive?" I replied that I would appreciate it if we talked about it sometime. And now Canaris, without saying a word about Rome, the Belgian envoy or the radio transmissions, gave me the following version:

A social event had taken place at the von Steengrachts' on the evening before the offensive against the West. That evening, the wife of the Dutch envoy, who was also present, was suddenly called to the telephone and then left the party in a state of great agitation. After the capture of Brussels, during a search of the apartments of members of the Belgian Foreign Office, a note was found showing that the Dutch envoy in Berlin had telephoned the night before the start of the offensive against the West to announce that the offensive would begin the following day. On the basis of these documents, it was clear to him, Canaris, that the circle around Steengracht was highly suspicious, and he suggested that we proceed together in this direction.

I assured him of such cooperation, and there really was an extensive process in "matters of Steengracht and Genossens" with the expected result that nothing came of it. On the other line in the direction of Rome, for which we had some clues in any case, we were unable to find any solid evidence either.

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to obtain documents. Canaris had assigned the head of his counterintelligence department, Colonel Rohleder, to conduct the relevant investigations. After the admiral's arrest in 1944, the colonel was also questioned about the betrayal of the Western Offensive.

Rohleder stated that he had submitted extensive investigative material to Canaris at the time (of which only his closest confidants, General Oster and von Dohnanyi, had been aware). What Rohleder had brought out was this: The trail of the message received in Brussels on the eve of the Western Offensive led not to Berlin but to Rome. And here it had been a journalist named Stern who, as a Catholic convert, had been in close intelligence contact with the first lieutenant of the Abwehrstelle in Munich, Joseph Müller. Stern had stated at the time that Müller had been the informant at the beginning of the attack. Müller, however, had been heard by Canaris "secretly and directly on the matter, and had claimed in his counter-statements that this was a matter of malicious slander; triggered not least by jealousy, because he maintained particularly good connections with the Jesuit priest Dr. Leiber.

However, Rohleder had emphasized to Canaris that he was not convinced by Müller's counterarguments and that he considered him extremely suspicious. As a result, Canaris imposed on him a duty of confidentiality in the entire matter.

The journalist Stern was forbidden by the admiral from any further activity and was given a large sum of foreign currency. He was then deported from Rome to Sweden under a different name. During the interrogations in 1944, Rohleder also stated that, in his opinion, Müller could not have acted on his own authority - none other than Canaris could have been Joseph Müller's client."

Admiral Canaris had thus cleverly misdirected the investigations. The so badly denounced family of Gustav Adolf Baron Steengracht von Moyland, the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, had not the least to do with the whole affair. But this led the trail away from Hans Oster and, moreover, succeeded in fully covering the Munich group at the Vatican.

Again it is Fabian von Schlabrendorff who sheds light on the background of this inexplicable action of the head of the German Abwehr. He writes:

"That he [Oster] had been able to take on this role was to the credit of his superior, Admiral Canaris. Canaris hated Hitler and the

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National Socialism, but he felt too old to act himself anymore. Instead, he held the protective shield over Oster and allowed the apparatus of military intelligence, insofar as it was under Oster's control, to be used to maintain and strengthen the organization of the German opposition to Hitler and to supply it with new forces."

Oster remained at his post for a full three more years, eventually being promoted to major general and doing everything he could from his position to sabotage the plans and operations of the high command. He eventually fell upon a ridiculousness. Over \$400 found in September 1942 in Pressburg with an agent named David. David claimed to be carrying out transactions on behalf of Major Schlögel of the Abwehr. This Major Schlögel immediately confessed to Customs Councillor Wappenhensch that he was doing business with watches, gold and pictures.

At the same time, he provided information about transactions by Captain Ickrath and an associate of the Abwehr, the Portuguese consul Dr. Schmidhuber from Munich, for the benefit of endangered Jews. This Dr. Schmidhuber had already been in contact with the Abwehr since 1940 and had also brought the lawyer Dr. Josef Müller from Munich, known as Ochsenhepp, to the Abwehr. The main connection of the two was their relationship with the Vatican.

Customs Councillor Wappenhensch filed a complaint, without having any idea of what this would mean.

Admiral Canaris raged when he learned of this.

In the meantime, Dr. Schmidhuber had taken the precaution of going to Merano and had taken up quarters with his wife in the Parkhotel. He had agreed with Dr. Müller that the latter would visit him and inform him about the further course of events.

Finally, on October 7, Dr. Müller appeared in South Tyrol and ordered Dr. Schmidhuber to Bolzano. He was very brief and said almost in an official tone: "I have to give you the official order from Lieutenant Colonel Ficht, Abwehr Munich, to return to Munich within 24 hours." Schmidhuber laughed at him and could not be persuaded to return even in further conversation. Finally, he said sarcastically, "I will return to Munich only as an English high-commissioner."

Furthermore, when he declared that he would go to England via Lisbon, Dr. Müller shouted in an unrestrained manner: "You have lost your life when we get to the

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rudder, forfeited and would be treated by us as deserters and traitors to their country just as they were by the Nazis."

Schmidhuber did not know what to say to Müller, whom he no longer recognized. He had no knowledge of the fact that a detailed conference on Schmidhuber's foreign exchange offense had taken place in Berlin at the Abwehr headquarters on Tirpitzufer, attended by Canaris, Oster, and the staff members Gisevius, Dohnanyi, Bonhoeffer, and, for a time, Dr. Müller. It became clear that Dr. Schmidhuber could not be covered, and although Bonhoeffer and Dohnanyi spoke out against it, they agreed to drop him. This, of course, had to mean

death for Dr. Schmidhuber.

After Schmidhuber could not be persuaded by Dr. Müller to return voluntarily, he was arrested by the Italian police and transferred to the Questura in Bolzano on November 2, 1942.

From there he was taken to the Brenner Pass as a German deserter and handed over to the German authorities. Dr. Schmidhuber's life was no longer worth a penny. He knew what they wanted: to have him liquidated as a deserter by a court-martial without any fuss.

The military judge to whom he was brought before in Munich suddenly interrupted the routine interrogation and said sharply: "Dr. Müller stated during his interrogation before the Air Force Court that you had told him at a meeting in Bolzano when he ordered you to come to Germany: 'I will only come to Germany as an English High Commissioner. I am fleeing to England's " Schmidhuber turned pale. He now saw through the game completely.

The air force court in Munich handed Schmidhuber over to the Gestapo, which transferred him to Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse in Berlin. After interrogation there, he was transferred to the Wehrmacht prison in Tegel, where he met Bonhoeffer, who told him the background of the affair.

Now the Secret State Police handed over the investigation of the Schmidhuber case to the Wehrmacht, and the Reich Military Court appointed Dr. Manfred Roeder, Chief War Judge of the Luftwaffe, as examining magistrate. During the interrogation, Dr. Schmidhuber also referred to Vice Consul Bernd Gisevius. In order to verify Schmidhuber's statements, Dr. Roeder summoned Vice Consul Gisevius for questioning.

Karl Bartz described Gisevius' appearance with Dr. Roeder in his book "Die Tragödie der deutschen Abwehr".

The book was published in 1955, distributed in many thousands of copies, without Gisevius being^{je-}

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mals would have made the attempt to correct the representation. Dr. Karl Bartz wrote:

"Gisevius traveled from Switzerland to Berlin and auditioned with Dr. Roeder. He offered to dictate his statement into the minutes. Roeder had no reservations.

Then Gisevius dictated strange things that were incomprehensible to the investigator and were interpreted by him as slander. Thus Gisevius dictated that Canaris knew about plans to overthrow Hitler. They had been discussed in Rome and betrayed by Canaris to the Russians. He, Gisevius, had held talks in Switzerland with Schmidhuber and Ickrath, and there had been talk of Vatican negotiations. A Mr. X had started negotiations with the Vatican through a German Jesuit. These were then continued by a Dr. Franz Hartmann in Rome. (Dr. Hartmann actually rented a room in Rome in 1940 on behalf of the Abwehr with a monthly allowance of \$400. He was to take advantage of his connections with Father Leiber at the Vatican. It was suggested to him by the Abwehr that he settle in for a year's stay. Then he suddenly received the news that someone else - Dr. Josef Müller - would take over his work. Hartmann, who had meanwhile rented an apartment in Rome, complained about this and recalled that Canaris had committed him to Rome for a year. Canaris sent Captain Liedig, who was Hartmann's IM commanding officer at the time as group leader, to Rome to settle the matter. According to Roeder, Liedig presented Hartmann with a receipt for a large dollar sum. He was to sign the receipt and then he would receive the money. Hartmann did so, received 500 dollars, but never the rest).

Gisevius now dictated into the protocol that a German tank general, whose troops had been refreshed in the Elbing area in 1941/42, intended to advance with his troops against the Führer's headquarters and eliminate the Nazi leadership. Gisevius signed this protocol. Then he left."

Dr. Roeder thought the whole thing was gossip. But he now referred the Schmidhuber file to the Reich Military Court for submission. On April 4, 1942, the court demanded the arrest of Dohnanyi, his wife, and Bonhoeffer, as well as the securing of the evidence.

Again, the Abwehr was warned in time. Reich Criminal Director SS-Gruppenführer Lieutenant General of Police and Chief of Office V in the Reich Security Main Office, Arthur Nebe, who had long con-

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sent him a warning. Admiral Canaris had also got wind of the ongoing proceedings and urged Oster to make sure that nothing incriminating could be found in his office.

General Hans Oster, however, was so sure of his cause that he smiled about it.

On April 5, 1943, Colonel War Judge Dr. Manfred Roeder and Criminal Secretary Sonderegger of the Secret

State Police entered the Abwehr headquarters on Tirpitzufer. After checking in with Admiral Canaris, Dr. Roeder announced that he had been ordered to arrest Herr von Dohnanyi and secure evidence. Red-faced, Canaris accompanied the two to General Oster.

The latter eyed the two visitors through his monocle and briefly declared, "Dohnanyi hasn't done anything I don't know about."

The four of them now entered Dohnanyi's room, who was visibly startled as they searched the room. Admiral Canaris stood motionless at the door, while Oster remained by the window. Then Dr. Roeder laid seizure on a file which contained a "language regulation" for Bonhoeffer. This "language regulation" consisted throughout of messages that were to be sent abroad. Next to it lay an act containing the unauthorized uk position of seven confessional pastors by Oster.

Dr. Roeder declared the files, which he could only examine very superficially, confiscated. He turned further to the desk and checked one drawer after the other. Suddenly Oster, alerted by Dohnanyi's glances, recognized the "language regulation" protruding from the edge of the bundle of files. General Oster approached the small table on which the files lay with his back on which he had clasped his hands. While seemingly indifferently watching the searching Dr. Roeder, he gently pulled out the deadly "language regulation" and let it disappear under his jacket.

At that moment, Detective Secretary Sonderegger shouted loudly, "Stop!" In a flash, Dr. Roeder understood the situation. He jumped to his feet: "General, I demand that you deliver to me the note you have just taken out of the file cover!"

Oster, pale as death, first stared at Canaris, who was staring blankly ahead of him, and then began to deny it. Only when Dr. Roeder threatened an immediate physical examination did he hand over the incriminating "language regulation".

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Dr. Roeder had Dohnanyi open the armored cabinet, in which they also found documents about a circle of officers from the OKW, circles of the confessional church and the economy, who were determined to depose the National Socialist regime. The document was signed off with a 0 on 17.3. 1943. Dohnanyi, his wife and Bonhoeffer were arrested. The investigators were of the opinion that the big 0 was called Oster. However, this was not the case at all. It was the secret sign of Generaloberst Beck and signified his agreement.

Dr. Roeder was now close to uncovering the conspiratorial group. But that was when Canaris pulled out all the stops. On July 23, 1943, Dr. Roeder received an order from Keitel himself prohibiting him from further investigation against the Abwehr from the standpoint of treason and high treason. Although charges were brought before the Reich Military Court against Oster, who was relieved of his duties but remained at liberty, Dohnanyi, Schmidhuber, and Ickrath, they were only for subversion of the Wehrmacht through unauthorized uk positions, false official travel, and official travel accounting, and against the last two for foreign currency offenses.

On August 25, 1943, Dr. Roeder was promoted to judge general of an air fleet and shortly thereafter transferred to the Balkans. The trial was put on the back burner by the intervention of Chief Judge Sack, who was also a member of the conspirators' circle. Only the events of July 20 were to bring this case before the merciless judges as well. In the course of the investigations into the July 20 conspiracy, General Oster was also arrested. He ended up on the gallows.

Neither the judges nor the executioners had any idea of the extent of his military treachery.

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It would be completely wrong to assume that only Oster had provided information about imminent military actions to the Western powers. On August 18, 1938, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, a Pomeranian landowner, informed Vansittart and Churchill in London of the Reich government's intentions on the Sudeten question. Naturally, his information was immediately passed on to Lord Halifax and Premier Chamberlain. Once when Carl Goerdeler made a report to Lord Vansittart, the latter interrupted Goerdeler and said coolly, "Such speeches are Ja Landesverrat."

General Franz Halder, as Chief of the German General Staff, sent a man of confidence to London and had the English government called upon,
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to oppose Hitler's demands for the liberation of the Sudeten Germans.

The most important information was brought to London by the brothers Erich and Theo Kordt, Lord Vansittart, and thus the documents about the incipient German-Russian talks were passed on to England. On July 7, 1939, Count von Schwerin, an employee of the German War Ministry, suggested in London that the British should demonstratively move their air fleet to France, accept Churchill into the Cabinet, and deploy their fleet in the Baltic Sea.

The intensity with which treason was committed is documented in Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster's memoirs "Erlebte Weltgeschichte 1869 bis 1953," in which he virtually boasts:

"At the end of June 1939 I received from a high German officer who was on my side and who was traveling to Italy on a military mission, the entire plan of the German attack on Poland, Holland and Belgium, a plan which described all the details of the preparations down to the stand-by camps in Krefeld, etc. I also received the speech of General Halder which he had given a few days before the attack. I also received the speech of General Halder, which he had delivered a few weeks before the attack before an elite of Reichswehr officers, and wherein he had quite precisely and definitely set apart the impending attack on Poland. This speech was filled with such disregard for the Polish army and its reserves that I doubted for a moment its authenticity. But yes all the events of the German attack on Poland showed quite unmistakably that the Prussian general had correctly estimated the Polish opponents of the time. I immediately transmitted the plan to the English government by the safest possible means. Lord Vansittart acknowledged its receipt and expressed his conviction that the plan was absolutely authentic. The English Government thus had six weeks in which to prepare for the event and to present itself with the great question of destiny: whether or not the attack on Poland was a cause of war for England and France. In the meantime, the Foreign Office sent my report to the Polish General Staff."

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Group "Millet" in Tokyo

Dr. Richard Sorge, German Confidant - Eastern Campaign Betrayed Four Weeks
- Japan's Momentous Decision Not to Attack
Reported to Moscow - Execution Without Witnesses

The outbreak of the German-Soviet struggle for destiny abruptly activated the old ideological antagonisms between National Socialism and Communism. Within Germany, Communism was practically eradicated as a result of the rigorous police measures. The few illegal cells of the KPD that still vegetated underground were unable to become politically effective. They had lost not only all organizational but also ideological influence on the German working masses. Thus they could not even be effective in the broad field of sabotage, and all that remained for them was espionage for the Soviet Union.

Already in the night of June 20, 1941, the communist worker Alfred Liskow from Kolberg, who was an infantryman in the large supply, deserted in the area of Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South. Liskow swam across the Pruth River and enlisted in the Red Army. He revealed to the political commissar that the Germans would attack in the next few days. Liskow was immediately taken to Moscow.

But this comrade Alfred Liskow was only a small fish who could not influence the course of events and for the time being disappeared without a trace in one of the many camps like all his desertion comrades who also defected to the Red Army. Just like Liskow, Private Hans Zippel, who had formerly been in the Communist Youth League, had deserted from Staff III. IR 178 and had warned the Red Army. Other defectors were the Frankfurt shoemaker Max Emendörfer, a soldier with IR 2 in the 11th ID, and Corporal Gold. They were followed by Sergeant Hans Hermann from Breslau, who flew his Ju 88 and the crew Hans Kratz from Frankfurt/Main, Wilhelm Schmidt from Regensburg and Appel from Brunn to the Soviets and landed behind their lines.

Basically, these deserters were hardly able to reveal anything worth knowing to the politruks of the Red Army beyond the scope of their local units. Their statements were of course carefully evaluated by the Red Ic, but then it was over and off to the camp.

It was something completely different with Dr. Richard Sorge. This traitor caused immeasurable damage to the German Eastern Front and most probably decided the battle on the Eastern Front for Bolshevism. The story of this most fateful traitor of the Second World War sounds like a bad agent novel.

Richard Sorge was born in Baku before the turn of the century, the only son of a German oil engineer and a Russian mother,
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grew up in Germany, however, and volunteered for the front in 1914. He was wounded three times in the West and in the East and still was not promoted to officer. Sorge felt unfairly set back, and this feeling brought a rupture to his whole life. He began to hate the officers and the monarchy with a passion.

In 1918 he became closer to the communists, broke with his family, which was loyal to the emperor, and in 1923 already took an active part in the bloody communist coup in Hamburg. Nevertheless, he completed his studies, married in Frankfurt am Main and came more and more under communist influence. In 1924, Dr. Richard Sorge was already in Moscow as a calibrated Communist and was even entered in the list of the Soviet Russian CP there because of his merits. His Frankfurt apartment had long since become a safe house for illegal agents from the USSR.

In 1931 he left Germany for good. He emigrated first to San Francisco, and from there to Tokyo in 1933, where he settled as a correspondent for various papers, including the "Frankfurter Zeitung" and the official DNB (Deutsches Nachrichten-Büro). Soon Sorge was considered a "great guy" in Tokyo's German colony, whose drinking binges became just as famous as his affairs with women and his insane motor racing.

He soon became very friendly with the German Embassy's weapons attaché, Eugen Ott. Ott had been pushed to this post in Tokyo by the Foreign Office because he had been convicted in Berlin of anti-government

He had gotten into trouble with the Gestapo because of his statements. In front of him, Sorge did not need to make a murderer's pit out of his heart. The friendship remained even when Ott finally became ambassador.

Margret Boveri states very matter-of-factly the conditions that prevailed in most German foreign missions during the Third Reich, writing: "Very few members of the Foreign Office and probably hardly a third of the foreign correspondents were National Socialists. Whether someone was a party member or not played a relatively minor role in the distinction and was more a sign of the courage or skill with which the individual had been able to resist the strong pressure to join the party. Among themselves, not only in the closest circle, people spoke openly - at most, the newcomer was made aware of the people - whether state group leader or member of the SD - one had to be careful of." Only in this way was it possible that this police-known communist Sorge,

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who had already been suspected by the Weimar State Police of spying for Moscow in Scandinavia, was given the editorship of the "Deutscher Dienst," the official German information correspondence for Japan, at the outbreak of war in 1939.

From that moment on, Dr. Richard Sorge was the most diligent employee of the German Embassy in Tokyo. Every day he could be seen at the Embassy as early as 5:30 a.m., carefully reading all radio messages and other information from Berlin. He then compiled the "German Service" and used to have breakfast with Ambassador Ott, discuss the latest news and thus knew all the important messages that arrived at the Embassy. He had free access to all rooms of the German Embassy, and there was no secret of the German Embassy in Tokyo before him.

No one suspected that Dr. Richard Sorge had quietly set up an intelligence group in Tokyo that radioed all the material it received to the Red Army's Fourth Bureau. The group went by the code name "Millet." Sorge's treasurer, a German radio operator named Klausen who had been trained in Russia, was based with his apparatus on a small sailing yacht that kept changing location.

Besides the German Ambassador Ott, Sorge's main sources were the HAVAS representative Branco Voukelitsch and the Japanese Ozaki Hozumi and Miyagi Yotoku. Both were conscious communists who cleverly disguised themselves. Ozaki was a kind of secretary and confidant of the Japanese head of government and Prince Konoye.

Miyagi got his news from the secretary of General Ugaki, who was Konoye's foreign minister, and provided material about the Japanese army.

In this way, Sorge received all the information that the German Foreign Office passed on to its important embassy in Japan, as well as that received by the Japanese government.

Already after May 20, 1941, Sorge had Klausen radio Moscow that a German attack was imminent. Sorge sent his fateful message to Moscow on October 15, 1941. He had learned that the Japanese government was not prepared to comply with German wishes to move against the Soviet Union from Manchuria. The Japanese had decided to advance southward, to attack the Malay countries of Singapore and Burma. Thus, there was no longer any serious threat from the Japanese Kwantung Army against Siberia.

The former American military attaché in Moscow, General John Deane, a close expert on the situation at the time, writes in his

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private memoir that in Manchuria at the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, the Japanese Kwantung Army, which had a total strength of about one million men, had 18 divisions. The Japanese, writes General Deane, were far superior to the Soviets at that time.

In his memoirs, published under the title "The strange alliance," he states:

"The war gods must have been on the side of the Western Allies when, in the days of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad, Japan refused to violate the neutrality pact and did not attack Russia in the Far East. The Red Army had seriously weakened its Siberian forces for the battle before Stalingrad and had left the eastern provinces dangling like ripe plums before the Japanese. If Japan had attacked Russia at that time, the supply route from America across the Pacific, carrying more than half of our supplies to the Soviet Union, would have been eliminated. Germany could then have let Africa and all other things go and concentrated on driving the Red Army further east. Russia would then have been deprived of access to the northern ports and those on the Persian Gulf. Once such a situation had developed, the Soviet Union could no longer be an important factor in the war."

Up to the moment when Sorge's message reached the Kremlin, Stalin had not touched his Siberian reserves despite the crushing blows the Red Army had suffered at the hands of the Germans. He knew that if the Japanese invaded Siberia from Manchuria, the Soviet Union was in grave danger, if not lost. But now that he knew he no longer had to fear a two-front war, the Siberian rifle divisions, which were among the Red Army's elite divisions, were thrown in express transports from the Far East to the European theater of war. Only the training cadres remained in Siberia.

The rested and best-trained Red divisions arrived on the Russian Western Front at the very moment when the worn-out German soldiers were assailed by the bone-chilling winter of 1941. In biting cold, freezing and starving, they now had to withstand the mass onslaught of rested and well-fed Siberian rifle divisions with almost no reserves. The German attack came to a standstill.

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For the first time, conquered territories were lost again, and the German Eastern Army suffered losses from which it could not recover.

Stalin, however, had gained the necessary time thanks to the gigantic betrayal of Dr. Richard Sorge. The time until Franklin Delano Roosevelt came to his aid so energetically with his loan and lease system that the German Landser could no longer cope with this excess of men and material despite unprecedented bravery and sacrifice. They fell by the tens of thousands in the heavy defensive battles in the east of the winter of 1941, frozen to death in the merciless expanse of the frozen landscape, unaware that their fate had been Dr. Richard Sorge.

It was by no means the case that there were no German authorities who distrusted Sorge. The foreign organization of the NSDAP was the first to express distrust of Sorge. Mr. von Ritgen, the head of the German News Office (DNB), the official German press correspondence for which Dr. Sorge worked in Tokyo, therefore approached Walter Schellenberg, the head of the SD secret service, with concern.

Schellenberg reports on this in his memoirs:

"When I talked to v. Ritgen about possible cross connections of Sorge, he said: If he really should have connections to foreign secret services, then we should be able to find ways and means to protect ourselves accordingly, but at the same time to profit from Sorge's expertise. I finally promised v. Ritgen to protect Sorge

from attacks by the Party from now on, provided he agreed to work for us in addition to his journalistic activities. He was to supply the secret service from time to time with information about Japan, China and the Soviet Union; in doing so, I told v. Ritgen to think for himself about how he wanted to expand the news connection accordingly.

When I informed Heydrich of this, he approved my plan only on the condition that Sorge be monitored from now on. Heydrich was skeptical and reckoned that Sorge might supply us with misleading material; his information was therefore not to be run through the normal course of business, but subjected to special scrutiny. However, the whole case was also to be discussed again with Jahnke.

I must confess that I negligently delayed the immediate supervision of Sorge demanded by Heydrich."

Thus, because there was tension between Schellenberg and Heydrich, Schellenberg "negligently" delayed immediate surveillance of the Soviet master spy who was causing us immeasurable damage.

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Finally, Heydrich then dispatched the criminal director Meisinger to Tokyo, certainly hardly a suitable man to get on the trail of a concern. Schellenberg reports on this:

"Now that his secondment to Tokyo was a done deal, I had to instruct Meisinger to start monitoring Sorges and to report to me regularly by telephone. Instead of devoting himself to his actual task, however, he gave himself over to a comfortable life and suddenly played the role of a bourgeois. He did report regularly via "Post" - this was the code name we had agreed upon for Sorge - but I do not know that his reports to me were ever anything other than positive. Meisinger constantly emphasized the good reputation that Sorge enjoyed both with the German Embassy in Tokyo and with the Japanese services. I would like to mention, however, that some of his telephone conversations also reached Müller, who spoke to his compatriot in an Upper Bavarian dialect that hardly anyone understood.

On the basis of these reports, I was initially reassured, especially since the information material Sorges had sent me seemed useful and did not arouse the suspicion of gaming material.

I received my first shock in the spring of 1941, when a Japanese police delegation was staying in Berlin. During the numerous meetings, the head of this delegation suddenly asked me whether Meisinger had certain secret surveillance assignments concerning German nationals in Japan. I denied this. In the course of the conversation, the Japanese man once again casually remarked that he thought it wiser for Meisinger to cooperate in such a case with the Japanese services, which would be available to him at any time with their experience. From these remarks it became clear to me that Meisinger had approached his assignment extremely clumsily and had aroused the distrust of the Japanese.

At that time, Sorge had just sent us an assessment of the situation, according to which he described Japan's accession to the Three-Power Pact as a mere political manipulation that had no real military significance for Germany. (After the beginning of the Russian campaign, he also pointed out that Japan would adhere to its non-aggression pact with Russia under all circumstances; the war in China was placing the highest demands on Japan's armaments potential, and the navy in particular was urgently demanding the safeguarding of the South Pacific area. He deduced this from the supply of oil and fuel to the Japanese army, which he then

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as sufficient for half a year. That the fleet and navy were hoarding larger supplies clearly indicated, in his opinion, a shift in the emphasis of active warfare. In 1942, it became apparent how accurate these reports were; however, they were no longer utilized, since Himmler, after Heydrich's death, no longer wanted to take responsibility for the source information to Hitler).

In my opinion, it is not unlikely that Meisinger, without knowing it, was the one who put the Japanese on the trail of this agent working against them in the first place."

Sorge, who had a sixth sense, sensed the danger coming his way. He therefore asked the Fourth Bureau of the Red Army for immediate recall from Tokyo.

It is very doubtful whether this important agent would have been withdrawn from Japan in Moscow, but the comrades of the Fourth Bureau did not even get to decide about it. Radio operator Klausen thought this saying was nervousness on the part of his boss and had not even taken it off.

The next day, October 18, 1941, both were arrested. The Japanese, whose radio interceptors had already

monitored Sorge's secret transmitter for months without being able to decipher the sayings, which consisted of over 30,000 ciphered word groups, interrogated them thoroughly. Sorge made a full confession, and he was hanged in Sugano Prison on November 7, 1943. He was buried in Zoshigaya Cemetery; later his remains were transferred to Tama Cemetery.

In terms of capital, this war-deciding activity of the "Millet" group had cost Moscow only \$40,000 from 1936 to October 1941.

The files of the Dr. Richard Sorge case fell into the hands of General MacArthur's troops. The American defense chief Charles A. Willoughby published these documents in part in his book "Shanghai Conspiracy the Sorge Spying", which appeared in New York in 1952.

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Company "Pastorius"

German sabotage action under bad star - With George John Daschreiste
the death - Six were executed - The Judas but returned home

In the U.S., German counterintelligence was continually dogged by misfortune. In 1938, the leader of the decisive organization of German-Americans in the USA, "Der Bund" - it had over 40,000 members - Dr. Ignaz Griebel, was accused of espionage by the FBI and indicted by American courts. He was able to escape to Germany just in the nick of time. As a result, the German Abwehr also lost its reservoir of people in the United States. News flowed very sparsely. After England's declaration of war and the open support President Roosevelt gave the British, however, it was essential to keep an eye on the English supply route from the United States to Great Britain.

The Abwehr therefore rejoiced when, in January 1940, William Sebold, a naturalized American, enlisted in the intelligence service in the United States while visiting relatives in his native Germany. Sebold was extremely enthusiastic and trained as a news radio operator in Berlin. He returned to the U.S. with a shortwave transmitter and was assigned to report British ship movements and American arms shipments to England. Obviously, the Germans hoped to use the submarine weapon to stop or at least disrupt military supplies from the U.S. to England.

But Sebold never dreamed of risking his life in case of emergency. When he returned to the U.S., he immediately reported to the FBI, told them everything he knew, and for many months the German authorities received false reports and were systematically misled. But it did not stop there. The FBI installed carefully camouflaged film equipment and secret dictaphones in Sebold's apartment so that the Germans who visited Sebold were photographed and their conversations recorded. In this way, the FBI succeeded in tracking down 35 German-Americans, men and women, who were suspected of working, or had worked, for Germany in intelligence. They were arrested abruptly in June 1940.

German agents reported from the USA in 1942 that American aluminum production was in a bottleneck. In view of the ever-increasing production of enemy bombers, this was of immense interest to German warfare. It was decided to help this situation along. Division II of the German Abwehr was given the task of launching a sabotage operation against American aluminum production.

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On April 7, plans were made on the Tirpitz shore in Berlin to create a sabotage enterprise. A number of sabotage groups, carefully trained and familiar with the country, were to be landed on the American coast by submarine, and then to cause disruption and confusion by sabotage attacks on factories and means of transportation. The company was given the cover name "Pastorius".

The whole enterprise was ill-fated from the start. Admiral Canaris was immediately against the action, as was Major General Erwin Lahousen, the head of Abwehr II, who was ultimately in charge of the entire enterprise. But neither of them dared to refuse to carry it out, because the Abwehr had already run into too much trouble with the top leadership. So Lahousen ordered the "West" officer, Captain Dr. Astor, to prepare the operation.

Astor got hold of a first lieutenant, Walter Kappe, who had been in the United States for years and spoke fluent American. Kappe proved to be a swashbuckler who was in no way up to the task. The dilettantism with which the men of the "Pastorius" company were trained and treated was boundless.

In secrecy, the volunteers were assembled at a sabotage school on the Quenzsee estate. All of them, like Kappe, had to have been in the United States for a long time and speak fluent English with American slang.

All in all, ten men gathered around Lieutenant Kappe, of whom only one was a soldier: Ernst Peter Burger. He had already enlisted in the Freikorps Oberland at the age of fifteen, fought in Upper Silesia, and only later finished his studies. A business graduate, he joined the SA in 1923, took part in the march to the Feldherrnhalle, and was in action against the separatists in Pirmasens. Burger was repeatedly wounded in street fights with the red mob. As he got into more and more trouble with the authorities and his economic situation was completely hopeless, he emigrated to the United States in 1927. When he became unemployed there as well in 1932, he joined the 125th Regiment of the 32nd Division of the U.S. National Guards as a volunteer and was taken to Midwest to fight labor unrest. Burger was granted U.S. citizenship.

But the rise of the new Germany did not let the old nationalist Burger rest, and he joyfully returned to Germany in 1933. He rejoined the SA and NSDAP and was appointed to the adjutancy of the SA-

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Chief of Staff Ernst Röhm. Thus he became an involuntary witness to the problematic and turbulent events in Bad Wiessee. In 1939/1940, he was then sent to Poland as an NSV reporter, where he got into trouble with the SD because Burger opposed and protested against resettlement actions and arbitrary shootings of Jews in Lipno. Reported by the SD for conduct detrimental to the party, Burger was arrested on March 4, 1940, and went on trial in July for alleged participation in the Röhm putsch. At the trial, the prosecution collapsed and Burger was acquitted, but nevertheless transferred on probation to the Brandenburg Regiment of the Abwehr II. From there he was detached to the "Pastorius" enterprise, since he knew the American conditions better than anyone else.

All the others were civilians. So was 40-year-old George John Dasch, who went by the cover name John Davis and had an adventurous life behind him. As early as 1919, he served the French occupation forces in Germany as an interpreter. In 1920 he came to the United States as a stowaway on a cargo steamer and first made his way as a dishwasher and errand boy, and in 1921 he enlisted as a volunteer in the American Air Force. He later changed jobs constantly and joined the unions in 1926. On March 23, 1941, he left the United States with a free ticket from the German consulate in Washington, leaving behind his American wife, who was ill in a women's hospital in New York. Dasch traveled as far as Tokyo and later took the Trans-Siberian Railway via Moscow to Berlin. He then tried, unsuccessfully, to get a position with IG-Farben in Ludwigshafen, and finally reported for the foreign language department of the Foreign Office in Berlin. When he heard about the "Pastorius" company, he went there immediately.

Edward John Kerling, age 33, code name Ed Kelly, Werner Thiel, age 35, toolmaker, code name William Thomas, Heinrich Harm Heinck, age 35, seaman, code name Henry Keynor, Richard Quirin, age 30, long, code name Richard Quintas, and Hermann Neubauer, age 32, farmer, code name Hermann Nicolas, giant John Want, a certain Schmidt, and Herbert Haupt, age 22, had all been in the United States for a long time. Herbert Haupt's parents lived in Chicago. He had made his way to Japan with a German blockade runner, and from there to Germany with another blockade runner, and had left his Grand [46]

mother in Stettin. All of them, with the exception of Dasch and Burger, had belonged to the "Deutscher Bund" or the HJ in the USA and were inspired by the desire to help Germany in this decisive struggle, even at the risk of their lives.

The training of the 10 saboteurs by Abwehr specialists lasted only three weeks. The men were trained primarily in the manufacture of detonators and the placement and fabrication of explosive devices, a skill they were to use in the United States primarily against the American Aluminum Company plants, the Tennessee Valley Power Plant, which was critical to the atomic bomb project, the Cryolite plant in Philadelphia, the Chesapeake and Ohio plants, the Pennsylvania Railroad depot in Newark, the Ohio locks between Cincinnati and St. New York City, and the Pennsylvania Rail Louis, the Hall-Gade Bridge administration in New York City, and the Pennsylvania Railroad curve in Altoona.

It was planned that two groups, under Kerling in the south and under Dasch in the north, would be effective.

After the short training the "Pastorius" men came to Berlin, where they were provisionally dressed in navy uniforms in an apartment of Rankestraße and also grasped regular American civilian suits. Each was given \$3,000 to \$5,000 sewn into their belts and \$100 pocket money. The two group leaders, Kerling and Dasch, also carried a suitcase full of American banknotes for their groups. The detonators and explosive devices were packed in seaworthy cases.

It was ordered that the moment the saboteurs set foot on American soil, they were to remove their German naval uniforms and change into civilian clothes. The naval uniforms were to be taken back by the submarines. The boxes of explosives were to be buried on shore after landing, as per orders. Each group was given two spades for this purpose. Then the men were first to go underground and approach a list of German-Americans. This list was written in invisible ink on a handkerchief for the two group leaders, depending on their area of operations.

During the entire training and now during the last hours in Berlin, Dasch in particular behaved in an overly radical manner, chattering incessantly and playing the big man. He was the fiddle number one of the whole company "Pastorius" and enjoyed the complete confidence of the first lieutenant Walter Kappe.

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Kerling, who was of small stature, talked little. He had been awarded the Golden HJ Badge for his services in the HJ of the "German Federation" and had already tried to sail to Germany from Florida in 1940. But this enterprise failed, he would have drowned by a hair, if the American Coastguards had not picked him up. He sat silently by when Dasch was renowned.

The transport went via Paris, where the group split up. Already in Quenzsee, John Want declared that his nerves would not hold out and immediately dropped out. In Paris Schmidt jumped off, so that in the end only eight men remained. Group Dasch was to be put ashore off the coast of Long Island near New York, and Group Kerling at Jacksonville on the coast of Florida. The Dasch group included Burger, Quirin and Heinck, the Kerling group Thiel, Neubauer and Haupt. From Paris, the Kerling group went to Brest, the Dasch group to Lorient. The Dasch group disembarked on May 26, the Kerling group on May 28.

Then the submarines, each separately, began their journey across the ocean.

U 202 surfaced in impenetrable fog off the coast of Long Island at 0:45 a.m. on June 14, 1942. One could not see ten meters far.

The commander had the machine guns made ready for battle. Two sailors pushed the inflatable boat overboard. Laboriously, six crates were taken out of a hatch and carefully packed into the boat. A little later Dasch, Heinck, Quirin and Burger followed.

Silently, the two sailors dipped their paddles. The boat disappeared into the fog.

The men didn't talk much. Only Dasch growled, "If those damned Nazi bastards would row better!"

Heinck wheeled around, knowing that the two sailors did not understand English. "Nazi, you say to them?"

Dasch quickly reassured him, "I'm just training."

Then the rough sea prevented any further word. The dinghy was tossed up and then finally came into the shallow water on the sandy beach. Dasch was the first to jump ashore. The men in the boat sat motionless for a moment, listening into the fog. Nothing stirred. Then Burger followed. The men tore off their uniforms and began to change.

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Dasch moved away from them and climbed over a dune to, as he said, take a look around.

Just as Burger was trying to stuff the wet uniforms into one of the duffel bags, a light flashed on the dune. Almost abruptly, a green flare fizzled into the air, fired by the sailors of the inflatable boat to report to the commander that the job was done and they were coming back.

Burger wheeled around. "You are to take the uniforms with you," he shouted in a half-muffled voice, but the two sailors, who were already paddling back at the top of their lungs, no longer heard him.

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Dasch was standing on the dune with a small fellow who was shining a flashlight on the man in front of him. In his right hand, you could clearly see the pistol he was carrying. It was the bloody young Coastguard Jack Culley.

American Coast Guard! The three men pressed themselves into the sand. The order they had received for this case was clear: If an American guard should appear, he is to be rendered harmless and, if possible, sent to Germany by submarine.

But there was no more submarine. But the American was. The three men prepared to jump. Dasch was still talking hastily to the Coastguard man. He told him that they were fishermen.

Then Burger bristled. He clearly heard Dasch say, "You'll hear from me in Washington, but shine the light in my face first, look at me closely."

The three men jumped up and ran to the dune. But there Dasch still stood chatting to the young man, and Burger did not know whether he had misheard, for it seemed to him that Dasch had now quite clearly told the guard his name: George John Dasch.

Burger called out excitedly, "George," but he waved it off impatiently and called out:

"Get out of here! It's all right!"

Burger still wanted to retrieve the uniforms, but Dasch urged, "Let lie, we don't have time."

This would later prove to be an almost fatal mistake.

The four men hastily moved away from the shore and, on Danch's instructions, dug out the boxes containing the explosives and the duffel bags that the

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sailors had not taken with them, about a meter deep in sand and earth.

Down on the beach, lights suddenly flashed, vehicles with Coastguards drove up. Burger took the suitcase containing the money Dasch was to manage as squad leader, and then all four ran across a road up a slope. With beating hearts and bated breath, they watched from above as the lights approached the Platz where they had buried the explosive material. At the last moment, however, the lights moved away. They had apparently found nothing. Instead, the four men realized that they were in the immediate vicinity of a location. It was Amagansett. Now it had become 2:30. Dasch ordered them to march along the road to the next railroad station, which they reached at 5 o'clock. Far and wide there was no one to be seen. The Coast Guard seemed to have discovered nothing after all.

Finally, at 5:45 a.m., the ticket counter opened. Heinck bought four Jamaica tickets on Dasch's order. The group split up and mingled with the passengers. Thus they rolled toward New York.

While Quirin and Heinck sought accommodation at the Central Park in the Hotel "Martinique", Dasch and Burger rented rooms in the Hotel "Governor Clinton".

They all got shaved first, bought new summer suits, shoes and underwear, and threw the old stuff in the nearest trash cans.

The next day, Dasch demanded the money suitcase from Burger, who handed it over to him without any objections, since Dasch was the group leader. The suitcase contained the impressive sum of 80,550 dollars.

Dasch behaved so strangely on this occasion that Burger didn't know what to make of it. He threw money around, tipped the waiter \$5 to get a window seat, and acted like a bon vivant who orders only the best wines and the most expensive food.

But Burger did not get to think about it for long. Dasch suddenly began to talk about Burger's past, especially about the fact that he had been commanded to the company as a paroled soldier.

Burger looked wordlessly into the face of the garrulous Dasch. "And," the latter just continued, "I may therefore assume that you have just as little interest in this stupid enterprise ever getting started."

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Burger was speechless. "What are you talking about:" he stammered. "You picked everybody but me, didn't you? You were the first one at Kappe!"

Dasch gave a distorted smile. "I played that just fine. But now I'm not playing anymore. I'm going to call the FBI agency here in New York later tonight and let them know we're here."

Burger's face changed color. He struggled for breath.

Dasch mockingly claimed that he had only come to Germany to spy on everything and to let this venture fall through. He merely wanted to give Burger a chance. He would have to decide whether he wanted to join in or not; in the latter case, he would have to have him arrested on the spot.

Burger tried desperately to get his thoughts in order. "Do you want to or don't you want to?" Dasch urged demandingly. Wait and see, Burger thought, somehow buy time. "I agree with you," he finally pressed out. Satisfied, Dasch refilled the glasses.

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After the Amagansett Coastguard had found nothing during the night, the alert crew had moved back in despite Jack Culley's report. Then in the morning at about 6 o'clock the Coastguard undertook a new raid and promptly found a German naval uniform, German cigarettes and an empty bottle with the label "German brandy" in the daylight.

Now the Coastguard of Amagansett had become wide awake, systematically searched every meter of the area around the site and actually found the grave site. A short time later, six boxes with detonators were unearthed.

Now the Coast Guard passed the message on to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the all-powerful head Edgar B. Hoover took matters into his own hands. He put all Coast Guards on high alert and ordered planes to search all coasts continuously. All FBI agencies in every state were ordered to keep special watch on German Americans and to check all hotels for suspects.

This would not have been necessary.

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On June 15, 1942, at 7:45 p.m., Dasch called the FBI agency on Lafayette Street in New York. He was connected with agent Harold Brain. Dasch called in under the name Franz Daniel Pastorius. He demanded that his message be passed immediately to FBI headquarters in Washington, and advised that he and three Nazi saboteurs had been put ashore the previous night by a German submarine on the coast of Long Island near Amagansett, with orders to break America's aluminum industry by blasting.

Harold Brain wanted to stop Dasch's stream of speech. But there was no stopping him. "I absolutely must speak to Mr. Hoover in Washington," he continued. "Make your headquarters aware of what's going on already! Put the three Nazi saboteurs, Burger, Quintas, and Keynor, under surveillance. Burger is in the hotel "Governor Clintons the others in a Rooming House at the central park. Besides these, a second group has left. It is landed in Florida." The FBI agent Brain listened bored. The services were only alarmed. What had actually happened had not been made known to them. Therefore, he thought that the caller was one of the numerous lunatics who, since the outbreak of the war, had been flooding the FBI with fantastic reports of espionage and sabotage. So he gave Dasch the short shrift and threw the note in the wastebasket.

So the next day passed, and nothing happened. George John Dasch had left for Washington.

Burger warned Quirin and Heinck about Dasch, but they did not believe him. They trusted rock-solid in Dasch's radical and fanatical speeches given so often in Berlin and Quenzsee.

Dasch, who had long since been determined to reveal everything, had meanwhile arrived in Washington, had taken up quarters at the Hotel Chesterfield, and from there called FBI headquarters in the morning hours of June 19. He reported again as Franz Daniel Pastorius and was horrified to discover that the FBI in New York had not even put through his report.

Dasch explained that he absolutely had to talk to Mr. Hoover, that the security of the United States depended on it. When he could not get the right hearing by telephone, he decided to visit FBI headquarters in person.

In the FBI, he was led to Conelly, who also initially out-

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laughed. The security officer looked pityingly at the skinny and unimpressive Dasch standing in front of him, whose crooked face was not at all sympathetic, and laughed: "You think we pay a pretty penny for pretty stories? Who are you going to tell that the boss of these Nazis - that is, you - would go straight to us? They're tough guys, we know them. Mr. Hoover has other things to do than listen to pretty stories. If you really want to know: We're

looking for pins in a load of hay. We're busy with that and don't have time for you. Goodbye!"

Anger and despair rose in Dasch. "You don't need to look for anything!" he whispered. "I have the pins in my hand." He plucked a handkerchief from his pocket. "On them, in secret writing, are all the people we are to call on here in America. Here are the addresses of our liaisons."

Conelly lifted the handkerchief in disgust and held it against the light. There was nothing to see. "Let's make this quick," he growled. "How many dollars do you want when you leave again?"

"I don't need your money," the traitor gasped. "I don't care about the money. In this bag I have all the dollars the Nazis gave me from Germany for the work, for the bombs. Here!" He opened the bag and threw the money packets on the table. All in all, \$80,000.

Conelly had suddenly turned pale. He jumped up and checked the money. Then he walked up to Dasch. "What's your real name?" he asked. "George John Dasch."

Then Conelly prepared to lead Dasch to Mr. Hoover. Dasch breathed a sigh of relief. "My terms -"

Conelly grinned. "Conditions? You're going to tell us everything with no strings attached." The introduction to Mr. Hoover was brief. Then the interrogation began. There was no longer any question of Dasch being able to impose any conditions. He was questioned tersely and thoroughly by the FBI agents who interrogated him. Very quickly he realized the bitter truth of the old adage that you may love a betrayer, but you don't love a traitor. FBI men Conelly and Tain broke all Dasch's attempts to cover up or conceal anything. They extracted all the information from him about everything he knew.

On the afternoon of June 20, 1942, in New York, rapid successive-

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other Burger, Quirin and Heinck arrested and led away in chains.

Through the address of the parents Haupts in Chicago, the FBI managed in a short time to arrest all the men of the group Kerling, who had landed at Pontevedra on June 17. 60,000 dollars were found on Kerling. In addition to the men of the Pastorius company, numerous Germans whose addresses had been on Dasch's handkerchief were arrested and put on trial.

To his boundless surprise, Georg John Dasch was also arrested and charged in the end.

In the first week of July 1942, the court of the "Special Military Commission", which President Roosevelt had established for the Pastorius men, began. General Kramer and Biddle acted as prosecutors. General McCoy presided over the trial. The trial was secret. Everyone, including the judges, prosecutors, assessors, defendants, and witnesses, first had to take the stand and swear an oath that they would never utter another word about the trial to which the Pastorius enterprise was subject for the rest of their lives. This was to prevent the American public from learning of the FBI's unprecedented failure. The fact that Dasch gave everything away to both the New York agent Brain and the Washington agent Conelly without being believed, that he became credible only when he put \$80,000 on the table, was not allowed to become known to the public. In the subsequent press releases, the young and naive Coast Guard Jack Culley, who in reality had failed miserably, was lied about as a hero.

The FBI was personally represented at the trial by Director Hoover. The court was composed of eight generals. The defense of the traitor Dasch had been undertaken by Colonel Reestin, the defense of the seven other defendants by Major Royal, who fought hopelessly but courageously for the lives of his clients.

During his imprisonment, George John Dasch had written down a 300-page report about his observations in Germany and about the Pastorius enterprise, which was now read out. The case was completely clear, there was nothing to deny here.

Although no one was harmed, the prosecution demanded the death penalty. Dasch alone was able to buy his life through his betrayal. Unfortunately for Dasch, Burger was also sentenced to life imprisonment because he had joined the enterprise as a soldier.

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had been mandated, while Dasch received 30 years in prison. The other six were executed in the electric chair in August 1942. Thus died: Herbert Haupt, Heinrich Harm Heinck, Edward John Kerling, Hermann Neubauer, Richard Quirin, Werner Thiel. Their bodies were handed over to Walter Reed Hospital for autopsy.

The trial continued against the relatives of the convicts, their friends. The father Haupt, his uncle Fröhling, an acquaintance, Wergin, were also sentenced to death and executed. The wives of the convicts were sentenced to 25 years in prison.

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On the afternoon of 29 June 1942, Admiral Canaris was ordered to the Führer's headquarters at Wolfsschanze, where he and General Erwin Lahousen reported to the adjutant's office on the morning of 30 June. Since Hitler was at the situation briefing, it took until 4 p.m. for the two to get to Hitler.

When the latter saw Canaris, he immediately approached the admiral, his face white with anger: "I demand an explanation from you," he said sharply. "What do I have an intelligence service for, anyway, when such unqualifiable disasters happen? A year ago we had practically the same mess. Do you want to explain to me how this is possible? You could have thought everything through more carefully, but above all you should have taken a better look at the people. Then it would have been impossible for a traitor to sneak in."

"My Führer," Canaris replied smoothly, "all the participants in the enterprise are from the party. All of them have been handed over to me as convinced National Socialists by the foreign organization of the party; the organizer of the enterprise is a bearer of the Blood Order."

Hitler was silent for a moment, then he replied coldly: "So, what will happen to the poor guys who signed up in good faith for this enterprise? So they will be hanged and shot. If that's what your work looks like," he concluded, "you should take criminals or Jews to do it." He turned and walked away without a greeting.

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Six years later, on Easter Sunday 1948, Ernst Peter Burger was called from the Atlanta penitentiary. For some time Dasch had also been in the Atlanta penitentiary. But the American justice system had transferred the traitor from Atlanta to Fort Leavenworth.

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Atlanta had been home to numerous German prisoners, and the Americans feared for the life of Dasch.

Burger was now transported to New York and transferred to Governor's Island without explanation. There he saw the traitor Dasch for the first time after all these years. After two weeks, both were taken to a ship and locked together in a holding cell. In Bremerhaven they were told by a sergeant that they had been transferred to Germany by way of an act of mercy. From Bremerhaven they were sent to the Ludwigsburg internment camp.

On June 23, 1948, Burger and Dasch were released from there. It was only through Jürgen Thorwald's harrowing report, "The Pastorius Case," that the public learned of the salacious story of this unique betrayal.

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The Red Chapel

European spy network of the Red Army - Harro Schulze-Boysen,
German chief - It was simply all betrayed - Fateful radio
from Moscow - End on the gallows

In 1939, in view of the deteriorating situation in Western Europe, the Red Army High Command activated its network of agents, which had existed for many years, and sent Lieutenant Colonel Victor Sokolov to the West for this purpose. The Soviet intelligence officer arrived in Western Europe with forged papers and immediately set to work. In 1940, he showed up in Brussels and Ostend with a Uruguayan passport in the name of "Vincente Sierra" and began coordinating Soviet intelligence agencies already working in Europe. Sokolov also went by the names Dupuis, Lebrun, Jean Morel, Alphonso de Barientos, and Urwitz in turn. His official agent cover names were "Kent" or "Petit Chef."

Before him, the Soviet lieutenant pilot Michael Makarov had already come to Paris in 1939 via Stockholm and

Copenhagen with false papers in which he was called "Carlos Alamo". From there he traveled via Antwerp to Brussels. He had \$10000 with him and orders to be rolled over and stay in the country in case of a German attack on Belgium. In the fall of 1940, he was followed by Soviet Lieutenant Anton Danilov, who also arrived via Paris, where he had hidden in the Soviet embassy during the German occupation.

In an inconspicuous villa in the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek, the headquarters of the Kent Group was now set up. Under the eyes of the unsuspecting German security authorities - long before the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities - the Soviet secret service built up its almost lethal spy network against Germany for the eventuality.

Besides them, two groups were working in Belgium; that of the Red Army war engineer Captain Konstantin Yefremov, whose code name was "Bordo". Yefremov's passport was issued in the name of a Finnish student Jernström. Yefremov was a specialist in chemical warfare. He arrived in Brussels via Switzerland on September 6, 1941. The German Comintern agent, Johann Wenzel, code name "Hermann," also headed a group and, in addition, trained other intelligence radio operators who worked for both Kent and Yefremov. In the nearby Netherlands, the group "Hilda" worked, led by the Dutch Communist Anton Winterink. His code name was "Tibo."

In Paris, the German-born communist agent Leopold Trepper, whose code name was "Gilbert", had already been active for years and

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who also called himself "Otto" or "Grand Chef". Gilbert had already been in the Communist espionage service since 1930 and in 1938 founded a front company, a commission company for export and import, "Simex", as whose director he acted. "Simex," which had its headquarters at 24 Boulevard Haussmann, Paris, and was duly registered in the Commercial Register, conducted commercial business, but only to the extent necessary to cover its agent activities to the outside world. "Simex" later established a subsidiary in Brussels, "Simexo," and branches in Marseilles, Prague, Oslo, Stockholm, and Raudnitz on the Elbe. Immediately after the German occupation, "Simex" made itself available to the services of the Wehrmacht and cooperated in particular with the Todt organization, to their complete satisfaction.

In Switzerland, the group of the "Red Three" was active for the Soviet military espionage. The Hungarian Alexander Rado, who set up his headquarters in Geneva in 1940 at 113 rue de Lausanne under the cover of a "Geopress" company, the German communist writer Rudolf Karl Rössler and the Swiss Dr. Xaver Schnieper worked in it.

The most important group, however, was set up in Berlin before the war began, the "Coro" group, which in the further course provided news, some of it decisive for the war, about war production, new weapons, troop movements, attack plans, and attack dates. This Berlin group was staffed without exception by Germans, whose treasonous activities were supported only by radio agents trained in Moscow. No one in Germany had any idea of this sinister and almost fatally dangerous network: neither the Reich leadership nor the soldiers, whose attacks or operations had usually been betrayed beforehand to the Red Army high command directly from Berlin. The unmasking of this largest and most dangerous group of traitors in World War II is far more exciting than any detective novel.

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The six listening radio operators of the German radio monitoring station Cranz in East Prussia discovered on June 26, 1941 for the first time a radio station reporting with the sign PTX and calling a station HLK. In addition, they had noticed that from June 15, other mysterious radio stations also abruptly increased their radio traffic. A network running under the designation WNA grew in the period from June 15 to July 8.

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increased from 20 to 78 radio stations in 1941. Radio stations that were unknown to German surveillance.

The German radio defense was working day and night to find out the secret of these illegal stations. Very soon it could be established that all these illegal radio operators had one destination to which they sent their still indecipherable radio messages: Moscow. Since the radio operators were called "musicians" in the jargon of radio surveillance, the mysterious network of illegal radio operators was given the name "Red Orchestra" by the

German Abwehr.

At the headquarters of the Supreme Intelligence Service of the Red Army, Moscow, Znaminsky 19, these radio transmissions were received and carefully evaluated. Colonel General Fyodor Fyodorovich Kuznetsov was highly interested in this information.

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On June 25, 1941, radio surveillance found that three of the illegal stations were radioing from Berlin to Moscow. One was stunned. Was Soviet espionage sitting in the middle of the Reich capital?

At that time, no one suspected that the radio surveillance had tracked down Hans Coppi, toolmaker of the Radio-Loewe company, who, as a fanatical communist, operated the Berlin radio stations of the "Red Chapel". Coppi had three locations: in Chausseestraße, at Meraner Platz in Schöneberg and in Sebastianstraße in southeast Berlin.

Coppi had already been punished in 1932 as a sixteen-year-old for communist activities and breach of the peace. The former Imperial Navy radio operator Kurt Schulze, also a convinced communist, had trained Hans Coppi as an old agent radio operator in the service of Soviet espionage.

On September 7, 1941, radio surveillance detected a second Red Chapel radio line, whose station had to be in Brussels, since all bearing beams passed exactly over the Belgian capital.

After painstaking preparatory work, radio surveillance hoped to strike on October 21, 1941. Since it was rightly feared that the appearance of members of the Wehrmacht might jeopardize the whole operation, the news radio operators were disguised as postal workers and Reichspost tents were pitched in Berlin to take the final bearings on the spot. The tents were first set up at the junction of Teufelseechaussee and Heerstraße and at the Bavarian Platz in Schöneberg. Later

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next to Schöneberg City Hall and next to Invalidenplatz in the north of Berlin.

Soon, with the utmost certainty, house No. 9 on Meraner Platz was identified as one of the locations of the illegal radio stations. But still, all the painstaking work led to no success. By chance, Hans Coppi had noticed one of the Reichspost tents, and he had curiously stepped closer. Coppi heard one of the "postmen" say to the other, "Jawohl, Herr Leutnant," and he recognized the whistle of a direction finder.

Hans Coppi immediately raced to the head of the "Coro" group, who was based in an elegant studio apartment at Altenburger Allee 19 in Berlin's posh West. In this case, he violated the ban on visiting the boss personally, because danger was imminent.

"Coro" was the first lieutenant in the Reich Aviation Ministry, Harro Schulze-Boysen. In his civilian profession, he was a seminar leader at the Faculty of Foreign Studies at the University of Berlin. His wife, Liberia's Victoria, a née Haas-Heye, a journalist by profession, worked as a film dramaturge at the Reich Propaganda Ministry's Kulturfilmzentrale. Even in his student days, Schulze-Boysen had become a fierce opponent of National Socialism. A three-month protective custody in 1933, during which he was treated very rudely, strengthened his ardent desire to harm the system by any means necessary. Schulze-Boysen soon became what is generally called a salon communist. Nevertheless, he remained unmolested and also unguarded as he progressed. After 1933, he joined the German Air Sports Association and was later accepted into the officer corps of the Luftwaffe. Because his then bride and later wife met Field Marshal General Hermann Göring at the grandparental Liebenberg estate of Prince Philipp Eulenburg and asked for protection for her fiancé, the unsuspecting Göring personally paved the way for Schulze-Boysen to get a post in the Reich Aviation Ministry, where he worked in the Attachee Department. From here, Harro Schulze-Boysen established the largest spy network for the Soviets at work in the middle of Germany.

After Coppi's report, Schulze-Boysen immediately paralyzed all previous radio stations. For days, the radio surveillance squads struggled without coming to a conclusion. They were again completely in the dark as far as Berlin was concerned.

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The radio communication of the "Coro" group to Moscow never worked properly. The messages were received with difficulty in Moscow, and therefore the Moscow headquarters ordered that all messages of "Coro" should be sent via the Kent group in Brussels. Harro Schulze-Boysen from now on delivered his information directly to the Soviet officer Sokolow, while Berlin fell completely silent.

Very soon, Radio Surveillance noticed that illegal radio traffic in Brussels was increasing at an astounding rate. Three squads of radio surveillance were now sent to Brussels and placed under the command of Captain Piepe. Again the protracted game began. The radio surveillance vehicles were parked at the Place de la Duchesse de Brabant, at the Place de Koekelberg, and at the church of St. Jean Baptiste. Finally, the location of the station was determined: a villa in the suburb of Molenbeek.

Not only the Ausland-Abwehr office, but also the Reich Security Main Office had been deployed in the fight against the threatening source of traitors. Kriminalkommissar Josef Reiser, Kriminalsekretär Karl Ball, Kriminalsekretär Otto Schwab and Kriminalassistent Rolf Richter went to Belgium and France to investigate. At the same time, the Secret Field Police were alerted.

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On the foggy 13th of December 1941, a Saturday, the Abwehr struck. At 4 p.m. sharp, two police cars pulled up at the villa. The policemen jumped down, pistols drawn, arrested the two guards who were constantly patrolling the street and entered the house with a lockpick. While they found only an old woman on the ground floor, the German police officers surprised four men and a woman on the second floor in the middle of radio communication with Moscow. They were Sofia Poznanska, who wanted to jump out of the window screaming, but was prevented from doing so, the two Soviet Russian officers Michael Makarov and Anton Danilov, as well as a liaison man who happened to be present. Despite the surprise, the two Soviet Russians managed to throw the papers lying on the table into the blazing fire of the open fireplace. Then they were all led away tied up. Again, the coincidence was rare for the communist spies. A V-man of the group "Bordo" had a few minutes before the Überrumpe-.

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lung with a message for Yefremov left the villa. However, he was still in the street when the police cars stopped in front of the house and arrested the security guards. The agent calmly walked on as a harmless street passerby, making a wide arc and taking up an observation position from which he could follow everything in the distance. After the group was led away, he ran as fast as he could to Sokolov, who did not live in the radio center. Thus, in the end, the successful action had become a failure. For the boss had escaped. Kent disappeared from Brussels and moved to the south of France, where he continued to work in the Marseille area.

The German police guarded the empty house for some time, but apart from one small employee who had not been warned, nothing came into the net. They proceeded so carelessly that they did not even ensure that the radio room was set up. When the police guard was lifted, Sokolov had two agents calmly collect from the unsuspecting homeowner the furnishings belonging to the group and take them away.

But the most important thing was that it was still not possible to decipher even one radio message from the Red Band.

The German Abwehr therefore formed its own deciphering group under a Leipzig student councilor with Berlin students of mathematics and modern philology. So far, they had only been able to recognize that the code of the radio messages was a so-called book key. Without knowledge of the basic work one did not get further.

The radio counterintelligence unit at Matthaeikirchenplatz in Berlin doubled its team. More than 300 illegal agent transmitters had to be controlled.

Again, it took some time to succeed, through individual and careful questioning of the old landlady, in identifying a book that the dechiffreuse, Miss Sofia Poznanska, had always had in her hands: Guy de Lecerf, "Le miracle du professeur Teramond".

Sofia Poznanska could no longer be questioned: She had committed suicide in the military prison in order not to have to testify.

This book, however, had disappeared from the villa without a trace. Kent had done a great job.

Immediate investigations revealed that it had been out of print in bookstores for years and that the publisher no

longer existed. From Berlin, a French-speaking German officer was sent to Paris with the order to search all antiquarian bookshops in the French capital.

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He was determined to get the book and bring it back at any cost. After a long and desperate search, he found it in a store in Montmartre. On May 17, 1942, the book was finally in Berlin. Immediately, the decoding group went to work.

In the meantime, however, "Coro" had not remained idle. No sooner had he learned that a deciphering group was working for the Abwehr than he managed to infiltrate an employee, the student Horst Heilmann, into the deciphering group. "Coro" thus sat right in the heart of his most dangerous adversaries. Luck was with him. "At least for the time being.

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At the same time, a sergeant, Karl Hannemann, reported to the HKL on the Eastern Front with a Soviet machine gun and stated that he belonged to an aircrew of the "Heydebreck" squadron, which had been supposed to reconnoiter east of Kursk on January 26, 1942, but had been shot down. Hannemann stated that he had escaped from captivity and had made his way to the German HKL. Just before he had done so, he had shot down a Soviet machine-gun post and brought the weapon with him as evidence.

Sergeant Hannemann was immediately taken to Berlin, where he was jubilantly celebrated. He was given three weeks of special leave from which he never returned. It was the communist emigrant Albert Hössler, Red Spain fighter, who was parachuted near Gomel by the Soviet Air Force with the papers of the German Sergeant Hannemann. He was assigned to reinforce the "Coro" group as a trained radio operator and was passed on by Schulze-Boysen to Hans Coppi, who now handled radio communications from a furnished room on the corner of Chausseestraße and Invalidenstraße.

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In the meantime, illegal radio traffic in Paris had increased to such an extent that on May 16, a direction-finding platoon from the Radio Surveillance Company "Channel Coast" was ordered to the French capital. After five days, the tracking platoon established the transmitter's location in Montmartre. In the meantime, the transmitter repeatedly changed its place of work, so that the direction-finding platoon needed another 12 days until, in an attic apartment, the married couple Herez and

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Miriam Sokol and both were arrested in radio traffic. Herez Sokol probably revealed two other quarters from where he had transmitted, but only knew that his boss was called "Gilbert". More was not to be brought out of him.

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Then, in Berlin, an officer who had attended the celebration in honor of the brave returnee spotted Sergeant Hannemann in plain clothes on Wittenbergplatz. The officer was riding in the streetcar and could not arrest Hannemann, who was strolling along the sidewalk. Knowing that Hannemann should have returned to the force on April 15, he filed a report against the deserter. Hannemann was now put on the wanted list and, through intensive observation of the area around Wittenbergplatz, was arrested a short time later. Again, shortly after Hössler's arrest, Coppi noticed that something was wrong and reported Hössler's disappearance to "Coro," who denied it for a long time and confessed nothing.

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On July 30, 1942, "Hermann" fell into the hands of the German security authorities in Brussels. This was the Comintern agent Johann Wenzel, who, in the hopeless situation in which he found himself, very soon changed fronts and allowed himself to be turned. Thus the Germans had finally penetrated the tighter net of the "Red Chapel".

In Berlin, at the same time, the deciphering group was decoding the radio transmissions according to plan. Again and again three names appeared as senders of the momentous messages: Kent, Gilbert, Coro.

The radio control officers were scared to death when they read the first decoded radio messages. "Source: Anton. Combat units of the German Air Force, previously stationed on Crete, are on their way to the Eastern Front. A part was sent to the Crimea closed. Rest will be distributed to other sections of the front."

"Source: Coro.

New Messerschmitt fighter has two guns and two MG mounted in the side of the wings. Develops speed up to 600 kilometers per hour."

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"Source: Coro.

Plan III with Caucasus as target, originally planned for November, comes into effect in spring 1942. Deployment should be completed by May 1. Deployment for the Caucasus offensive: Losovaya - Balakieya - Chuguev - Belgorod - Akhtyrka - Krasnograd. High command in Kharkov. More details to follow." "Source: Susanne.

Line, which was proposed as a winter position of the German army by General Staff and should be occupied in early November, runs from Rostov through Isyum - Kursk - Orel - Bryansk - Dorogobush - Novgorod - Leningrad. Hitler rejected this proposal as well and ordered sixth attack on Moscow, throwing all available material into the fight. If this advance fails, the German troops will not have any material reserves available at the moment in case of retreat." "Source: Ninette.

Germans reportedly assembling launches in Bulgarian ports for Caucasus operation."

"Source; Jacques.

Germans lost elite of their army on Eastern Front. Russian combat vehicles make superior impression. German generals discouraged because of Hitler's constant changes in strategic plans and attack objectives."

And so it went on, saying after saying, many hundreds. The officers took their breath away. There was practically everything betrayed that could be betrayed. The General Staff of the Red Army often knew the German attack intentions months before. Thus, as early as November 1941, it knew that an offensive against the Caucasus had been planned for the summer of 1942. It was revealed that Leningrad would not be decisively attacked, but only nuked. The exact production of the German aircraft industry was revealed punctually every month, as well as the fuel situation of the German Reich, the daily production of the ammunition production, that of the tanks up to the Tigers, all weapon renewals, the figures of the troop strengths, the exact troop relocations, names and dates of the outgoing submarines, operational plans of the General Staff of the Army, etc., etc.

It was unbelievable. The enemy was actually sitting in the middle of the most important command posts. It was perfectly clear to the officers that no one person could possibly have missed these important, sometimes war-decisive messages.

can guess. A whole group of traitors was at work here. But who belonged to them?

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Before assumptions could be made and investigations undertaken, Moscow itself provided the shocking clarification. In an almost unbelievable recklessness, Moscow had ordered Kent by radio on October 18, 1941, to activate the connection to "Coro", whose radio traffic had been interrupted again and again. This spell, too, has now been decoded.

Here Harro Schulze-Boysen had no more luck. By chance, the leader of the deciphering group deciphered this fateful saying personally, so that the "Coro" agents in his group did not get to know about it. This by no means deliberate handling - no one was distrusted, least of all Heilmann - was the death sentence for the "Red Chapel".

The saying was: "KLS de RTX. 1010.1725.99 wds qbt. To Kent from Director personally. - Proceed immediately to the three addresses given in Berlin and ascertain why radio communication keeps failing. If interruptions are repeated, take over radio transmission. Work of the three Berlin groups and message transmission of the utmost importance. Addresses: Neuwestend, Altenburger Allee 19, three flights of stairs on right. Coro. - Charlottenburg, Fredericiastrasse 26a. Two stairs to the left. Wolf. - Friedenau, Kaiserstrasse 18.

Four stairs on the left. Farmer. (Adam and Greta Grauhoff). Remind here of "Ulenspiegel". - Password everywhere: Director. Give message by October 20. Start new (repeat: new) at all three places with radio plan on 15th in the morning. qbt. ar. KLS de RTX."

Now the Secret State Police were called in. Their findings were: "Coro" is First Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen; "Wolf" the neurologist Dr. John Rittmeister; "Adam and Greta Grauhoff" the film and stage writer Adam Kuckhoff and his wife Greta.

This circle of traitors, now perfectly recognized, was not arrested for the time being, but was watched carefully and cautiously. The phones of the unsuspecting were monitored from now on.

Last but not least, one of those incredible coincidences happened that can save or kill in this milieu. Schulze-Boysen and his wife had made a special offer for their friends, most of whom were employees of the "Rote [67]

Kapelle" were, arranged a small celebration on Sunday, August 29, 1942, in Wannsee.

The head of the deciphering group, who alone knew the secret state of affairs exactly from his people, now wanted to work up the shocks of the radio transmissions as quickly as possible and ordered duty for his staff for this Saturday and the following Sunday.

Heilmann was also invited to Wannsee. Since he could not possibly come, he called Schulze-Boysen to apologize. But the lieutenant was not there, his wife had already left for Wannsee. Heilmann left the number of his office - 21 87 07 - with the maid, without giving his name, and requested that the lieutenant call him. Heilmann was on telephone duty that day. Therefore, when Schulze-Boysen called the number, he had to speak to him.

But as fate would have it, Schulze-Boysen did not return home until Sunday evening and therefore did not call the number 21 87 07 until Monday morning. This time, however, the head of the deciphering group was on telephone duty himself and was startled when Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen called him. He realized in a flash that one of his people must be working with "Coro".

That same day, August 31, 1942, at 5 p.m., First Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen was called to his duty room. A detective announced himself as a porter from Portal III: "A gentleman would like to speak to you urgently, Herr Oberleutnant." "I'll be right there," Schulze-Boysen replied. He ran down unsuspectingly without his cap, without his belt, and was arrested in front of the portal of the Reich Air Ministry. At the same time, more than 80 people were arrested in Berlin alone. Blow after blow followed. In Berlin, four agent stations blew up within 24 hours, with their headquarters in Friedenau, Reichskanzlerplatz and Neukölln.

By this time, however, the German "Rote Kapelle" had already passed on more than 500 traitor reports to Moscow.

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Among those arrested was a Miss Ilse Stoebe from the Information Department of the Foreign Office. Although she seemed to be sufficiently incriminated, she remained stubbornly silent. Just in case, a room was set up in her residential

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At the same time, a criminal investigation secretary was stationed in the building at Wielandstr. 37, and two officers of the Reich Security Main Office took turns observing the building's entrance from a window in the house opposite.

Days passed and nothing happened. Suddenly, one morning at ten o'clock, the doorbell rang. A young man stood in front of the Stoebe apartment and murmured uncertainly, "I'm looking for an old acquaintance."

The officer was confused. She first paused at the word "old acquaintance. The files showed that Ilse Stoebe also had the cover name "Die Alte. Did the man know Ilse Stoebe, or did he not know her?

On the off chance, the detective secretary hastily replied, "Maybe I'm your old acquaintance."

The man smiled with relief and wordlessly pressed a letter into her hand. Without a greeting, he disappeared, and

before the two officers reached the street, he was gone.

The letter said, "Koester expected to arrive October 20. Establish connection Koester - Scheliha." Scheliha - the name had not yet been mentioned.

The officials searched feverishly and finally determined that only a Scheliha could be considered: Legationsrat I. Class in the Information Department of the Foreign Office, Rudolf von Scheliha. Investigations at lightning speed revealed that he was currently on a business trip to Switzerland.

The detectives were furious. After all, they had intervened too early. The arrests had not been shielded tightly enough, and at least this fish had slipped through the cracks. Nevertheless, Kriminalrat Panzinger received the order to go to Constance and lie in wait for Scheliha. German V-men in Switzerland were inconspicuously put on the scent of the Legation Council.

The crime secretary was still waiting at Wielandstrasse 37. She carried a pistol ready to fire, just in case. On October 20, no one came.

From Switzerland, the V-men reported on October 24: Scheliha was preparing to return to Germany. The officials looked at each other in disbelief.

On the same day, at about 5 p.m., the two detectives from the house across Wielandstr. 37 observed a man in a gray raincoat entering the house with a suitcase. Cautiously, they rushed to the street.

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The doorbell rang again.

"Are you my old acquaintance?" asked the stranger.

The officer, now much more confident, smiled and calmly replied, "I'm the old one."

It was the notified "Koester" who now handed over the suitcase to the officer, which contained an agent transmitter.

He said briefly, "I'm going to Papa Hübner's now - tomorrow I'd like to see Scheliha at the Cafe Adler on Wittenbergplatz."

The detective secretary, whose throat was now tight, nodded. Koester left.

He was then arrested at the Cafe Adler on October 26, 1942.

It was Hein Koenen, the son of the former KPD deputy Wilhelm Koenen, who had parachuted out of a Soviet bomber and was supposed to bring new orders for Rudolf von Scheliha and - money.

Rudolf von Scheliha had no idea of what had been going on in Berlin during his tour of duty. Because Ilse Stoebe had been taken into custody right away with the first group, he received no news. He was arrested by Krimmalrat Panzinger in Konstanz and immediately collapsed. After his confession, Ilse Stoebe also gave up her denial. "Papa Hübner" turned out to be an old man with a dignified gray goatee, who acted as treasurer of the "Red Chapel".

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The Chief of the Security Police and SD IV reported under the number A 2 B, 320/42 g. Rs. on December 22, 1942, in his final report for the Reich Military Tribunal, the following persons, some of them from the first circles of society, among them officers who, together with Communist intellectuals and old Communists, had built up the largest agent apparatus of the Red Army and had, according to plan, betrayed everything they could to the Bolshevik mortal enemy, as ringleaders:

1. Dr. jur. and phil. Arvid Harnack, code name "Arvid". Party comrade, senior government councillor in the Reich Ministry of Economics, advisor for foreign exchange procurement, later for America, fundamental issues, intended as lecturer in the foreign science faculty, lecturer in the foreign policy training house of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

2. Dr. phil. Mildred Harnack, née Fish, American, 1931/32 Lecturer

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at the University of Berlin, from 1936 lecturer at the Volkshochschule Berlin, translator for German publishers, language lecturer at the Faculty of Foreign Studies in Berlin.

3. Harro Schulze-Boysen, code name "Coro" and "Georg". First lieutenant in the Reich Aviation Ministry-Attachee Group, seminar leader at the Faculty of Foreign Studies of the University of Berlin. Father Frigate Captain Schulze, son of Privy Councillor and Director of Studies Georg Schulze, whose wife Olga was the sister of Grand Admiral A. v. Tirpitz.
 4. Liberias Schulze-Boysen, née Haas-Heye. Journalist, most recently film dramaturge at the Kulturfilmzentrale in the Reich Propaganda Ministry. Mother Countess Victoria Eulenburg now uses her maiden name again, daughter of Prince Philipp Eulenburg.
 5. Dr. phil. Adam Kuckhoff. Freelance writer, author of the books "Der Deutsche von Bayencourt", "Strogany" and "Till Eulenspiegel", director of the Pragfilm AG, last cultural film created by him "Posen, Stadt im Aufbau".
 6. Margarete Kuckhoff, née Lorke, graduate economist, studied for many years in the USA. Translator for the NSDAP's Office of Racial Policy, translated speeches by Goebbels and large parts of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" into English on behalf of James Morphy, among others.
 7. Johannes Graudenz. Sales representative, formerly waiter in France, Switzerland and England, tourist guide in Berlin, correspondent for the United Press and the New York Times in Berlin. Owner of a photographic company, industrial representative in Ireland, Belgium, Holland and France and of Electropol, Prague (light metal construction).
 8. Kurt Schumacher, independent sculptor, 1923-1935 attended the Hochschule für bildende Künste (College of Fine Arts), most recently a rifleman with the Landesschützenbataillon in Berlin.
 9. Elisabeth Schumacher, née Hohenemser, Mischling I. degree. Lutheran upbringing, attendance at the Höhere Töchterschule in Meiningen, arts and crafts school in Offenbach, further technical training at the united state schools in Berlin, last employed at the Reichsstelle für Arbeitsschutz in Berlin. Father senior engineer at AEG.
 10. Hans Coppi, lathe operator, formerly delivery boy, house servant, unskilled laborer, obtained middle school-leaving certificate at the Scharfenberg secondary school, attended DAF evening courses for technical draftsmen.
 11. Countess Erika Brockdorff, née Schoenfeld, house daughter, projectionist, stenographer, lastly temporary employee at the Reichsstelle für Arbeitsschutz.
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12. Oda Schottmüller, self-employed dancer and sculptor, graduated from high school in 1924.
 13. Horst Heilmann, student at the Faculty of Foreign Studies at the University of Berlin. Last radio operator with an intelligence substitute unit, intelligence interpreter, as such detached as decipherer for English, French and Russian radio transmissions. Since 1937 HJ. 1941 Member of the NSDAP.
 14. Alfred Traxi, sergeant of the 4th Intelligence Division in the OKH, 1934-1936 military service in the former Czech Army, attended the Re-serve Officer Candidate School in Pardubitz, promoted to Czech sub-lieutenant in 1937. 1930 Abitur, 1941 commercial employee at Concordia Spinning Mill in Neschwitz near Czechs and Georg Schicht AG, Außig.
 15. Wolfgang Havemann, studied law and national economics, last position as court assessor at the Potsdam District Court, drafted into the Navy since the outbreak of the war. Employed at the OKM-Siegeleitungs/Chief MND III, since 12. 8. 42 seconded to the Naval Intelligence School Flensburg-Mürwick. Father Prof. Dr. h. c. Gustav Havemann, Berlin.
 16. Herbert Gollnow, civil servant trainee with the Reichsbahn, consular secretary at the Foreign Office, studied at the Foreign Science Faculty, first lieutenant in the Luftwaffe, airborne troops and parachutist officer with the OKW Defense Department.
 17. Heinrich Scheel, Air Force Weather Service Inspector a. Kr. Fliegerhorst-kommandantur Rangsdorf. Since 1935 studies at the University of Berlin, modern philology - 1940 state examination passed with distinction.
 18. Erwin Gehrts, Air Force Colonel in the RLM, early writer for various West German newspapers, enlisted

in the Air Force in 1935 as Captain © from a private profession, 1938 1c clerk to the Air Force General with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. 1939 Clerk to the Inspector of Reconnaissance Pilots, Group Leader to the Chief of Air Force Training in the RLM.

19. Anna Kraus, Hungarian citizen by marriage, home worker and graphologist; in 1935 she took over a varnish and paint business en gros. Was active as a fortune teller until recent times.

20. Marcel Melliand, publisher and editor of MillanTextilberichte, leading German textile trade magazine. Plant manager in the largest textile factory in Bielefeld. Director of a large textile factory in Romanshorn, Switzerland. Recognized as the first German expert in the textile industry. Before-
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presentations before authorities and experts, extensive study trips abroad.

21. Kurt Schulze, code name "Berg". Motorist, salesman, in 1916 drafted into the navy and trained as a radio operator, upon arrest conscripted into service as a motorist for the Reichspost.

22. Leo Szczribczynski, factory owner, co-owner of the Krone & Co. defense industry in Berlin (secret production), annual income 200,000 RM. Attended the Commercial College and the University of Berlin.

23. Hans Henniger, railroad civil servant, dismissed in 1934 on the basis of § 4 of the Professional Civil Servants Act, later re-employed as a construction architect for the Reichsbahn. Since the beginning of the war, government building inspector (a. Kr.) at the Reich Aviation Ministry, Department of General Aircraft Master, where he was responsible for planning tasks.

24. Philipp Schaefer, Dr. phil., philologist, librarian, most recently commercial employee, married a Russian woman during the World War.

25. Elli Lotte Schleif, library inspector, tenured civil servant in the city of Berlin, Volksbücherei Hauptstelle Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin.

26. Helmut Himpel, dentist, studied electrical engineering at the TH in Karlsruhe, then dentistry in Freiburg and Munich. Fraternity member.

27. Maria Terwiel, stenotypist, Mischling 1. degree. Father Dr. Johann Terwiel, last Vice-President of the Higher Presidium in Szczecin, who retired in 1934 on the basis of the Professional Civil Servants Act.

28. Walter Husemann, toolmaker, employee of the Communist newspapers in Berlin, "Berliner Morgen," "Berlin am Abend" and "Rote Fahne. Editor of the workers' newspaper in Mannheim.

29. Karl Behrens, design engineer. At the time of his arrest, he was a soldier on the Eastern Front. 1929 SA member. Left the SA after the Stennes Putsch and switched to the "Black Front," later a follower of the resistance circle around Ernst Niekisch, after 1939 attended the Berlin Abendgymnasium.

30. Walter Küchenmeister, writer and advertiser, ironworker, 1917/18 sailor in Kiel, 1921/26 editor.

31. Dr. med. Elfriede Paul, general practitioner, 1921/24 teacher, 1924/28 director of the municipal children's home in Hamburg, then studied medicine in Hamburg and Berlin. Assistant physician at the Institute of Hygiene
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of the University of Berlin, city school and infant welfare physician in Berlin, own practice since 1936.

32. John Rittmeister, MD, neurologist, studied medicine in Marburg, Kiel, Hamburg and Munich. Ass. Physician in Zurich and Bern, 1938 Senior Physician at the "Waldhaus" Nervenlinik Berlin. Head of the Polyclinic of the German Institute for Psychological Psychotherapy.

33. Günther Weisenborn, writer and dramaturge at the Schiller Theater in Berlin. Studied 13 semesters of philosophy and medicine in Cologne and Bonn. Author of several books, including "Mädchen von Fanö" and "Die Furie.

34. Helmuth Kolon", first studied law, then music. Well-known Berlin concert pianist, father professor of history Gustav Roloff, Berlin.

35. Adolf Grimme, former Prussian Minister of Education, studied in Halle, Munich and Göttingen. Oberstudienrat, 1925 Oberschulrat in the Provinzialschulkollegium Magdeburg, 1927 Ministerialrat in the Prussian Ministry of Education, 1929 Vice-President in the Prov. Koll. Berlin, 1930 until the takeover of power Social Democratic Minister of Education under the former Minister President Braun.

36. Wilhelm Guddorf, bookseller, son of the German professor at the University of Ghent, Ludwig Guddorf,

elementary school, Humanistisches Gymnasium Meile/Holland, University of Leyden, Münster, Paris, study of oriental languages and philology. In 1928, employee of the "Rote Fahne" under the pseudonym Paul Braun. Arrested in 1934, 3 years in prison, until 1939 in protective custody, 1940/41 bookseller's assistant at the Gsellius company in Berlin.

37. Eva Buch, studied at the Institute for Foreign Studies in Berlin. Since 1940 scholarship in the amount of 150 RM per month, at the same time as assistant at the institute. Education in a Catholic Ursuline convent.

38. Johannes Sieg, born in America, of German parents, returns to Germany in 1912, attends the teacher training seminar in Deutsch-Krone, in 1923 again leaves for North America, packer, construction laborer and auto worker. 1928 return to Berlin. Until the takeover of power, volunteer at the Berlin Communist newspaper "Rote Fahne". Reichsbahn assistant.

39. Ilse Stoebe, code name "Alte" or "Alta". Editor, until the seizure of power employed in the propaganda department of the Jewish advertising agency Mosse, for two years private secretary to Theodor Wolf, since 1936 foreign correspondent for several German and Swiss newspapers.

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tions in Warsaw, most recently working as an employee in the information department of the German Foreign Office.

40. Rudolf v. Scheliha, Legationsrat I. Class in the Information Department of the Foreign Office, officer of the First World War, law studies in Heidelberg, Attache in the A. A. Hamburg, Prague. 1929 Vice Consul, 1932 Legation Secretary in Warsaw, 1937 Legation Councillor I. Kl. 1939 A. A.

41. Wilhelm Heinrich Fellendorf, motor vehicle driver. 1933 Emigration to Sweden, then emigration to the Soviet Union, takes part in the Spanish Civil War as a tank officer on the Red Spanish side. After the outbreak of war, attends special parachuting schools in the SU. 1942 deployment as a parachute agent in Germany.

42. Erna Eitler, stenotypist and office clerk, 1928 secretary at the Russian trade mission in Berlin. 1931/33 Full-time employee of the BB apparatus, Chemistry subdivision. 1933 emigration to Russia. 1936/38 Soviet agent in Shanghai. 1939 illegal communist party functionary in Holland. After the outbreak of war, in-depth training as a parachute agent in Germany.

43. Albert Hössler, code name "Helmut Wiegner", "Franz" and "Walter Stein". Gardener. Emigrated to Spain in 1933 via CSR, Holland, France. Participated in the Spanish Civil War, as a result of wounding left for the SU via Paris. Locksmith at the Chelyabinsk tractor plant, after extensive training in 1942 deployment as a parachute agent in Germany.

44. Robert Barth, code name "Walter Kersten" and "Beck". Typesetter. Before the seizure of power, worked for the Berlin Communist newspaper "Rote Fahne". Electrician, drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1939. Wounded in the Western campaign. EK II in the East. 1942 allegedly Russian captivity, is brought to Berlin by NKW as a parachutist.

45. Heinrich Koenen, code names "Heinrich Ludwig Koester", "Karl", mechanical engineer, Technical University Berlin. 1933 Emigration via Denmark, Sweden to the SU. Experimental engineer in Moscow at the Automobile and Tractor Institute in Moscow. 1940 Acquisition of SU citizenship. 1941 Attended special parachute schools in the SU. 1942 deployment as a parachute agent in Germany. Father communist member of the Reich and state parliament Wilhelm Koenen.

In the end, the number of those arrested, who were suspected of having actively worked in the "Red Chapel", increased to 146. 86 of them were charged with high treason and treason against their country at the Reich War Court. Many hundreds of collaborators and helpers were never caught.

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The German branch of the "Red Chapel" was organized in terms of work in the following groups:

Group Coro

It was led by First Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen, who would have sought and found contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Berlin as early as 1936. Through an intermediary at the time, he supplied Soviet spy chief Alexander Erdberg with information about the Condor Legion fighting in Spain. Schulze-Boysen was the most important man of the "Red Chapel" in Germany.

His wife Liberias, code names "Vicky" and "Libs," recruited by him for the Soviet intelligence service, became, unconditionally devoted to her husband, his best collaborator. If Harro Schulze-Boysen was the soul of the "Red Chapel" in Germany, Mrs. Liberias was its heart. She was the chief of staff. No one would have suspected such a dangerous agent in this exceedingly beautiful, charming woman. She drove as a courier, organized illegal meetings, and kept the strings to the agents and informer groups firmly in her neat hands.

To the narrower group Coro still belonged:

Colonel Erwin Gehrts, Ic in the Reich Aviation Ministry,

Oberleutnant Herbert Gollnow, Abwehrabteilung des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht,

Leutnant zur See Wolfgang Havemann, Naval Intelligence Service III in the High Command of the Navy, his code name was "Italian",

Sales representative Johannes Graudenz, code name "John",

News radio operator Horst Heilmann, code name "Hans",

Luftwaffe Weather Service Inspector Heinrich Scheel, Berlin-Rangsdorf Air Base Commandant, Factory Manager Leo Szczribczynski,

Construction Inspector at the Ministry of Aviation Hans Gerhard Henniger.

In addition, a number of intermediaries were active, including: the secretary in the Reich Aviation Ministry Hanni Kaminski, art ceramist Jan Bontjes van Beek, his daughter, the student Catja, code name "Cato", Viktor Dubinski and wife Jutta, journalist Dr. Karl Helferich, journalist Arnold Bauer, Director Thuestedt.

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Party communists were employed at Coro:

the sculptor Ruthild Hahne, furthermore Liane Berkowitz, Erich Heine, Wolfgang Thiess, Wilhelm Boelter and Klara Schabbel.

The treasury was also in the hands of a proven communist, the already aged Emil Hübner, whose whole family, especially his daughter Frida Wesoleck and her husband Stanislaus Wesoleck, were built into the "Red Chapel".

In his unfortunately brief notes "Die Rote Kapelle" (The Red Chapel), Judge General Dr. Manfred Roeder describes the role of the Hübner family as follows:

"The Hübner family lived in the northeast of Berlin. The head of the family, the old Emil Hübner, then 8 years old, had joined the KPD in 1919 after many years of membership in the SPD. In his neighborhood, the old invalid pensioner was regarded as a well-situated, somewhat solitary man, who held the scepter in the house over his children living with him, his daughter Frida and her husband Stanislaus Wesoleck. The son-in-law with his already grown-up sons had also been a member of the KPD since its foundation. In the middle of October 1942 the family was arrested because of evidence that Russian parachute agents had repeatedly arrived here and were in contact with the family. The house search uncovered a fortune in gold currency, hidden and built into coal boxes, tables, clothes brushes - in short, every piece of furniture held monetary values. In addition, furnishings of a complete passport forgery workshop were found. Son and grandson had probably participated in this business until the outbreak of the war, but with the beginning of the war, father Hübner had continued the "business" alone with his daughter and son-in-law. For many years, illegal couriers of the KPD had passed through him, had supplemented their papers with him, and had also fetched new papers when the old papers were no longer clean enough for the police.

When, after the outbreak of the German-Russian war, the first visitors from Moscow reappeared, Emil Hübner and his family took them in very well. Here they deposited large sums of foreign currency, the possession of which could possibly endanger them in their illegal work, but they were sure that if necessary they could withdraw the necessary money from father Hübner, as from a bank. He also knew how to make sure that he himself and his family did not miss out. If the deposited account was in danger of slowly running out of money due to withdrawals, his daughter Frida stepped in with her spouse.

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He told the agents that they could no longer be seen, since their work and their visit to Father Hübner had presumably become known to the police. So the agents had no choice but to disappear again into the darkness of illegality and leave the credit balance with Father Hübner."

Secondary groups Coros were:

Libs group

It was under the leadership of Liberia's Schulze-Boysen.

Female employees were:

Erika Countess von Brockdorff,

Stenotypist Maria Terwiel,

Journalist Ilse Stoebe.

Group dancer

Led by Oda Schottmüller, sculptor and dancer,

Dr. Philipp Schaefer,

Library Inspector Elli Lotte Schleif,

Anna Kraus, graphologist and fortune teller.

The latter's activity was grotesque. She used her camouflage as a fortune teller not only to obtain information, but also to morally strengthen the backbone of various members of the "Red Chapel". Colonel Gehrts, in particular, had a considerable penchant for the occult. He had Anna Kraus tell him fortunes even in official matters. However, the prophecies of the red fortune teller did not come true. She told Colonel Gehrts that his path would lead steeply upwards and prophesied that Graudenz would play a political role in the future. She knew nothing of their end on the gallows.

Group doctor

Led by Elfriede Paul, MD.

Employees were:

John Rittmeister, MD,

Writer Walter Küchenmeister.

Engineer group

Led by engineer Paul Scholz.

Employees were:

his wife Herta,

Director Thomfor, company Loewe AG-, which manufactured and developed measuring and radio direction finding equipment for the Wehrmacht,

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Engineer Hans Henkel, head of department of Loewe AG.,

Engineer Karl Boehme, Telefunken Company,

Chief Engineer Hans Kumerow, Auer-Werke,

Student Group

Led by Horst Heilmann, foreign studies student.

Employees:

Günter Gussow, international studies student,

Constable Alfred Traxi, Cipher Department in the OKW,

Helmut Himpel, electrical engineering student.

Closely connected with Coro worked the

Group Arvid.

It was led by Oberregierungsrat Dr. jur. and phil. Arvid Harnack.

Employees were:

Wife Dr. phil. Mildred Harnack,

Dr. phil. Adam Kuckhoff,

Wife Greta Kuckhoff,

Ernst Niekisch, writer,

Günther Weisenborn, writer,
Dr. Adolf Grimme, former Prussian Minister of Education,
Marcel Melliand, Publisher,
Helmut Roloff, pianist,
Karl Behrens, design engineer,
Eva Buch, University Assistant,
Rose Schlesinger, typist,
and the party communists: Johannes Sieg and Wilhelm Guddorf.

Shortly before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the Soviet spy chief Alexander Erdberg in Berlin first gave Dr. Arvid Harnack 12,000 RM, Kuckhoff 1500 RM and a non-operational radio set. Harnack paid out 2000 RM to Grimme, 5000 RM to Behrens, 3000 RM to Szczribczynski, and 1000 RM to Rose Schlesinger. Harnack himself kept 1000 RM.

The fact that Soviet money was constantly coming in for the employees of the "Red Chapel" was proven by the 8,000 RM carried by the Soviet agent Heinz Koenen, who parachuted down near Osterode in the Harz Mountains on October 23, 1942, to deliver it to Scheliha. The latter led one of the most interesting groups within the "Red Band," namely the [79]

Aryan Group.

It was led by Legationsrat I. Class Rudolf von Scheliha.

His co-worker was Ilse Stoebe.

Scheliha's continuing indebtedness in Warsaw as legation counselor at the German embassy there landed him in the clutches of Soviet espionage agent Herrstadt. Scheliha then attended the daily directors' meeting in Berlin at the Foreign Office, where he held a key position. He knew practically everything about German diplomatic activity.

The already quoted final report of the Chief of the Security Police on the "Red Chapel" to the Reich War Court reported the following results of the police investigation concerning this top Soviet agent:

"On 28. 8. 1941, an encrypted radio message was intercepted by the shortwave B station in Prague, which could be deciphered in August 1942 after the encryption method of the radio operator Johann Wenzel, who had been arrested in Brussels, was revealed. In the radio message, the Moscow agent Kent is requested from Brussels to seek out one Ilse Stoebe (code name Alte) in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Wielandstr. 37, and to have her contact the Brussels agent's office. Alte is described in the FT as an important agent.

On 12. 9. 42, in the course of the roll-up of the Berlin espionage organization, Stoebe was arrested and identified as Ilse Stoebe, Berlin resident. After almost seven weeks of denial, Stoebe made a confession that she had been working for the SU intelligence service and had been constantly passing on news in return for payment to her friend, the Jew and former journalist of the Berliner Tageblatt, Rudolf Herrstadt, who was currently staying in Moscow. She continued to commit racial defilement with Herrstadt and was in a complete bondage relationship with him. From spring 1942 to July 1942, working in the information department of the AA in Berlin, Stoebe, on instructions received, communicated via the SU embassy in Berlin with Legationsrat I. Kl. Rudolf v. Scheliha and continuously received political messages of all kinds from him, which she forwarded to an Attache of the SU Embassy. Via the Soviet Embassy, she forwarded instructions from the Moscow Jewish agent Herrstadt to von Scheliha, and in February 41 she handed over RM 30,000 to him for work done. Von Scheliha was arrested on 29. 10. 1942 and has since made a confession. According to this, he stands, already 37 by the Herrstadt in Warsaw (v. Scheliha was there-

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mally recruited for a total of 9 years at the German Embassy in Warsaw), in the Soviet intelligence service and continuously forwarded political incidents from the German Warsaw Embassy to Herrstadt for a fee.

In February 38, US \$6500 was transferred to his bank account Julius Baer & Co. in Zurich via the credit institution in Lyon, with a crossed check from the Chase National Bank in New York, as remuneration for the intelligence work performed. The extent of Scheliha's betrayal cannot be determined at this time. Problems on

which he had to comment on behalf of Moscow included German-Polish relations, the outcome of the talks between the Polish Foreign Minister and the German Ambassador in Warsaw, the accession of European states to the Three-Power Pact, and the official statement of the Foreign Office on the threat of an English invasion. According to the findings so far, v. Scheliha probably received about RM 50,000 in agent's money, which, since he and his family lived far beyond his means, was gobbled up by his household."

In addition to the groups and individuals mentioned above, there were a number of intermediate connections to the illegal KPD and to the circles of the German resistance movement, which were widely exploited for the purposes of Soviet espionage.

Within the framework of the German section of the "Red Chapel", the most important agent radio operators were:

as technical chief of the radio groups Hans Coppi, his wife Hilde Coppi, Heinrich Scheel, Walter Husemann, Kurt Schulze, Hans Lautenschläger with wife Ina, Wilhelm Thews, Fritz Thiel with wife Hannelore, Fritz Rehmer, Herbert Andreas Richter, Max Hübner, Helmut Marquardt and Richard Weißensteiner. Radio equipment and instructions came directly from Moscow at regular intervals and were delivered by paratroopers dropped in the Reich territory.

How many parachutists jumped for the "Red Chapel" in Germany could never be determined. All in all, it was only known that well over 100 were dropped over German territory. Only a fraction of them could be caught. All of the parachutists, all of them trained agents from the ranks of the KPD emigration, were armed and fought back with all means at their disposal. When two of these Soviet parachutists

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near Erbach in the Odenwald, they killed several policemen with their submachine guns until they could be liquidated.

The main parachute agents were:

Albert Hössler, code name "Helmuth Wiegner", who also called himself "Franz" and "Walter Stein".

Robert Barth, code name "Walter Kersten" and "Beck". Both jumped off at the Eastern Front and then traveled via Bialystock, Warsaw and Posen to Berlin.

Erna Eifler, code names "Gerda Sommer" and "Rosita." This professional communist worked as a Soviet agent in Shanghai from 1936 to 1938, became an illegal communist functionary in Holland in 1939, and then jumped Germany.

Wilhelm Heinrich Fellendorf, code names "Willi Machwurow" and "Helmuth". During the Spanish Civil War, he was a tank officer with the International Brigade.

*

Eugen Nesper was arrested in Stuttgart with a complete radio equipment.

The entire complex became pending before the Imperial War Court.

The trial began on December 15, 1942, in Lietzensee. The main defendants stated that they had worked with the "Red Orchestra" out of hatred for National Socialism and because they were convinced that Germany could only exist in the closest connection with the Soviet Union and work for a Bolshevik Europe.

The Reichskriegsanwalt countered the defendants:

"You betrayed Germany at a time when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle. You acted out of ambition and vanity, and in order to overthrow the government you need not have sacrificed the lives of hundreds of thousands of German people, and thereby in turn bring sorrow to the hearts of millions. But the worst thing you have done is that for this you have taken the enemy's silver pieces, the Judas wages."

The Reichsgesetz requested a legal opinion from the High Command of the Wehrmacht on the extent to which the actions of the defendants would have had a military impact.

The chief of the German Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, appeared before the Imperial War Tribunal and, in response to a question about it from the representative of the Imperial War Office, stated:

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"Of course, it is difficult to provide precise figures here. This is especially true with regard to material damage.

According to the results and documents available to me so far, it can be assumed with certainty that the treason of the Red Chapel claimed 220,000 to 280,000 victims."

*

Not all employees of the "Red Chapel" had been aware of the consequences of their actions. Some just slipped recklessly into the whole story. The case of First Lieutenant Herbert Gollnow was particularly tragic. He was in charge of German sabotage operations in the East in the Abweh Abteilung of the OKW as a unit leader for airborne troops and paratroopers. Somehow he became acquainted with Dr. Mildred Harnack and was repeatedly invited by her. Born in America, she showed an unmistakable interest in the first lieutenant. Her husband, Oberregierungsrat Dr. Arvid Harnack, smiled mildly at the "flirtation" and seemed to be so involved in his work at the Reich Ministry of Economics that he could hardly find time for his wife. He encouraged Gollnow wherever he could to pass the time with his wife.

Gollnow was very taken with the whole well-to-do milieu of the Harnack family and tried to please the elegant lady of the house. She wanted to know everything about his life, and he told. But there was not too much that was exciting. Finally, the frivolous lieutenant enriched his conversation with the adventurous actions of those daring, freedom-hungry Balts, Caucasians and Ukrainians who foolhardily risked their lives to defeat the hated Bolshevism.

In one night again with a small group of Balts and Ukrainians far behind the red lines the blowing up of a Soviet railroad network was planned.

Gollnow told excitingly about this enterprise. Mildred Harnack moved closer to him. She hung on his lips as if spellbound. While she pressed herself tenderly against him, Lieutenant Gollnow told everything he knew.

In between, the "overworked" husband arrived, and of course the amiable housewife also had something to discuss with him in the next room. Then, unfortunately, the Oberregierungsrat had to leave again: "You understand, Herr Oberleutnant, duty is duty. If your time permits, keep my wife company a little longer."

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Herbert Gollnow beamed.

Harnack, however, immediately informed Harro Schulze-Boysen, and a little later a new radio message was sent by Coppi. "From Coro to headquarters: deployment of undercover agents on the Kharkov-Urasov railroad line during the nights of November 3 to November 7. 17 men and four women. Takeoff: Lebedin. Aircraft type He 111."

Then one morning at 2:40 a.m., when the death-defying men jumped from 900 meters, they jumped to their deaths. The red executioners were already waiting below, ready to receive them.

*

In France, meanwhile, the services of the German Abwehr, the Security Police and the SD had not remained idle either. They had rediscovered the trail of Gilbert, the "Grand Chef," which led to Sevres to a villa and another house at No. 6 rue Forruny. It was very quickly established that there was telephone communication between the two houses. Civilian officers were now guarding the two buildings day and night, and one officer noticed that a note fell out of the pocket of the attendant who was keeping the villa in order, without her noticing. The note, picked up by the security guard, was a prescription for medication for dental treatment, issued by a dentist in downtown Paris who had his practice near the Metrostadon "Pyramides."

As a result, the unsuspecting dentist's office was also watched continuously. In fact, on the Friday of that week, Gilbert appeared at the dentist's office for treatment. Just as he was sitting in the dental chair, two officers arrested him, handcuffed him and took him away. Two other officers were already waiting in the dentist's waiting room, and they picked up Gilbert and immediately took him to the office by car without attracting attention. The dentist was told that he was an international impostor and that his arrest was to be kept strictly confidential.

Gilbert was so stunned that at first he didn't quite understand what was happening to him. Then it was too late. At the same time, the employees of the Simex company, which had long been under surveillance, were arrested,

especially Gilbert's secretary Andre, whose real name was Francois Katz. Leon Grossvogel was arrested as well as Alfred Corbin. In this hopeless situation, Leopold Trepper, alias Gil- [84]

bert, to his fate and allowed himself to be "turned around". From now on he worked for the German side. Gilbert was handled with ice-cream gloves by the German security police, was given well-secured private quarters, completely sealed off from the outside world, and where he and his associates lived on the best of rations, alcohol, tobacco products, and bean-to-bar coffee, which was so rare at the time.

As his first action, Gilbert lured the Soviet chief agent Harry, a Jewish émigré from Frankfurt am Main, into the trap. He ordered him to the Metro station on Avenue de Suffren and designated the accompanying German official Harry, who was actually arrested in the process. After lengthy questioning, Harry stated that his name was Heinrich Sigismund Robinson. At the time of his arrest, he had with him some business cards, ciphered notes and records which he had not been able to destroy during the raid arrest. On the basis of this material, three of Harry's illegal quarters were found, and in one of them a rather worn, shabby briefcase made of full-grain cowhide, which had been very carefully hidden. An expert examination of the notes and newspapers contained in the briefcase revealed a number of important records as well as evidence of agent connections. When the briefcase was finally taken apart, thin tissue papers containing other fruitful messages and two unfolded passports were found.

Now the ball was rolling. In one fell swoop, the "Red Chapel" was liquidated throughout southern France. Kent, alias Victor Sokolow, who was feverishly sought everywhere, now called himself "Carlo Sierra" and had retreated with the remnants of his group to Marseille - Toulon, from where he continued to work. He was arrested. Unbeknownst to him, his partner also fell into German hands. The group Isidor Springer was neutralized in Lyon - St. Etienne. All transmitters were silenced.

While Gilbert and Harry resigned themselves to their fate and were now working for the Germans, Isidor Springer threw himself from the fifth floor of the Wehrmacht prison in Paris on the second day of his imprisonment, when he was to be led for interrogation. He was killed instantly.

In Paris itself, the brother and sister Maxim Maximovich and Anna Maximovich, MD, were arrested. They were working as agents for the "Red Chapel". In order to obtain better information, Maxim Maximovich had contacted an elderly secretary at the German Gene- [85]

ral consul, Fräulein Hoffmann-Scholz, and used the unsuspecting woman to obtain information through her and to establish contacts important for Soviet espionage.

At the same time, the broadcasting groups near Bordeaux in Chelles (Paris East), Hay-les-Roses (Paris South), near Lilie and near Annecy were excavated in cooperation with the radio defense.

The case with the arrested Victor Sokolow, alias Kent, was difficult. He was immediately flown to Berlin, but he remained stubbornly silent. On November 3, 1943, he merely signed a protocol with the following lines: "I am a Soviet officer. I do not deny having worked against Germany where I was ordered. You can shoot me."

And he stayed that way. The interrogating officers, who knew full well that Kent, along with Gilbert, was the most important man in Soviet military espionage in Europe, despaired. They threatened and they promised, but Kent only smiled. For five long weeks. His interrogators' nerves were far worse off than his own.

Then the blonde picture-perfect woman Margarethe Barcza, with whom he had a little girl, who had been arrested in France, was also brought to Berlin. Kent hoped that Margarethe Barcza was safe in unoccupied France. More by chance than design, the two met when they were brought in for their separate interrogations.

Kent, who had no idea that Margarethe had been in German custody for weeks, threw himself on the woman and kissed her passionately. Then the hard man burst into tears and implored the commissar to set the woman, who had nothing whatsoever to do with his work, at liberty; he was ready for anything. Kent suffered a real nervous breakdown.

His offer was immediately accepted. Under the strictest secrecy, Kent was taken to Weimar with his wife and child and quartered in an isolated house. From that moment on, the Kremlin's master agent worked for Germany. Since in the meantime essential agents and radio operators had been turned over, a grandiose game began on the German side: The turned over Soviet agents now radioed to Moscow in German service, and for a long time the

clever Soviet secret service promptly fell for it.

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At the Lietzensee, meanwhile, the monster trial against the "Red Band" rolled out in groups under the alternating presidency of the Senate Presidents Dr. Kraell and Dr. Schmauser. Judicial assessors of general rank were: Dr. Ernst and Dr. Mantel; military assessors: Admiral Arps, General Bertram and General Musshoff. The prosecution was represented by Judge General Dr. Roeder.

Most of the defendants confessed. The facts of the case were therefore clear. The following were sentenced to death: Harro Schulze-Boysen, Dr. Arvid Harnack, Rudolf von Scheliha, Dr. Adam Kuckhoff, Coppi, Graudenz, Heilmann, Schulze, Schumacher, Gollnow, Gehrts, Schaefer, Himpel, Husemann, Küchenmeister, Dr. Rittmeister, Guddorf, Fellendorf, Barth.

Of the women sentenced to death were: Liberias Schulze-Boysen, Erika Gräfin Brockdorff, Ilse Stoebe, Dr. Mildred Harnack, Elisabeth Schumacher, Oda Schottmüller, Anna Kraus, Marie Terwiel, Erna Eitler, Clara Schabbel and Greta Kuckhoff. In the case of her alone, the death sentence was commuted to a prison term of 10 years in the penitentiary. All the others were executed. All in all, 41 defendants were executed in connection with the "Red Chapel".

In the case of Roloff, Koenen, Melliand, the proceedings were dropped. Alfred Traxi received three years in prison. Wolfgang Havemann received 11 months in prison and was placed on front-line parole without demotion. Henniger received three years and front parole, Szczribczynski one year front parole, Schleif four years penitentiary, Dr. Elfriede Paul eight years penitentiary, Weisenborn three years prison, Dr. Grimme three years penitentiary,

Eva Rittmeister three years in prison. The accused Sieg committed suicide while in custody.

Those condemned to death died gripped except for Scheliha. Only the latter threw himself on his knees before his executioners and begged for his life. He had to be dragged by force to the gallows.

Harro Sdhulze-Boysen's last words were, "I die a convinced communist!"

While a number of documents on the "Red Chapel" survived the war and collapse, the judgments themselves were destroyed in May 1945 during the transfer from Torgau to the south in Czechoslovakia. [87]

The "Red Three" continues to work

Deadly radio network in Switzerland - The betrayal sat at the highest German

Place - "Werther" remained unrecognized until today

The "Red Chapel" had been crushed. At least in the German sphere of influence. But whoever thought that the betrayal of Germany had come to an end was mistaken. On the contrary, the treacherous news from Germany increased in an almost unbelievable way.

This time, however, the messages flowed to Switzerland into the "Red Three" network, which was headed by Alexander Rado.

Even before the war, Switzerland was a favorite stomping ground for Soviet espionage. In 1937, the top Red agent Maria Schutz, code name "Sonja," was sent to the Swiss Confederation with the task of setting up an espionage group against Germany. Sonja was joined by two British Soviet agents, Alexander Foote and Bill Phillips, who had fought in the "International Brigade" in the Spanish Civil War. First of all, an illegal radio station was set up in Caux-sur-Montreux. After the radio communication worked in December 1940, "Sonja" was recalled.

The new, powerful head of the entire Red Army network in Switzerland was now Alexander Rado. In Geneva, he had set up a graphic office, Geopress, at 113 rue de Lausanne, as a cover. His collaborators included: his wife Helene, Edmond Hamel and his wife Olga. The cover names of this couple were "Eduard" and "Maud". Furthermore, Rachel Dübendorfer, code name "Sissy", Marguerite Bolli, Georg Wilmer and wife Johanna with the code names "Lorenz" and "Laura". In addition, a number of V-men and radio operators worked for Rado.

His news sources were par excellence. The most important three were:

Pakbo. Behind this abbreviation was a group of agents of Italian communists who worked in Germany, Italy and Switzerland.

The Swiss Dr. phil. Franz Josef Xaver Schnieper, officially a journalist, a left-wing radical intellectual with the

best connections to the Swiss intelligence major Hausamann. Schnieper achieved his secondment to the Swiss Abwehr office. Through him, the most important man of this "Red Three" came into close contact with the Swiss intelligence service: Rudolf Rössler, alias Selzinger.

Rössler, code name "Lucy," was a German emigrant. He came from Kaufbeuren, was editor of the Augsburgische Allgemeine Zeitung for some time, and then headed the Deutscher Bühnenvolksbund in Berlin.

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In 1933 he emigrated to Switzerland and worked as a sophisticated intelligence agent both for Switzerland and, until the collapse, for Czechoslovakia. Through Rado, he was now also working for the Soviet Union. Rössler was a real jack of all trades. Not only did he get along brilliantly with the Swiss defense officers, he was also always a welcome guest at the German Embassy. Even in the days of the "Red Chapel," Rössler had first-class news sources in Germany. His associates were so well-informed that they must have sat in the very highest military offices, perhaps even in the immediate vicinity of Adolf Hitler. Rössler's main source ran under the code name "Werther." After the destruction of the "Red Kapelle," the Kremlin drew from this source its best information, which was deadly for Germany.

The most grotesque thing was that the German radio listening service was able to follow day by day all that was betrayed without ever finding or even plugging the sources. A personality in the highest place must have prevented this in a planned way.

The former German Abwehrroberst W. F. Flicke reported about it in his book "Agenten funken nach Moskau":

"The eavesdropping service was able to establish continuously that the Russians were well informed about all phases of German preparations. They knew all the formations in the front and in readiness. Completely hidden from German reconnaissance, on the other hand, was the enormous deployment that was taking place behind the Russian front in the "nose" between Orel and Belgorod and to the south of it. Gritting their teeth, the German evaluators realized that nothing remained hidden from the "Red Three" in this decisive phase of the entire war in the East."

Then the time had come. On July 4, 1943, Hitler issued a blazing call to the troops prepared for the limited-area attack. And the German divisions set out on the offensive, which was to be their last in the East.

The attack did not come as a surprise to the Soviets; the "Red Three" had been announcing it for a quarter of a year. They knew that the original plans had been replaced by the idea of a double attack with a limited target north of Belgorod and north of Maloarchangelsk. They knew that a third of all German armored forces of the Eastern Front were gathered in the attack areas: 15 armored divisions, one fast and 14 infantry divisions. Already the first day of fighting showed the error about the estimation of the Soviet defensive force.

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The German front staffs were wondering where the Russians' material superiority came from, just where the German troops were attacking. How it was possible that the Russians knew exactly the weak points in the German front and crashed into them. Or when the German tanks between Kursk and Orel encountered ten to fifteen defensive positions staggered in a row and still had not broken through. All this was due to the work of the "Red Three", who had signaled the imminent German attack to Moscow months before.

On July 14, the German offensive between Orel and Belgorod flagged. The next day the Russians counterattacked north of Orel. By July 17, they had shattered the German lines at depths of up to 50 kilometers. German tank losses now totaled nearly 2500. And on the 22nd Rado radioed:

To Director.

From red by courier.

OKH planned only local offensive on Eastern Front to take Kursk in five days, for which it was ready to sacrifice crews of two divisions and 600 tanks. Due to failure of the attack and very high losses there is great confusion in OKH, OKW and in staff of Kluge. By eleven o'clock in the evening Germans had lost three divisions completely and four divisions partially. This made reorganization necessary. Reserves and material en route to eastern front from Berlin, Hannover, Kassel, Ludwigshafen, Kaiserslautern, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Ulm, Breslau, Sagan, Frankfurt an Oder. Kluge lost a quarter of available aircraft and a sixth of available tanks. Dora."

Alexander Foote, the active British Soviet spy Alexander Rados, who later changed fronts, reports about

Rössler's activity in his "Handbook for Spies":

"Lucy" not only provided news about the deployment of German troops, news that could only have come from the OKW in Bendlerstrasse, but also obtained equally good news from the Luftwaffe High Command and the Naval Office. The latter two sources ran more on the sidelines because headquarters was, of course, primarily interested in troop movements, but "Lucy" could, and did, provide news of German aircraft and ship movements and occasionally interspersed reports on German economic production and science. For example, I remember that in the year.

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1941 provided news on the manufacture of flying bombs and plans for the construction of 10t rockets."

Foote assures that "Lucy" had reported the exact date of the German attack two weeks before the beginning of the Eastern campaign. However, the British Soviet spy does not know anything about the German sources of "Lucy" either. "Lucy" had merely told Foote:

"... that the purge after the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 had considerably reduced the number of his sources. However, he managed to produce an astonishing number of documents afterwards, which he asked me to take with me to Paris for forwarding to the Soviet Embassy in Bern. The purge and the resulting almost complete annihilation of any resistance movement in Germany had apparently merely worried him and temporarily put him in an awkward position, but in no way deprived him of his sources."

Rudolf Rössler was not cheap. Again and again he demanded money, money and more money from Rado. He received a fixed monthly fee of 7,000 Swiss francs, which he never managed to get by on; he was always claiming new, numerous special bonuses.

The German services were powerless. They were able to control the dangerous radio lines operating on the neutral ground of Switzerland by radio surveillance, and eventually they were able to decode the messages, but they were not able to silence them. Gradually, German counterintelligence succeeded in infiltrating the Rado group, but it, too, never got as far as the sources. The radio surveillance established only by continuous comparisons of the betrayal reports that the reports of "Werther" from the OKH were signed with "Teddy", from the office of the Commander of the Reserve Army with "Olga", from the Foreign Office by "Anna", at the High Command of the Air Force under "Stoffen". Who were the persons who continued to commit this monstrous betrayal even after the gruesome end of the "Red Chapel" was never known.

The extent of this gigantic betrayal becomes clear only after a detailed knowledge of the radio transmissions.

For example:

"10.10. 1943

To director

From Werther, October 5.

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a) Between Volkhov and Leningrad sections, General Lindemann began clearing exposed positions on September 30.

b) In the area north of the Luga River, the population capable of work has been collected for two weeks and deported to Estonia and Latvia. The majority of deportees is used in Latvia for the construction of shelters, air raid shelters, winter shelters for Wehrmacht.

c) In order to drive Slovenian partisans out of the forest area east of Gorizia, General Hauser had forests set on fire by incendiary bombs and chloride fog blown from airplanes. In the eastern part of Jstrein there are still 10,000 armed, resolutely fighting Slovenians. They are waiting for Allied weapons aid, which they have been promised from leaflets from British planes.

Dora."

"To Director

From Olga, October 7.

a) Recently Hitler and Führer headquarters are in Rovno.

b) Since September 20, German troops have been proceeding in Volhynia with the most brutal means, such as burning down villages. The aim is to provide maximum security for Rovno, Dubno, Luzk, which are now centers

of German administrative and economic apparatus in Ukraine.

Dora."

Finally, the Swiss police, who had been watching the game for some time, intervened and on October 8, 1943, in Geneva, at Route de Florissant No. 197, arrested the couple Edmond and Olga Hamel during radio communications with Moscow.

Alexander Rado was almost arrested as well. It was only thanks to a routine precaution that he remained free for some time this time. Edmond Hamel stopped a clock hanging on the first floor of the house every time he started a broadcast. Thus all members of the spy network knew that he was broadcasting with Moscow.

Habitually, Rado, entering the house, glanced at the clock and winced: The clock had already been three hours. Something must be wrong here. Of course, each program lasted only a few minutes, and when it was over, the clock was started again.

Rado left the house in a hurry. He had received an important piece of information from "Werther" that would not tolerate any delay. He had to deliver the message from another radio station.

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The saying went:

"To Director.

From Werther.

OKH estimates Russian troops advancing against Vitebsk, Orsdiya, Gorky at 5 army corps with 2 armored divisions, 5 armored brigades, 3-4 motorized divisions, 10 infantry and cavalry divisions, with strongest group believed to be advancing along and south Smolensk-Vitebsk road. It is expected decisive attack on Vitebsk in the southeast of the city. There are no contiguous defensive positions there. At some points between the Smolensk-Vitebsk road and the Orsdiya-Vitebsk railroad, positions were hastily built only after Smolensk was threatened. The only well-developed positions are those in the northeast and north of the city in the Surash and Gododok sections.

Dora."

But the Swiss police, who had taken so long, now proceeded all the more thoroughly. Not content with just searching the house, they tore up the floors. Under the boards they discovered a whole arsenal of reports, plain texts of messages, cipher documents and even Rado's key book. Based on the cash records, it was discovered that Rado had disbursed over 400,000 Swiss francs in agent funds.

Thanks to these documents, the whole group was discovered and all of them, including Rado and Rössler, were arrested for illegal espionage. After the war, they received sentences; only Rössler did not. His connection to the Swiss intelligence service protected him from punishment for the time being.

The radio lines that had carried the messages of "Werther" to Moscow were silent. For the German Eastern Front, all this came much too late. Here the monstrous betrayal had contributed substantially to the fact that the fate took its merciless course.

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Once, however, German counterintelligence came close to unraveling the Werther mystery. It was in the months of May to July 1943.

Repeatedly, the British used Denis Sefton Delmer's black transmitters to foil German plans or even to pass coded instructions to agents or sabotage groups. At 9 o'clock one morning, the OKW had a briefing on operational measures.

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took place in Italy. At 5 p.m., these decisions and the entire content of this top-secret service meeting went out over the "Gustav Siegfried I" transmitter.

An immediate investigation by radio surveillance revealed that this betrayal could not have left the Reich territory by radio. There were no gaps in the examination of enemy agent radio traffic. This possibility was therefore ruled out.

All investigations, which converged centrally with the chief judge Dr. Manfred Roeder, led to the same

conclusion. The report of the betrayal could only have been phoned through from Berlin to Munich via the secret Dora line of the Abwehr. From there, a courier equipped with all the necessary papers (and probably also vehicles) must have brought the message to Bregenz, from where it found its way to Switzerland in a hurry.

A transmission by car or even by rail from Berlin via Basel was already impossible in terms of time.

Dr. Roeder now proceeded to evaluate and analyze the decoded Werther messages in a mosaic process. The treason messages consisted of tactical, operational and personnel information. For this reason, Dr. Roeder and his staff assumed that the traitor must be both in the Operations Department of the OKW and with a V-man in the AHA (General Army Office). But these inquiries had to be suddenly interrupted before they could lead to success. On July 21, 1943, the Chief Reich Military Prosecutor Dr. Kraell informed the Chief Judge Dr. Roeder that Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel had ordered that the investigations against General Oster, Dr. Müller, Bonhoeffer and Dohnanyi were no longer to be conducted with a view to high treason and treason against the country. This meant that Dr. Roeder no longer had official legitimation to continue dealing with the problem.

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Perhaps Walter Görlitz's account best illuminates the human background of this probably so exceedingly disastrous instruction:

"In the spring of 1943, the Oster case was submitted to Keitel. He hit his own office. Major General Hans Oster, chief of the Central Department of the Abwehr Division in the OKW, was accused of unlawful uk positions and indirectly [96]

suspected of foreign exchange offenses. But in the light of day, for at least five years he had been much more: the chief of staff of a clandestine conspiracy against Hitler that had never come to fruition. Oster, soldier body and soul, was a revolutionary, like Stauffenberg, like Schulze-Boysen again in a different way. And like the latter, he was willing to use any means, even the most unusual, to bring about Hitler's downfall, because he considered Hitler to be the corrupter of the nation and the Reich. Oster's and Schulze-Boysen's political goals were diametrically opposed. But just as Schulze-Boysen did not shrink from leaking military news to the Bolsheviks, Oster did not shrink from announcing to his friends in the West, for example, Hitler's attack date before the 1940 Western Offensive.

Field Marshal Keitel understood only so much of these things, that here was an embarrassing affair, which had presumably sprung from the intricate goings-on that the "Abwehr" had to engage in. When, in the course of the affair, a court-martial councilor reported to him that he believed he could prove that Admiral Canaris, the head of the Foreign/Abwehr Office in the OKW, was at least committing high treason, he got rough - and he could then get very rough. How could he presume, he asked the court-martial councilor, to claim that a bureau chief of the OKW was committing treason? A German admiral would not do such a thing! He threatened the unfortunate man with a trial by court-martial. The statement was quickly withdrawn. Oster received a simple farewell with pension.

The Field Marshal also refused to believe in any guilt on the part of Admiral Canaris when he was arrested after July 20 and eventually taken to a concentration camp. He supported the admiral's family with money. In the same way, he refused to believe in any guilt of the

General Thomas, his office chief for military economy, who was arrested after July 20, as an old member of the Fronde. It was not departmental ambition that guided him. He was quite literally too straight to suppose that anyone could have been double-crossing someone who had been well acquainted with him year after year."

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The gigantic traitor - who could only have sat in the very highest military echelons - and his henchmen never became known. If the Swiss intelligence agencies knew the names, they never released them. Rössler has died in the meantime. Allegedly, he had been

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He was entrusted to Father Karrer from Lucerne, who also remained silent about the person "Werther". Even as a witness in the subsequent espionage trial against Rössler and Dr. Schnieper - when they were convicted of other

offenses after the war - Father Karrer only testified that Rössler received his news from Germany from circles that cooperated with the Ecumenical Council in Geneva.

The Swiss Abwehr chief Waibel wanted to publish a book about these events after the war. The Swiss General Staff prevented the implementation of this plan.

Therefore, possibly "Werther", whose hands are sullied by the blood of hundreds of thousands of soldiers he betrayed, lives respected among us.

Perhaps he is waiting for the next opportunity to be so successful again for the Kremlin.

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Organization "Bernhard"

Ships to Germany were blown up - Ernst Wollweber's deadly

- Jakob Liebersohn finished the job - Supplies

Finnish front came to a standstill

All hell broke loose in all Scandinavian ports from 1938. Just in the nick of time, an incendiary bomb was discovered and defused on board the Polish ship "Batory" on January 28, 1938. The steamer "Klaus Böge", which had sailed from Oslo, sank on March 19 as a result of a mysterious explosion at Riff Horn near Esbjerg. On the Italian steamer "Feice" an infernal engine was thrown overboard in time. In the harbor of Frederikshafen, the Spanish fishing steamers "Abrego" and "Cicero" sank in the night of May 22 due to explosions. Numerous ships exploded at sea and sank so quickly that they could no longer give an SOS signal. They remained missing forever.

All the ships, however different their nationalities, had one thing in common: their cargoes were destined for Germany.

Police stations in all the Nordic countries were baffled. Then, after the Frederikshafen attack, the Danish criminal police managed to catch some of the assassins, namely Alberti Hansen, Kai Geji and Londfords. Hansen, cornered, confessed to having brought the dynamite from Malmö. The Swedish police immediately questioned the store owner from whom Hansen had picked up the suitcase with explosives. He was adamant that he had taken custody of the suitcase from a stranger only as a courtesy, the very suitcase that Hansen had later picked up in accordance with his orders. Thus the Swedish investigations came to nothing for the time being.

Only after a long period of denial did those arrested in Denmark confess that they belonged to the International Seamen's and Dockers' Union and that their leader was Ernst Wollweber.

This Wollweber was one of the most ruthless and brutal communists in Germany, who had long since ceased to be an unknown quantity to the police. In 1913 he had left Hannoversch-Münden to become a ship's boy on a riverboat on the Weser. In 1918 he hoisted the red flag on the cruiser SMS Helgoland as a stoker in the Imperial Navy.

During the Spartacus uprisings and Max Holz's terror gangs, he and his accomplices engaged the police in wild firefights.

Nevertheless, he very soon represented the KPD as a deputy in the Prussian state parliament and later in the Reichstag. Wollweber's father, an incurable alcoholic, died in the insane asylum in Göttingen in 1927. In order to preserve his mut-

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Ernst Wollweber never cared about her. She spent her life in the most severe misery.

In 1933 Wollweber disappeared without a trace. It was not until September 1935 that he reappeared in Copenhagen, where he founded a timber import company Adolf Seelo & Co. in the immediate vicinity of the city hall. In Denmark, Wollweber's code name was Adolf Seel. Under this cover he began to set up his dangerous nets against Germany in Scandinavia. The closest collaborators of that period were: his wife Ragnhild, the Dutchman Adrian Vey, the Dane Eric Aage Jensen, the German Richard Krebs, the Norwegian Dr. med. Vossen. The hangman in Wollweber's group was Meeritz-Looring. He provided "discipline."

But no matter how masterfully Wollweber organized, he was not immune to setbacks. When the Estonian Eitermann was about to go limp, he was beaten to death by Eric Aage Jensen and Meeritz-Looring. The two were

arrested and had to stand trial for murder in the Copenhagen City Court. In Berlin, Wollweber's wife Ragnhild fell into the Gestapo's trap and was sentenced to death. But Wollweber reckoned with these operational accidents. "After all, death is half the battle, it doesn't hurt," he repeatedly preached to his comrades.

A search for him was conducted in all Scandinavian police stations. But for the time being, Ernst Wollweber remained without a trace.

For this, on June 25, 1938, an explosive charge blew up on the Japanese steamer Kaismaru, which was on its way to Hamburg. On June 27, the German ship Veronia, coming from Gothenburg, was at it in the lock at Holtenau. The infernal machine did a great job.

Here, too, as in most cases, the perpetrators could not be apprehended. It was like bewitched. Above all the ships, which for Germany

the red bird of death hovered. At the same time, everything was basically quite simple.

Comrade Ernst Wollweber had withdrawn to the Scandinavian countries after 1933 in accordance with his orders, and there, with the help of the shop stewards of the International Seamen's and Dockers' Union (IHS), which he led, he organized a terrorist group whose task was to disrupt shipping to Germany and to prevent it as far as possible. In a short time Wollweber had built up four powerful groups in Sweden alone: in Kiruna, in Luleå, in Poijus and in Stockholm. His most important comrades were; the Norwegian Martin Rasmussen Hjelmen,

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the crippled Norwegian Frans Barly Devold Pettersen, the Swede

Edvard Nyberg, the Swede Gustav Söder and the Germans Adolf Baier and Rolf Hagge, both International Brigadists from Spanten. In general, Wollweber with preference strengthened the organization Bernhard from the ranks of the former International Brigade. From their ranks came the Swedes Gösta Anderson, Harry Ericsson, Erik Lundahl, Karl Staf and the Finn Einar Risto. In addition, a number of daring men and women worked for Wollweber.

The most important man in the organization was the crane repairer

Edvard Nyberg in Kiruna, a resourceful technician and imaginative tinkerer. He made Wollweber the infernal machines and first experimented with an electric time fuse of the so-called bell model. Here, a small, fine, rotating crown of an alarm clock triggers the electric

Current off, which manages the explosion. Thus Nyberg made boxes for railroad sabotage. Each box was equipped with a button that, when pressed by a passing train, ignited the explosive charge in a flash. He also built Hell machines of the type of rat traps and made a lot of time fuses, as well as the explosive effect triggering metal tubes of various types.

Ernst Wollweber, whose code name was "Anton", met from time to time with Edvard Nyberg again and again for new considerations for the

Constructions partly in Stockholm, but also in Oslo.

The finished infernal machines were then picked up by rotating couriers.

Not content with that, the eager Nyberg also led the group

Kiruna, which had the task of procuring dynamite. In August 1937, in November 1937 and in March 1938, the Kiruna group carried out in the

Kiruna-Luossavaarabolaget" carried out three major burglaries in which they captured over 300 pounds of dynamite. In the end, Nyberg even got himself a key and, with his two accomplices Viktor Sundberg and Markström, calmly took as many dynamite boxes as were needed from remote magazines.

As the main courier, Gustav Söder picked up the infernal machines and transported them to the various ports.

The gruesome result of this work was usually not even known to the police stations. Only in the lists of shipping companies more and more ships disappeared without a trace on the high seas. About 70 of them can be attributed to the Bernhard organization. The last victim of this communist

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see saboteurs was the German troopship "Marion", which sank within eight minutes on May 8, 1940 with 4000 mountain troops on board in the icy waters of the fjords. The bomb had been smuggled onto the ship on

Wollweber's orders by comrade Richard Krebs.

Suddenly, on February 4, 1939, Gustaf Ceder, a miner, reported to the Luleå police, claiming to belong to a secret communist sabotage organization. The police gave him little credence at first, but when they were able to seize 5.7 kilograms of dynamite from a farm in the area following his instructions, it became clear to everyone that Ceder was telling the truth. The man reported that he had been recruited in the fall of 1938 by a Norwegian who called himself Nielson, and later he had been put in touch with another Norwegian who called himself Franz, who had ordered him to Narvik to the Hotel Nobel. Ceder had been introduced to Nielson by the head of the Communist Party of Norrbotten, Gotthild Ögren.

Ögren, questioned by police, said he knew nothing about anything.

The Norwegian State Police, however, immediately sent pictures based on the description of the person that Ceder had given, and Ceder also immediately recognized his previous comrades. Nielson was in fact Martin Rasmussen-Hjelmen and Franz in reality Frans Barly Devold Pettersen. On May 5, 1939, the Oslo police informed the Swedes that

Rasmussen-Hjelmen had been a senior official of the International Seamen's Club during the years 1930-1935.

Ceder further testified that he had been told that the activities of the organization was to prevent Swedish ore from being exported to Germany in the event of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the time being, his task had been only to smuggle parcels and letters aboard various ships. In the event of war, however

Railroad bridges, ships and the harbor entrance of Luleå (Tjuvholmsund) to be blown up. Ceder had received the order to investigate the depth of the Tjuvholmsund, to obtain a sea chart with the water depth in order to prepare the sinking of an ore-laden ship, which would unceremoniously close the sound.

On January 16, 1940, the Swedish Council of State, in which, in addition to Ministers Möller, Westmann and Bergquist, the State Secretary

Erlander and the security chief participated, with the communist

Threat to Sweden. On the basis of the documents, the Chief of Security, with the approval of the Minister of Social Affairs, Gustav Möller, decided on

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February 5, 1940, to conduct house searches of all known Communists.

On the morning of February 10, Swedish police raided Communist headquarters throughout the country, arresting large numbers of Communists while they were still in bed. Forty-five party headquarters were searched and 995 Communists had their houses searched. In Stockholm and the surrounding area, 14 people were arrested, and in Gothenburg two people.

The director of the Swedish Criminal Investigation Department, Lundquist, handed over the following communique to the press, which was also published:

"On Saturday, by virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1940 relating to certain means of restraint in time of war or danger of war, the

House searches have been carried out in the premises of communist party organizations and newspapers and at the homes of various members of the CP. The result of the investigation, which has been conducted throughout the country

is not yet fully known. It is to the knowledge of the criminal investigation department

from Stockholm that the CP in Sweden has received significant funds from Russia, which may be assumed to have been intended to be used for harmful purposes against Sweden. A summary of the investigations carried out so far by the Criminal Investigation Department is given here:

At the beginning of 1934, a workers' delegation in Sweden had been

who, on the initiative of friends of the Soviet Union, had been invited to travel to Moscow to attend the reappraisal there.

and to attend the festive celebration of May 1 in Moscow. One day, probably at the end of April 1934, the delegation traveled from Stockholm via Finland to Moscow. After the delegation had attended the May Day festivities there, the delegates were divided into two sections, one of which traveled to the Crimea and the other to Odessa. Around May 12, all the delegates returned to Moscow. A faction meeting with the delegates, who

were communists, had been held there at that time. At this meeting, which was probably chaired by Comintern representative Sixten von Gegerfeldt, only two Swedish delegates and one Communist from Narvik were present. After the caucus meeting, the Swedish delegates and the Norwegian were asked to meet the next day at the Comintern headquarters in Moscow. They were escorted there by a specially chosen escort, who took them to a room in the
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home of the Comintern. There they were welcomed by the Finnish Communist leader and Stalin's "head of the people's government" in Finland, Kuusinen, received. Kuusinen gave a speech at the meeting and pointed out that it was necessary for the Swedish CP to have representatives in the municipality of Stockholms, and that the Swedish CP has the order to I got the idea to try to get Sven Larsson-Linderot and Valter Andersson in there as authorized representatives. This, however, required money. Since the Finnish illegal CP also needed money for its activities, they were also to take money into this party. Kuusinen took out three black silk belts, of which he stated that each one was worth 7000 The men had to dress up and put on their belts. The men had to undress and put on their belts. harnesses, which were provided with three clasps and loops to the rear. They were ordered to wear the belts, not before going to Stockholm

would have come to take off. The next day they traveled via Finland to Stockholm, where they arrived on May 25. Upon arrival, it was determined that they would probably meet in the premises of the Seamen's Cell in Stockholm, Slussplan 5. There they took off their belts and were handed over to Mrs. Stilen. On the basis of this, and also on the basis of the result obtained at the As a result of the house visits, ten people were arrested on Saturday, including two foreigners. Of the foreigners, one has been in Stockholm illegally, that is, without complying with the mandatory registration, and the other has been engaged in an activity that the Criminal Investigation Department has yet to investigate further. Of those arrested, the editor-in-chief of Ny Dag, Gustaf Johansson, and one other person were released.... The extensive material which has been seized, and which, judging from everything, is likely to be of great importance in assessing the spread of Communism and its aims in Sweden, has not yet been so thoroughly gone through that anything further can be said on the basis of it at the present time." The police raid led to an important result in Stockholm. At a communist in Ängby, a Norwegian was stopped who was was not registered with the police. He first claimed to be called Oskar Perrsson. Later, he was willing to declare that his name was Fridtjof Johannesen. He was arrested. After some interrogation, he admitted to being Martin Rasmussen-
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Hjelmen to be. Rasmussen was tried and on April 18, 1940, since he could not be proven otherwise, he was charged with passport forgery. sentenced to eight months and 15 days of penal servitude. After serving of the sentence, Rasmussen-Hjelmen demanded to be expelled to Norway. to become. Although Norway was already occupied by the Germans, the German-Sovietpactstill existed The communist agent believed he had nothing to fear. On January 20, 1941, the Swedes handed Rasmussen-Hjelmen over to the Norwegian police in Kornsjö, who turned him over to the German authorities in Oslo. Here he was confronted with his comrade Pettersen, who had already made a full confession. The two were transferred to Berlin and later executed. But Wollweber had also been netted. He had been quietly in Oslo during the German occupation of Norway and, despite the deadly danger he was in, he continued his conspiratorial activities. He sent some tested German Communists illegally across the border to Sweden to strengthen the secret organization there. It was not until May 1940 that he

decided to move his headquarters from Oslo to Stockholm and tried to cross the Norwegian-Swedish border by surreptitious means with his sister-in-law Gudrun Wiik.

It was only on Swedish soil at the small railroad station of Ottebols in Värmland that he was apprehended by a Swedish military patrol on May 18. Wollweber identified himself as Danish citizen Hans Koller. However, the police quickly discovered that the passport was forged. Wollweber, who had no idea how far the Swedish police had already come in their investigation, finally calmly confessed to Ernst

Wollweber, and on July 17, 1940, he was sentenced by the Stockholm District Court to six months' penal servitude for passport forgery. Even now, Wollweber did not see through the Swedish authorities' game. The German legation in Stockholm now made representations and asked that Wollweber be kept in custody until an application could be made about his

delivery to Germany would be received. Due to this

Wollweber on January 20, 1941, under the law on the extradition of
Criminals declared arrested.

Only now did Ernst Wollweber understand what was at stake. He was faced with the choice of voluntarily confessing and answering for some crimes committed in Sweden or remaining silent. In the first case, he had to be tried in Sweden and could thus avoid extradition to the United States.

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Germany, where he was sure of the death penalty. Before this decision, Wollweber gave up.

The Swedish Commission's report on this states:

"At the beginning of April, the Security Service took the decision to intervene against the secret sabotage organization in the country. With the intention of coordinating the actions of the Swedish police authorities in connection with the decided intervention, a conference was held in Stockholm on May 26, 1941, with the police agencies concerned. The date for the intervention was set for June 4, 1942. On the aforementioned day and the days immediately following, a

A number of persons were arrested and subjected to interrogation. At the same time, Wollweber was interrogated, who was still under arrest at that time, awaiting the decision of His Royal Majesty about his Delivery. Wollweber thus gradually admitted that he had connection among other things to with Rasmussen-Hjelman and several of the other arrestees.

He admitted in this way that he had asked one of the arrested,

To resort to dynamite at the pits in Kiruna."

Now that Wollweber was confessing, the Swedish

Police relatively quickly, the entire organization Wollweber and
of its groups and arrest most of the employees.

Numerous dynamite stores, including in the forest near the hospital

Långbro, were seized and rendered harmless. Wollweber named as his client the Soviet Russian Maxim Petrovitj, from whom he had claimed that he only knew this alias.

Moscow gave after the failure of the organization Bernhard in Sweden

was far from over. Comrade Jakob Liebersohn, born in Frankfurt (Main) on December 1, 1909, the son of Sara Liebersohn and Samuel Romow, was the next to receive the order to destroy German ships and German railroad trains in transit through Sweden.

Liebersohn, who used numerous aliases, had also been in Spain with the International Brigade, and had been a member of the International Brigade since the 1.

International Conference "Against War and Fascism", at which the
already terminally ill Henri Barbusse chaired in 1933, in Soviet intelligence.

In September 1939 Liebersohn came to Sweden and learned in the

Restaurant Blå Fågeln at Strandvägen met the waitress Erika Möller. This divorced woman took a liking to Liebersohn, and he became close to her.

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Drawings. Liebersohn introduced himself to the woman as Swiss merchant Jonny Götzinger. He soon succeeded in Erika Möller, a stranded dancer, also for his delicate task. Moreover, she brought into the group that was now being formed her intimate friend Gunhild Ahman.

Liebersohn made sure that both women had jobs in the state-run munitions factory in Karlsborg, while he went to Moscow via Helsingfors to report. In the period that followed, Erika Möller met Liebersohn again and again in Stockholm, and in time they succeeded in winning a group of Swedish workers to cooperate. These were, among others, Karl Theodor B., Lars Erik H., Carl Albin A., Sven Einar K. and Ake F.

Erika Möller, who went by the alias "Macke," moved back to Stockholm, rented an apartment in Rensgatan and a small

Cottage with garden near Gribbbylund.

Finally, Gunhild Ahman, who had been given the code name "Ake," also left her post in Karlsborg and moved to Luleå on behalf of the group, where she took work at the Scandia dining restaurant. Her mission was the constant observation of the port. When she fell ill, Erika Möller hurried over from Stockholm, nursed her and used the trip to buy a number of chemicals, especially Natrosalpeter. She took Gunhild Ahmann back to Stockholm and placed her in Östermalmskeller as a waitress.

Meanwhile, in the cottage in Gribbbylund Liebersohn experimented neberhaft with sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, saltpeter, ammonium sulfate, 'hydrogen peroxide, acetone and hydrochloric acid. He labored to invent an incendiary bomb with hitherto unknown heat generation and a land mine that could not be detected by magnetic means. Liebersohn planned to sink the explosive into the earth without a metal casing, a mine whose acid was pressed by pressure on the explosive charge, causing it to explode. The goal of the Soviet sabotage groups was the same for both Ernst Wollweber and Jakob Liebersohn: destruction of ore shipments to Germany and prevention of German rail transit through Sweden for the Finnish front.

Officially, the sealed German freight trains carried only rations, medical supplies or troops. On July 18, 1941, in the small Swedish town of Krylbo, more than 20 freight cars of a German supply train thunderously blew up. The

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devastating effect of the communist blast proved to the Swedish public that the Germans had not kept to the wording of the treaty. With the declared canned vegetables undeniably scattered all over the area of the explosion lay the burnt-out debris of bazookas, ammunition and machine guns.

Liebersohn wanted to go further. He sent Erika Möller with Lars Erik H. to the railroad junction near Bracke. But there was no operation, although the two of them waited for days and nights in a small tent for a German transport train. On August 17, 1941, Liebersohn gave the order to comrade express worker Ake F. to blow up the railroad line without further ado. "What if someone surprises me?" Ake F. asked uncertainly.

Liebersohn replied coldly, "Then grab the knife! You must get away with it by any means necessary."

Thus confronted with the harsh communist reality, comrade Ake F.'s heart fell into his pants and he pretended that the police had mistakenly arrested him temporarily on suspicion of stealing a bicycle.

Erika Möller smiled contemptuously when Ake F. came up with this excuse. "You're not alone, there are eyes you don't know that are watching you closely anyway." She warned him to back off. The organization was powerful, she said. It had means to take revenge.

That was too much for comrade Ake F.. He ran to the police in a hurry and brought two bicycle bags with dynamite and sabotage material as proof of his adventurous story.

Jakob Liebersohn was arrested at Jarlaplan in Stockholm on September 2, 1941. He was carrying explosives and radio documents in his briefcase. Erika Möller and all other tangible members of the organization were now also arrested. In the cottage near Gribbbylund, in addition to numerous explosives and chemicals, a secret transmitter buried under a flowerbed was seized. Between the stair railing and the wall in the upstairs hallway, the police found the key to the applied code. It began: cxb 462330.

Swedish radio surveillance had for some time picked up signals from an illegal station cxb, which had been transmitting irregularly on 46 meters wavelength at 23:30. For the last time on July 19, 1941,

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the day the attack in Krylbo succeeded. Since then, cxb has remained silent, and Liebersohn had buried the radio as a precaution.

Jakob Liebersohn denied everything. He declared that he was a Swede and legitimized himself as Gösta Viktor Forsgren. The Swedish police easily refuted the forgeries. Now Liebersohn declared that he was the Balte Fritz Nikolai Rom. But with fingerprints he was finally convicted.

He also proved to be a bad loser and no gentleman. Erika Möller, who had been arrested while pregnant, gave him as the father of her child.

But Liebersohn cynically declared, "I don't have the slightest knowledge with whom Ms. Möller might have had intimate relations."

Jakob Liebersohn was sentenced in Stockholm to 8 years of penal servitude, Erika Möller to 3 years of penal servitude, Gunhild Ahman to 9 months of penal servitude.

Karl Theodor B. received 3 years, Lars Erik H. 2 years, the others got off with 9 to 10 months. Ake F. also had to serve 9 months.

Master Wollweber was better off than his successful apprentice Liebersohn. After serving his relatively short sentence, Germany tried to get hold of him, but failed because Ernst Wollweber had been expatriated in the German Reich. Soviet Ambassador Kollontay reclaimed Comrade Wollweber for extradition to the Soviet Union for "embezzlement of 25,000 rubles of trade union funds." After prolonged balking, Sweden's Minister of Social Affairs Möller finally reluctantly agreed to this maneuver.

In Moscow, Ernst Wollweber was received in triumph. Many delicate tasks still awaited him.

In the end, the Bernhard company was a complete success.

As a result of the incident in Krylbo, Sweden suspended the German Supplies for the Finnish Front. Wollweber's and Liebersohn's deployment had paid off splendidly for the Red Army.

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Secret Service Rickman

Decomposition propaganda from Sweden - Unsuccessful blasting of the ore
- Immanuel Birnbaum's letter

In the spring of 1939, an extremely interested British gentleman visited Sweden and studied primarily the ore mines. It was Mr. Alfred Frederick Rickman. There was a special reason for this. The Swedish export of ore to the German Reich was a thorn in the side of Great Britain in particular. The first acts of war between Germany and England in Norway were, after all, exclusively actions to secure Swedish ore, which was shipped in Narvik. Even earlier, the British had made far-reaching plans to stop Swedish ore shipments to the blast furnaces of the Ruhr. The interested Mr. Rickman was to help the British war effort considerably here.

To scientifically back up his all too obvious interest, Rickman wrote a book on Swedish ores, "The Swedish Iron Ore". But before the work was published, Rickman returned to Sweden and, with the help of a straw man, acquired the company "AB Dentalmaterial". However, no business was transacted. Nevertheless, Mr. Rickman founded the trading company Skandham. Here, too, commercial activity was avoided. But the framework for camouflaging Mr. Rickman's actual activity was given.

On September 18, 1939, he hired Elsa Johansson of Sweden as his secretary, who eventually became not only his lover but also his accomplice in his adventurous ventures. From the British side, Rickman was supported by Mr. Irlinest Biggs. He received his orders from Mr. Ingram Fräser, who traveled back and forth between England and Sweden.

The first order Mr. Rickman received was to organize decomposition propaganda into Germany. Appropriate leaflets were to be designed, put into pre-addressed envelopes, and then smuggled into Germany as luggage. British confidants were to deliver the letters to the post office in Germany, thus creating confusion and uncertainty among the German population.

Mr. Ingram Fräser recommended to Rickman mainly three German emigrants who were in Sweden at that time.

These were Arno Behrisch, Bermann-Fischer and Immanuel Birnbaum. Especially Behrisch, Mr. Fräser thought, was suitable for active intervention.

In the further course, Arno Behrisch brought about 30,000 illegal letters to German addressees to Copenhagen, where they were smuggled to Bremen and Hamburg by communist sailors. A Ture Nerman [112]

was persuaded to produce illegal printed matter in German for a fee, and Arno Behrisch recruited Emil Malmberg, who printed Rickman's propaganda material in the print shop of the newspaper "Arbetaren". Later, during a search of Mr. Rickman's house, the Swedish police were able to seize 4800 stamps at 12 pfennigs each and entire batches of lists with German addresses, arranged according to industry. For example, Mr. Rickman operated with 804 shoemakers in Essen, 607 carpenters, 528 butchers and 1000 bakers in Breslau, 8840 hairdressers, 750 butchers and 590 innkeepers in Dresden.

During this house search, an English note was also seized, dated March 11, 1940, which had the following wording;

"I instructed P. A. in Stockholm to produce a new edition of 10,000 copies about Hitler's concentration camps at a cost of 4800 kroner. I handed over a cash advance of 1000 kroner. Ethel explained that Nemo needed the balance of 3800 kroner. I suggested that Ethel should pay this herself. P. A. hoped to get approval for this expenditure from the government."

The Swedish police determined that P. A. was an alias for the English press attaché in Stockholm, Ethel Mr. Rickman, and Nemo Ture Nerman.

But it had not yet come to that. Mr. Rickman's activities developed very quickly, and it soon became apparent that he was also receiving other assignments than just British war propaganda against Germany. In November 1939, Mr. Ingram Fräser from London once again came to Sweden for a visit, handing Mr. Rickman a crate of high explosives. He instructed Rickman how to produce fire by adding a suitable dose of sulfuric acid to a mixture of potassium chlorate and sugar, and in this way set fuses on fire. Amazingly, this was partly the same blasting technique used by the Bernhard Communist organization.

Outside Stockholm at night, Mr. Rickman took over some boxes from a car, outwardly indistinguishable from book boxes from England with the inscription "Books - keep dry". The boxes had been smuggled into Sweden as diplomatic courier baggage. They contained 64.5 kg of hexogen, 412 time fuses, 327 magnesium flares or incendiary bombs, 8 sea mines, 24 bombs in the form of fountain pens, in addition to about a kilo of carborundum, 48 cigarettes or sulfuric acid ampoules, detonating cord, detonating caps, and

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other. 160 bars of explosives with a net weight of 35.9 kg were packed in 4 carrying axle bags of gray fabric.

Mr. Rickman now initiated Arno Behrisch and informed him that he had the mission to disrupt the Swedish ore shipment to Germany by force. First, he said, was to blow up the hoisting cranes at Oxelösund. Behrisch agreed, and on February 4, 1940, Mr. Rickman, Behrisch, and Elsa Johansson drove to Oxelösund to scout out the situation on the spot. All three had equipped themselves with skis so as to be less conspicuous. They skied to an island from where they had a good view of the harbor area. A sketch plan was made and it was determined that the sabotage could be carried out without much difficulty.

Two days later the saboteurs returned with dynamite, but to their disappointment they saw that work was being done on the quay. They postponed the enterprise.

But even a fortnight later, the British dynamites had no opportunity: work was going on again. Arno Behrisch now had serious doubts. He had consulted the Statistical Yearbook for the German Reich and calculated the damage that could be done to Germany by this blast at Oxelösund. He concluded that the plan was meaningless.

Mr. Rickman objected to this view, stating that it was not his job to make policy, but to obey.

On April 11, 1940, on top of all this, Mr. Rickman received a telegram ordering him in code to carry out the action against Oxelösund immediately. Mr. Biggs brought in three young Englishmen, Sayce, Inward, and Martin.

On April 12, the four Brits drove their dynamite car to Oxelösund again. However, this time they were also unlucky. Mr. Rickman, in his excitement, drove into a ditch. His car had to be towed away first, and so the blast

was not carried out.

Elsa Johansson immediately traveled to Ludvika and apparently rented a cabin there to secure as a storage place for the explosives.

But in the meantime, the Swedish police had become aware of the circle around Mr. Rickman.

Indeed, on February 8, 1940, the Stockholm post office received a letter,

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addressed to a Mr. E. Kutzner, Berlin NW 40, P.O. Box No. 23, detained and inspected. The letter had the following mysterious content:

"Dear Mr. Kutzner!

I am very glad for the ink pen that Horst brought from you. I am using it for the first time and hope that you will be satisfied with its use. The connection with my Uncle Richard, of whom you have heard talk, has not yet been of any great use to me, but I look upon it as promising for the future. The old man is a very suspicious man and for his part has not much to expect from association with me, but I hope to come into closer contact with his family, and through this I expect to be able to gain his confidence also. Although he has not yet mastered the Swedish language, he feels quite at home here and it is always interesting to look at a man like him, doing his job, because one can only benefit from it. He works within the trade industry, as far as I can understand, and not at all with official authorities, but only with private individuals, but has a certain beginner's progress. Of course, the war caused a lot of disturbances in this industry as well, but you have to try to overcome such things. Materially, I'm not doing as well here as I was at the beginning, because I have to waste a lot of time doing side jobs just to get to the right sources of origin, but this should only be temporary. Of course, one suffers a little because of the bad postal connection. In addition to the disruptions caused by the war, there are also delays due to ice conditions, etc. I would be interested to know if and when, for example, this letter comes into your hands. By the way, I hope to hear from you. One is glad about every word that one receives from one's homeland and we are doubly glad. What do you say to my possible plans to move? I don't know if they are feasible, but your advice would be important for me in any case. For today, just many warm greetings. Your devoted Kant."

This letter was subjected to chemical examination, and the Swedish police were now able to read the hidden text. It read:

"After prolonged efforts, I managed to determine the previous representation of the Secret Service. To achieve this, I turned to

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a former acquaintance, to an emigrant in London. My assumption that this man had made similar connections in England did not fail. I came in contact with him through a courier (English) and afterwards slowly progressed to a Mr. Rickman who was making studies of Swedish ore and writing a book on it. This man is subordinate to my Mr. Wilson, whose acquaintance I have not been able to make. He himself stays alternately here and in Norway and he has a newly established department for English propaganda in Sweden under him, further a completely newly started activity for propaganda attempts against the Reich. He has this material franked here with German stamps in order to post it in the Reich afterwards. The quality is abysmal, judging by random samples. I have an acquaintance in this activity through whom I get a little insight into the conditions. Rickman is afraid of the Swedish authorities and hides everything. His interest is now focused on Malmö. In my reports about him I will call him Uncle Richard in the future. Perhaps through him and his people I will gain an opportunity to get to England, where I am now mobilizing other acquaintances (press, Foreign Office). You will receive further news from me about this. Your devoted Kant."

The Swedish police were faced with a mystery. They themselves had been watching Mr. Rickman's group for some time, but now they were even more interested: who had written this letter?

The mystery was solved by the pseudonym "Kant". As is known, the first name of the famous philosopher from Königsberg was Immanuel. In the files of the Swedish security police it was found that on October 16, 1939 a journalist Immanuel Birnbaum had entered Sweden with a German passport.

On April 13, 1940, Immanuel Birnbaum was arrested. He vehemently denied having written this letter. But when, during a search of his apartment, a bottle containing a yellow liquid of exactly the same type as used in the invisible writing of the letter was found in a locked desk drawer, along with other material, he confessed. The Swede Per Meurling wrote a book "Spionage och Sabotage i Sverige". It was published in Kristianstad in 1954. In this book Per Meurling writes in detail about Birnbaum's statements to the Swedish police [116]

and the court. According to this account, Birnbaum explained that he had sent the letter to Mr. E. Kutzner because "as a German, despite having suffered injustice, he had been outraged by the fact that he had been believed to have been persuaded to carry on propaganda against Germany.

According to Per Meurling, Immanuel Birnbaum told Swedish police the following:

"He was an old Social Democratic editor-in-chief who had left the Reich under Hitler, not only for political but also for racial reasons: He was half-Jewish. Before World War II, he stayed in Poland, where he supported himself and his family by contributing to several European newspapers and magazines. He also worked as an economic expert in the Polish department of the Svenska Zündholzgesellschaft, which is why he was well acquainted with the leading Swedes in Poland. When the German-Russian Pact was signed in August 1939, he understood what had struck the bell and hurriedly left Poland. He fled with his family from the war and its misery to Latvia, where he settled near Riga. He used to spend his summers here.

From Latvia he went to Finland, but the fear of war drove him on from there to Sweden in October 1939, where he settled in Stockholm. Here one fine day he received a visit from an unknown man who introduced himself as Mr. Harmann. In fact, this was Ernest John Biggs, an Englishman engaged in the Rickman League, but this Birnbaum did not know until his identity was established with the help of the police. Mr. Harmann had been instructed to seek contact with Birnbaum through an emigrant in London, the former editor of the "Oberschlesischer Kurier," Johannes C. Maier.

The Rickman League wanted Birnbaum's involvement in the illegal propaganda against Germany that it was in the process of organizing. But after Harmann-Biggs opened the game, Rickman himself took over: he sought out Birnbaum and asked him to assess the propaganda material that had been provided.

Birnbaum claimed to the police and during the legal proceedings that he had taken a negative attitude toward the texts on the leaflets, which in his opinion were not suitable for influencing German public opinion. But Rickman, probably rightly, denied this. Birnbaum had not distanced himself from the propaganda material.

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Rickman's leaflets were rubberized on the back so that they could be stuck without difficulty to lampposts, notice boards and wherever else it suited in Germany.

The reason that one is inclined to believe Rickman, which is Birnbaum's judgment toward him about the leaflets, is that the latter was demonstrably engaged in German counterintelligence and consequently could have no interest in repulsing the Englishman by too pronounced a repudiation. In fact, Birnbaum was working for the Germans. According to his own assertion, he was not guided by sympathy for the Hitler regime, from which he distanced himself, but by general patriotism in his capacity as a fellow German citizen.

Birnbaum reports that in November 1939 he was visited by a German named Wolfgang Horst, who said he represented the Berlin Newspaper Correspondence Bureau, a company for which Birnbaum also worked. On the occasion of a visit to the opera bar, Wolfgang Horst had advertised German counterintelligence to Birnbaum and had subsequently given him the ink bottle and the bottle of invisible ink."

Immanuel Birnbaum disputed Per Meurling's account in a letter to me dated February 25, 1963, in which he wrote, among other things: "I have never considered it necessary to correct Meurling, since he is almost uniformly rejected in Sweden anyway. My part in uncovering the Rickman affair is objective fact, but I came to it like a virgin to a child."

On February 22, 1946, Birnbaum published his version in the Stockholm newspaper "Aftonbladet" with the following words:

"The police files on my case from 1940 give a partially misleading picture. At that time, in fact, I was forced to keep secret the anti-Nazi character of the newspaper office where the addressee of my letter was editor, because

of his and his friends' very exposed position in Berlin. The addressee and all his associates were in opposition to Hitler, and the purpose of the letter was to mediate contact between this circle and the English propaganda for which Rickman was then working in Stockholm. The wording and camouflage of the letter were intended to protect the addressee from the suspicion of the German authorities. That there was a Swedish letter censorship, I did not know at all.

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When I was released in 1941, I submitted material on my case to the German emigrants' confidant in the German Labor Delegation in New York. The latter investigated the matter on behalf of the American authorities, interrogated other liaison men of the same Berlin editorial office who could be found abroad, examined further evidence and came to the conclusion that I had to be cleared of any intention of promoting the interests of the Third Reich.

This result was later confirmed by the fact that the German authorities, without any connection with my case, arrested all the employees of the aforementioned editorial office within their reach in 1942, among them the addressee of my letter. According to German information, he died in the police prison, while several others were hanged, such as the editor Stube and the Legationsrat Scheliha."

This mysterious epistolary affair reflects all the intricacies of the time.

In any case, on May 15, 1940, Immanuel Birnbaum was sentenced in Stockholm to eight months in prison for unauthorized communication.

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On April 13, Birnbaum had been arrested.

On April 19, Mr. Alfred Frederick Rickman and Elsa Johansson were arrested. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Biggs met the same fate. On April 23, Arno Behrisch was arrested.

Thus the first Secret Service group on Swedish soil during the Second World War was busted. Its members were sentenced in June 1940 by the 5th Chamber of the City Hall Court in Stockholm. Rickman received eight years, Biggs five years, Elsa Johansson and Arno Behrisch each received three years and six months hard labor. Their efforts to disrupt the Swedish ore supply to Germany had failed.

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The British campaign of lies

The role of the emigrants in London - Denis Sefton Delmer took over
this black propaganda - From "Gustav Siegfried One" to "Soldatensender West"
- Lies and deception non-stop - Women and children hounded into the
hail of bombs

Immediately after the beginning of Britain's declaration of war on Germany, London organized not only military but also psychological warfare against the Germans. Their mission was to undermine and break down the fighting morale of the German people. Above all, they tried to exploit the ideological differences between National Socialists and non-National Socialists for the Allied war aims. A major role in this propaganda campaign fell to the London radio station, the BBC, which set up a "German Service" and attempted to turn the German population against the Reich and the war effort.

Of course, the English were not able to do this work themselves. But very soon they were offered sufficient German forces, which for the time being came exclusively from the political, mostly socialist emigration.

One of those political emigrants who fled to England at that time out of ideological opposition to National Socialism is the Roman Catholic priest Dr. h. c. Emmanuel J. Reichenberger, who describes the situation of the emigrants in his book "Wider Willkür und Machttausch" as follows:

"I know that the word emigrant still has a strange connotation today, just as the word Nazi or KZler does for others. There are no good and bad peoples, but in every people there are good and bad people, heroes and saints, but also scoundrels and criminals. No professional group is composed one hundred percent of ideal people; but it

would be wrong to evaluate them according to the unfit, inferior and failures. One cannot judge the tree by the fallen fruit, but by the good, ripe fruit ... In the concentration camps there were many people of high standing, but also asocials and criminals. Many tragedies of denazification could have been prevented if in each case one had judged the man, his character, his motives, his actions, his situation, not simply the fact of belonging to an organization which the victors considered "criminal". Thus, one must also distinguish emigrants and emigrants.

There was no uniform German emigration. We find emigrants for racial, political, ideological reasons, those who had no reason to emigrate at all, who just felt particularly important, who had talked stupidly or irresponsibly at some point, but also people who used the opportunity to disappear, not because they were against Hitler, but because Hitler was against them."

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"With the outbreak of war, the situation of the emigrants became particularly tragic. Those who have not experienced it can hardly understand what it means to experience a war against one's own people in enemy territory, in the midst of a suspicious, hateful, poisoned environment. Here stood Hitler's dictatorship, which many emigrants rejected out of their innermost convictions, the elimination of which would have seemed to them a blessing for the German homeland. On the other hand, there was the declaration of war, which had to bring unspeakable misery to our people. The host country expected active participation in the war - against the people and the homeland, although they certainly despised in their innermost being those who were prepared to do so. (By the way, even today every emigrant to America is called up for military service at the age of compulsory service, without having acquired citizenship beforehand. Whoever refuses loses the right to naturalization and has to expect all kinds of harassment in case of conflict!) The decision could not have been difficult for the Czechs, the Poles, whose country was occupied. But for us Germans? It became more and more clear that the war was not directed against Hitler, but against the German people. The internment of anti-Nazi émigrés in England was the final proof of this. A convert who found refuge in England with two sisters, one of whom went insane in the horror of internment and remains so to this day, wrote to me at the time: "In Germany we are Jews, in England Germans. " Under these circumstances, could we justify it before God and our people to continue the fight against Hitler and his regime?

I was never asked - probably because of my age and my status as a priest - to participate actively in the war in any form. I would not have refused to serve as a Samaritan. I would have refused any other war service regardless of the personal consequences. I find it immoral to expect a foreigner to perform even war service. Serving with weapons against one's own people, revealing secrets important to the war effort, sabotage, anti-German propaganda seemed to me to be treason and was also treated as treason by the Allies when it involved members of their people in the service of the war enemy.

I was convinced that anyone who stooped to acts against his people would block his way back home for good, no matter what the outcome of the war. This would certainly be the case in England and America. Who could have expected that the help of German people would have

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to anti-German propaganda, to the military defeat of one's own fatherland, thus to the fulfillment of the Morgenthau Plan, to the lynch law of Nuremberg etc. would be rewarded with highest positions of trust, with political offices and dignities, with sinecures, fat sinecures and sounding titles? The case "John" - which is only one - speaks volumes. I can only repeat: In England and America, this would be impossible, especially after such a catastrophic defeat. Madame de Staël once said, "The Germans dream so much of strength of character, they would like it, they grasp it theoretically, but in practice they often lack it.""

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Unfortunately, not all emigrants took such an exemplary attitude as this anti-national socialist, but German-conscious priest. A politically persecuted person of the Nazi regime, who as a Social Democrat had to spend years in concentration camps and prisons, Hans Frederik, reports on this subject in his book "The Candidates" as follows:

"Life in exile was extremely difficult. The political emigrant was mostly excluded from regular work. He was rarely granted a work permit and usually had to live on political benefits. It is well known that the chance of creating a new professional existence outside of political activity was very small. Moreover, political refugees were often not interested in building a professional existence abroad, but only in being politically active. In the case of these emigrants, the end of their lives was actually already sealed. In any case, they belonged to the tribe of activists.

The leftist parties, the SAP, ISK, and the NEU-BEGINNEN, probably provided the largest contingent of activists who participated in the belligerent effort against Germany. The vast majority of the leading functionaries were active in Allied intelligence, radio service, or troop service.

Willy Eichler, a leading member of the ISK and board member of the "Union," emigrated to Paris in 1933, where he edited the "Sozialistische Werte" and the "Reinhardbriefe" until 1939. He fled to London when the German troops invaded. There, too, he was active as a journalist. He was an employee of the BBC in London and had the "broadcasts for the German works over. Willy Eichler was also otherwise considered a close collaborator of the [124]

English authorities. However, he was one of the first to return from emigration. In 1945, he was already actively involved in building up the SPD in the Rhineland. He is still considered the SPD's chief theoretician today.

Erwin Schöttle emigrated to Switzerland in 1933 and from there to London. He joined the NEU-BEGINNEN group in emigration and held a leading position in the "German Department of BBC London" from 1941-1946. Schöttle returned to Germany in 1946 and was immediately elected SPD regional chairman of Württemberg-Baden. He became a member of the Bundestag in 1949 and deputy parliamentary group chairman in 1957. Heinrich Heine emigrated to Prague in 1933, was employed there by the SPD exile executive committee and was a member of the executive committee in Paris from 1938. He also held this position in London from 1940. He worked at the "Soldatensender Gustav Siegfried I" and held a leading position at the "Political Intelligence Department - PID", supervising the German staff working there. He returned to Germany in 1945, became a full member of the executive party board in 1946 and headed the SPD's press and propaganda department until 1958. Waldemar von Knoeringen emigrated to Austria in 1933, then to Czechoslovakia, from there temporarily to Switzerland and France, and finally to England. There he was a leading contributor to the "Deutschland-Sendungen der BBC-Londons He organized the "Deutsche Kriegsgefangenen- Sendungen. For this purpose he traveled to North Africa to interview prisoners of war and to select suitable men for his broadcasts. A special punch line is probably that Waldemar von Knoeringen was the then discoverer of Baron von Guttenberg, who also very willingly made himself available for these "prisoner of war broadcasts". When journalists once asked him in Tutzing about "those years," he replied with a grin: "What do you want from me? After all, I had a very attractive boss back then." Waldemar von Knoeringen also worked on the "Station of the European Revolution", which was set up by the Labour MP Crossman on behalf of the Foreign Office. He also belonged to the NEW BEGINNING group. He withdrew from propaganda when the unconditional surrender of Germany was set as the Allied war objective at the Casablanca Conference in 1943. Waldemar von Knoeringen is probably one of the very few German émigrés who refused to participate in negative propaganda out of conviction. He then continued to work as a teacher at the Wilton-Parc prisoner-of-war school until 1946 and returned to Germany in 1946.

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Germany back. In 1947, he was elected state chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Bavaria, and has been confirmed in this office every year since.

Those emigrants who were drafted into the BBC were mostly under the sphere of influence of Sefton Delmer, who was the head of the British underground propaganda organization during the war. Sefton Delmer was in charge of a wide variety of soldier stations. The best known of these were the soldier stations "Gustav Siegfried I" and "Calais". What tendencies these stations had to represent, Sefton Delmer himself explained most clearly:

"In order to get milieu-appropriate material for the decomposition transmitters, agent reports were analyzed, captured field mail letters were read, prisoners of war were eavesdropped on in their reading rooms by

microphones hidden in inkwells or table lamps. All the German newspapers, from the Völkischer Beobachter to the smallest sports paper, arrived daily by courier at the nameless estate where I had taken up my quarters near London !"

Delmer evaluated all the material for these decomposition broadcasts. No one can deny that the Socialist parties, with their internal information and courier reports, were a veritable treasure trove for these broadcasts.

Apart from the so-called radio announcers and the intellectual carriers of this war-psychological program, there were also emigrants who, through their literary work, provided the appropriate material for the decomposition of the German fronts and the German hinterland. Such a man was also

Fritz Eberhard, formerly Helmut von Rauschenplat. He emigrated to England in 1938 and was a board member of the German trade unions in London. He became very influential through his publications. The pamphlet "How to conquer Hitler," published in 1939 under the name Helmut von Rauschenplat, caused him the most bitter embarrassment as late as 1953. Fritz Eberhard was also known as Fritz Werkmann, Fritz Kampf and Hans Schneider.

Just as Eberhard was often able to create confusion with his publications even in the most active circles of his own people, the writings of Hans Kahle also had an effect. In his brochure "They plotted against Hitler" it says:

"... Actually, every refugee from Germany does his duty at

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War work, national defense or in the army. We Germans, however, feel the obligation within us to do more than our duty. We have a burning desire to go immediately to the front, to speak as Germans to the soldiers in the trenches opposite the Allied lines, and to address the German people:.... This is no longer a propaganda matter. We want to help from the outside, at the front, through the radio, to organize the uprising within Germany That would be the finest expression of gratitude we can pay to the people and government of England. "

Herbert Kriedemann was a completely different type of emigrant. He emigrated to Prague in 1933 after previous illegal activity. However, complications soon arose with the party leadership, and he left for Holland in 1936. In 1941, in the course of the general arrests of emigrants, he also had to believe in it, although it was expected in emigration circles that he would remain unmolested. This was roughly how the political emigrant Herbert Kriedemann was assessed at the time. Kriedemann was surrounded by a whole network of rumors that have not been disproved to this day and therefore have not been laid to rest.

Wenzel Jaksch emigrated to England in 1938 and was involved in Benesch's government in exile. He only separated from Benesch when the latter included the resettlement of the Sudeten Germans in his postwar program. He published the "Sozialdemokrat" in London as the organ of the Sudeten German Social Democrats until 1948. Wenzel Jaksch worked closely with the English authorities and urged emigrants to volunteer for service in the English army. Wenzel Jaksch was also one of those emigrants who not only fully committed himself to military action against Germany, but he could not decide to return to Germany until 1949. Nevertheless, he immediately received the trust of the SPD, has been a member of the Bundestag since 1953, and holds notable positions of trust within the party life and the associations of expellees.

The state of war, by its harsh reality, seized the lot of tens of thousands of emigrants. In front of the French and English recruiting offices at the outbreak of the war stood a myriad of German socialists and anti-Nazis who volunteered for military service against Germany.

Memoirs of well-known emigrants tell us about this time:

"When the war broke out, more than 8000 emigrants in England alone rushed to

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to the recruiting offices. They have fought in the most unpleasant of all branches of arms, in pioneer corps, and have stood their ground

In France, tens of thousands enlisted, and General de Gaulle later affirmed, "If all Frenchmen had done as the legionnaires and foreign volunteers had done, France would be standing here differently."

Hundreds of intellectual émigrés formed the core of the psychological warfare, and the official leaders of the Socialist parties, insofar as they were not actively on the war front, contributed through their party information to

support the decided total military annihilation of Germany."

The aforementioned Denis Sefton Delmer, a long-time employee of the British secret service Dept. M.I. 5, finally took it upon himself to lead the "black" propaganda against Germany on behalf of the Secret Service. His propaganda was called black because officially no one in Great Britain admitted to it and covered it morally. Thus, it was possible to lie and deceive to one's heart's content.

Sefton Delmer's mission, by his own admission, was to divide Germany.

He hastily left his position at the Daily Express and started his new job with Mr. Leonhard Ingrams of the SOE (Special Operations Executive), which was responsible for "organizing resistance and acts of sabotage, assassinations and similar undertakings."

The reason for Delmer's appointment was twofold: people in London began to doubt that Mr. Lindemann's theory, namely to break the fighting morale of the German people by destroying the German residential quarters, would actually lead to success. Moreover, the BBC's "German Service" had had no effect. The emigrants who spoke to the German people from this vantage point had been away from Germany too long and were no longer in real contact with the emotional life of their own people. This was to be remedied quickly. What bombs and emigrants did not achieve, the clever Delmer and his team were to accomplish: to confuse the Germans, make them uncertain and weaken their willingness to fight.

Before Delmer, two "black" stations had already attempted this: that of Otto Strasser's Black Front, which Rudolf Formis operated from the inn in Zahori in Czechoslovakia in 1934, and that of the Communist

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Willy Münzenberg, who worked in Paris in the fall of 1939 under the title "Deutscher Freiheitssender".

Both had been denied real success because they openly professed to be enemies of the Nazi regime, insulted Hitler, state and party leaders, and called for the overthrow of the government.

Formis was attacked and shot by a group of females on the night of January 23, 1935. Münzenberg, however, was robbed and murdered by a fellow emigrant in Paris in 1940.

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The clever Sefton Delmer now invented the twist that everyone had not come up with, neither the Black Front, the Socialists and Communists, nor the Allied psychological warfare: decomposition propaganda under superpatriotic camouflage. He immediately drafted his program, which he presented to Leonhard Ingrams:

""We must address ourselves in the name of his highest patriotic ideals to that "inner swine in every German," I said, "we must provide him with a patriotic justification for doing what he would like to do out of pure instinct of self-preservation or selfish interest. We must speak to him of his Führer, his fatherland, and all these things, and at the same time impress upon his brain any facts that will cause him to think and, if possible, to act in a way that must endanger Hitler's conduct of the war.""

On May 23, 1941, Delmer began broadcasting from Aspley Guise in Bedfordshire on what was supposed to be the German soldier station "Gustav Siegfried I." False reports, groundless suspicions and shameless lies, garnished with soldier marches and National Socialist battle songs, framed by phrases of perseverance, now pattered through the airwaves in hidden form. There was no real background for them at all. Delmer himself admits unconcernedly; "In the first weeks after we put Gustav Siegfried I into operation, we had to invent all the stories with which the "boss" embellished his speeches."

In time, however, Delmer received his information from the Secret Service, from the British Air Force, which after each attack delivered photos from which the damage to German cities was visible; the Army of Great Britain sent captured Wehrmacht documents, the dead German

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Soldiers were stripped of soldier's books and private letters, all prisoner mail to England was searched for usable information, and even the partisans of the various countries sent messages that were successfully "evaluated" by Sefton Delmer.

On June 6, 1941, at a conference at Bedford Castle attended by dozens of officers, scholars, publicists, and

politicians-including Lord Vansittart, Valentine Williams, Leonard Ingrams, Rex Leeper, Hugh Gaitskell-Delmer learned that wartime Prime Minister Churchill had known for months of a planned German attack on the Soviet Union.

Winston Churchill had known about it since March 1941, and the main British intelligence committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee, adopted June 22, 1941, as the day of the German attack.

The British government thus knew months beforehand what was known only to the very highest German authorities as a top state secret, but not at all to the army or the people. Only a high-ranking German officer could have revealed this to the British. So far, he has certainly not been exposed.

Sefton Delmer decided immediately upon the outbreak of the Eastern campaign to hype Hitler for his anti-Bolshevik struggle and call for an immediate purge in the homeland.

Gustav Siegfried I's broadcasts after the outbreak of the fateful Eastern campaign were a paean to Adolf Hitler. Rushing in, rushing deeper and deeper - that was the almost tangible goal for this work, and it was achieved. However, on a completely different level.

Now, with momentum, the most diabolical and criminal propaganda game ever seen in history began. Sefton Delmer shares in his memoirs how this was done: "All our lies must be deliberate lies!"

Truly, these fraudulent lies were well thought out. Only a man of Delmer's stature was capable of inventing them in all their devious meanness. Delmer spares us from describing this gruesome game with the living and the dead. He describes in his own words a number of examples, only a few of which we will mention here.

""While our brave soldiers have to freeze to death in Russia because the corrupt party bigwigs, who are only out for a fat profit, have deliberately delayed the timely delivery of winter clothing, these uk-set party pigs are living the good life and

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sit far from all danger and privation in comfortable pressure posts." Only the party was to blame; the Wehrmacht consisted of decent people, good Germans and loyal patriots.

I had chosen the party functionaries as the main target of our attacks because, in my opinion, these fanatical and determined followers of Hitler were doing an astonishingly effective job and were the tireless driving force behind the German people's will to war. I was also impressed by the way Goebbels and his propaganda people of every rank managed to spur the German people on to ever greater efforts and ever harder sacrifices. If we could portray these people in the eyes of the German public as a corrupt privileged class that demanded everything from the common man but made no sacrifices themselves, we might be able to strike a fatal blow against one of the lifelines of German fighting morale."

Such reports were produced on a continuous basis. In Schleswig-Holstein, the "boss" announced, the wives of high-ranking Nazi officials had bought out all the textile stores because they had learned that Germany's textile supplies were rapidly running out due to the requirement for troops in Russia. A storm on the stores was the result. Thus, the economic supply was repeatedly disrupted, in part successfully.

But the main task remained:

"With every broadcast a new legend was hammered into the listeners again and again: the Wehrmacht is against the Party, the Wehrmacht is against the SS, the Wehrmacht is against the -Gestapo ..., this legend became our foundation, the spiritual basis of almost all our black undertakings." May these methods perhaps still find their moral justification in the total war effort.

Sefton Delmer, however, continued:

"When we learned that bombed-out families were being evacuated to Eastern territories such as Poland, Slovakia and Ruthenia during the "terrorist attacks" on Hamburg, we reported on typhus and cholera epidemics that were allegedly raging in these areas. We brought similar reports about the "Kinderlandverschickungslager". Of course, we did not choose the concise and factual form of an official announcement for this, but certain paraphrases, such as the following:

"The Reich Medical Leader, Dr. Conti, has congratulated the medical officers in the KLV camps in the Warthegau for the selfless devotion with which

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they have fought the diphtheria epidemic among the children entrusted to their care. He expressed his appreciation for their success in bringing the number of deaths down to an average of sixty per week, despite the deplorable shortage of medicines."

We never gave up trying to keep alive in our listeners from the Wehrmacht the concern for the fate of their families back home. We even aroused serious concerns in them as to what these evil party bigwigs would do to their wives if they themselves should have the misfortune to lose their lives in the fight for Führer and Fatherland."

Sefton Delmer and his team worked not only with such radio broadcasts, but also with leaflets, illegal newspapers and faked letters. The whole unconscionability of this man and his collaborators is reflected in the following confession of the inventor of the most diabolical fraud of the Allied combat propaganda:

"Fortunately for us, the German administrative heads of these military hospitals were in the habit of sending unencrypted radio telegrams to the local party offices in Germany, requesting that they convey the message to the relatives of the deceased. These messages were intercepted and presented to me. And they provided us with all the necessary information: the name of the soldier, the address of his relatives and the name of the military hospital.

Now we drafted a touching letter written in German script on a sheet of paper with the letterhead of the military hospital in question. Supposedly, this letter came from a nurse or a comrade of the dead man who had given it to another who was going on leave to Germany. The writer stated that he or she had been with the deceased until the end and now wanted to send a few words of comfort to his or her relatives.

In touching terms, the "friend" then reported on the dying soldier's loyalty to the Führer, on his unshakable faith in final victory, and gave his final greetings to his loved ones. And then, almost in passing, he (or she) mentioned the diamond-studded watch, golden crucifix, or other precious object that the dead soldier had wanted to bring as a gift to his loved ones. "One has given the watch to the Herr Ortsgruppenleiter . . .", here followed the appropriate name, "so that he can hand it over to you personally or through one of his deputies."

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When a certain time had elapsed and we could assume that the letter had reached the relatives and had done its work, the soldier station took up the matter. In an indignant speech delivered by Sepp Obermeyer or another of our spokesmen from the German service, we scolded the "wretched ghoul who was not afraid to steal from a man who had sacrificed his life for the fatherland. And, of course, we cited other names and cases as examples of this kind of "crime.""

On other occasions, we used the same technique to tell the relatives of dead soldiers that they were not suffering from their wounds, but died of a "lethal injection". The National Socialist

The doctor in the military hospital, we were told by the alleged nurse, had come to the conclusion that the wounded man would not be fit to fight again before the end of the war. Therefore, the doctor had wanted to free the bed for another soldier who had better prospects for a speedy recovery."

Letters from relatives found with dead people were promptly answered:

""Dear Mrs. . . ." wrote one of our Germans on a German typewriter. "Please do not make any inquiries as to Martin's whereabouts. He is safe and sound in a neutral country with several comrades and is earning well there. When this terrible war that Hitler has conjured up is over, he will either return to you or let you come to him. He asks me to give you, Erna and little Martin my warmest regards and hopes that you are all well. Please do not tell anyone about this letter." The signature was a circle drawn in red ink. The letter was posted in Germany.

By my reckoning, the parents would never be able to resist the temptation to tell at least one close friend the good news of their son's rescue. And in this way the news of the successful desertion of German soldiers to neutral countries would spread and, I hoped, encourage more and more Germans to follow this example."

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Here we also finally learn the truth about the forged Mölders letter:

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"Colonel Mölders, one of the Luftwaffe's best-known fighter pilots, had been shot down by German flak near Breslau in the last days of 1941. It had almost certainly been an unfortunate accident. But when we learned something about the closer circumstances of this death through a captured Luftwaffe officer, we naturally did not leave it at this version.

Werner Mölders, the officer told us, had been a devout Catholic. And he began open criticism of the anti-Christian National Socialist

regime when, after an English air raid on Münster, the Nazis insisted on seizing a convent there and moving out the nuns, among whom was one of Mölders' sisters. Himmler's SD had just opened an investigation into Mölders' "highly treasonous activities" when he was shot down over the Breslau airport. He had wanted to land there.

Naturally, this mysterious death of one of the most popular heroes of the Third Reich in Germany gave rise to much discussion, and I was determined to exploit the incident with all the means at my disposal. Over the Gustav Siegfried I transmitter, the "Chief" gave a flaming speech accusing Himmler's Bolshevik canaille of cowardly murdering this shining example of German manhood.

Next, I arranged for the drafting of a letter allegedly written by Mölders, in which he expressed the doubts that moved him and his comrades as to whether it was permissible to fight for the atheist Hitler. This letter was intended as evidence for the campaign opened by Gustav Siegfried Eins. But in this case the written word was to trigger a stronger echo than the broadcast of the "chief".

We chose as the addressee for the letter allegedly written by Mölders the Catholic cathedral provost of Stettin, with whom, as the first sentence of the letter indicated, Mölders had been corresponding for some time. The content of the "Mölders letter," as it was soon called throughout Germany, was defeatist. Full of grief, Mölders told the cathedral provost how more and more of his comrades had to suffer the death of flying. And the letter was rebellious. Rebellious against the party, whose representatives Mölders called not the "Nazis" but the "godless". He informed the provost that more and more of his comrades from the Luftwaffe were turning away from the "godless" and turning to religion.

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"Nothing is more beautiful for a man than when he has successfully fought his way through this swamp of lies, slander and injustice and found his way to knowledge, light and true faith." It was clear from the letter that Mölders knew that the "godless" were after him and that his days might be numbered.

"If no priest can assist me in my last hour," the letter concluded, "I will leave this earth in the knowledge that I will find a merciful judge in God. Write to me again soon, my dear fatherly friend, and pray for your Werner Mölders. ""All these fraudulent lies, in order to gain popularity for the programs among the broad masses, were garnished with pornographic jokes and anecdotes.

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In 1960, a novel by Michael Mohr was published in Switzerland under the title "Soldatensender Calais," which, as we know, was also one of Delmer's foundations. On the inside cover of the book it says: "This novel is based on a factual account." No doubt the author or his sources collaborated with Delmer.

Mohr portrays the work of these Delmer people with gripping reality:

""This is the text of your first broadcast, which you will speak tonight," he said. "Please read it carefully, so that you can see how it's done, because in the future you should write your own programs if possible.

"Good evening, dear listeners, this is Ingeborg" she read. "You will now hear my voice regularly on this wave. Tonight I can give Mrs. Margarethe Felber in Dürerstraße in Düsseldorf a very special treat. She has not heard from her husband at the front for a long time and is certainly worried about him.

Dear Mrs. Felber, your husband is alive. He has been wounded, but don't be alarmed. You wouldn't believe how good he has it in the reserve hospital 573!

The nurse Maria takes care of him very touchingly. Day and night she reads his every wish from his eyes. His comrades are already jealous, because the beautiful, black-haired nurse Maria has otherwise distributed her favors quite evenly among all our men who are suffering so badly.

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But now she just sits next to your husband, dear Mrs. Felber, holds his feverish hand and has even taken over night duty at his bedside.

I don't think all the women at home have any idea how hard our sisters in the military hospitals try to represent them in everything, really everything, with their wounded husbands.

Petra frowned. "Not nice news for Mrs. Felber in Düsseldorf she said to the fat man. "Is this Sister Maria a German?"

"How should I know?" said the fat man cynically. "That's completely beside the point. The only thing that matters is the purpose. Up to now, women have been happy when their husbands got a home shot. Now they're supposed to rack their brains over whether their old man might also have taken a fancy to a pretty nurse. Good idea, huh?"

"Is this story true at all?" asked Petra suspiciously. The fat man laughed harshly. "You are naive, my dear!" he exclaimed. "With a story, the important thing is not whether it is true, but whether it works. And this story works, you can rely on that. It is even partly true. A Mrs. Felber does indeed exist in Düsseldorf. We got her name from a telephone directory

"And how do you know that her husband is in the military hospital and has an affair with this Sister Maria?" "But who said I knew that? It could be so, and that is enough for me."

Petra jumped up indignantly. "Don't you think about this poor woman? Just imagine how she must feel when she hears this news. Maybe she has lived in the happiest marriage so far.... All this is falling apart now, just because you need a dirty story for your show. You are not one bit better than Goebbels!"

The fat man grinned in amusement. "That's a compliment I appreciate," he said calmly. "Don't you know the saying that you have to cast out the devil with Beelzebub?"

Petra threw the report on his desk. "Cast out your devil alone!" she cried. "I want nothing to do with this filth." Threateningly, the fat man stood in front of her.

"You know, I hope, that there are only two choices for you now," he said sharply. "You've learned too much for me to let you go free. Either you work for me - or you become arrested

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Petra Nicodemus turned around slowly. The image of the fat man blurred in the veil of tears before her eyes. She had gone over to the enemy so that she could be near the only man she loved. She had risked her life to achieve this goal.

But now it became more and more clear to her that she had only been taken to do dirty work for the English." Certainly there may have been some who got into the machinery of Sefton Delmer because of diabolical entanglements, as it is described here by Michael Mohr. But most of the 300 employees, who did the dirty work at the Delmers lie offensive, were not pressed to it. They volunteered.

In its No. 44 of October 31, 1962, in which it deals with Delmer's memoirs, the "Spiegel" is amazingly reticent about these 300 associates of Delmer. He only mentions Otto John (code name Oskar Jürgens), Wolfgang Gans, Edler zu Putlitz (code name Mr. Pots). The latter immediately went over to Ulbricht in 1945.

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These two show who the children of Sefton Delmer's employees were. When Otto John changed fronts once again on July 20, 1954, and went to East Berlin, "Der Stern" published a series of revelations in its No. 32 of August 8, 1954, under the title "Come on, little brother!"

In this series, British Colonel Daniel Shapiro, M. C., who along with Sefton Delmer was Otto John's temporary handler and director of operations during World War II in London, writes about his former protégé and reports, among other things:

"At first, he was introduced to me as Oskar Jürgens. I could not imagine anything about that. A trivial conversation dragged on for a while and was boring. Only when this Mr. Oskar Jürgens came to talk about Peenemünde without any context, I became alert.

Lieutenant Colonel M. nodded at me in confirmation. But I still did not understand. I was simply not prepared

to suddenly sit across from the man who had delivered Peenemünde to us with its mysterious experimental facility for wonder weapons. After all, this was a big deal, at least until then the greatest success of our intelligence service. I

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I remember it very well: The message came from Berlin, from well-informed air force circles. It had come to us via Spain, whereupon the RAF first sent reconnaissance planes of the type "Moskito" to Peenemünde and soon after 600 bombers. And the man to whom we owed it all was now sitting in my office with badly dyed hair. Honestly thrilled, I jumped up and shook his hands. There he laughed at me, unconcerned and guileless, almost like a performer thanking me for the applause.

That was the beginning of my acquaintance with Dr. Otto John, who had been given the code name Oskar Jürgens. For the next few weeks he remained in my care. I put him up in Knightsbridge in one of our so-called permanent houses. That was the rule, and no exception could be made with Otto John, for all the recognition of his merits in it. I hope, however, that he was comfortable with us. The villa was comfortable and outwardly differed by nothing from the staid, middle-class villas of the neighborhood. The staff was dressed in civilian clothes and did their surveillance unobtrusively and unobtrusively. In all of London at that time, there were certainly not many houses where the cooking was better than here. And if we had kept a guest book, Otto John could have signed it under prominent names. General Ritter von Thomas was here, who got lost behind the English lines in Africa with his armored scout car, further SS-Obergruppenführer Zech-Nenntwich, who made a profitable arms deal with the Poles in Warsaw before moving into our permanent house via Stockholm, then young Vermehren, a relative of Papen's, who was press attaché in Ankara, and many others."

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Wolfgang Gans, Edler zu Putlitz, published his revelations about his treason in the London newspaper "The People" in serials from November 13 to December 4, 1955, titled "Astonishing Revelations from England's Greatest War Agent, "Idi indicts Foreign Office."" The People's editorial notes by way of introduction, "Thanks to him, England knew every Nazi spy."

In the issue of November 13, 1955, Putlitz almost made a confession. He writes:

"As press attaché (to the German Embassy in London), I had insight into the coded dispatches that told of the preparations for the rape-

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Austria as if it were the secret fifth column organization for every country in Europe.

..

That's when I decided - it was a decision that marked me as a "traitor" in the eyes of my compatriots ...From that moment on, I led a double life. I seemed to be almost a double personality.

I went to my office at the Embassy every day as usual. I attended official parties and dinner parties. And I read the dispatches that my secretary put on my desk every morning.

But I read them from a new point of view. I listened to the conversations of my colleagues. But I listened to them for a different reason than before.

I often wondered why others did not notice this change in me as much as I did. The Gestapo chief in the embassy now became my mortal enemy.

Sometimes I was sure that he was watching me - for my imagination played many a wicked trick on me - and I thought that he suddenly took an extraordinary interest in everything I did.

Whenever I came to Kensington now, I lived in constant fear of being followed. From a neighborhood in Soho Square, I always traveled in a roundabout way - changing subways and buses abruptly, taking cabs, and never daring to go anywhere in my car, with the diplomatic sign.

I was constantly living in a state where great excitement alternated with excited fear. My nerves were always close to breaking down.

But the information I was able to bring to Kensington, often only small details, was worth all the trouble. After all, they only completed the whole picture of Hitler's war plan.

Sometimes I was able to add details that were startling in themselves. Then Sir Robert Vansittart himself came to Kensington. Unnoticed, he got out of his car, walked around the corner and on alone to the area where my friend lived.

So it was the head of your Foreign Office himself to whom I handed Hitler's secret plan for the invasion of Austria in 1938 and a list of the Nazi spies working in England.

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de, he continued to work blithely for British intelligence. His information went through a Captain Steven. As late as the late summer of 1939, Putlitz continued to report, " ... I transmitted my last message to London. I wrote, "Aunt Fanny will arrive in a fortnight." This meant so much that the German army was about to invade Poland. For two weeks Germany and Poland were in a state of war. "On November 20, 1955, Putlitz again explicitly confessed in this report: "I had already handed over some of Hitler's most valuable military plans to the British Foreign Office." The British saw to it that their master spy Putlitz was finally brought to London and assigned to Sefton Delmer.

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In his memoirs, Delmer also mentions Zech-Nenntwich (code name Dr. Nansen) and the Saarland separatist Max Braun. Otherwise, he is very sparing with his information and lists only names of which one does not know whether they are clear names. The voice "This is the boss speaking!" came from Paul Sanders, an emigrant from Berlin who had volunteered to join the pioneers of the British army to fight against Germany, but ended up fighting his battle with the microphone. The former Stennes man and journalist Johannes Reinholz was also an emigrant. From the International Brigades of Red Spain came as collaborators Albrecht Ernst and Alexander Maaß. The former press attaché of the Austrian embassy in London, Dr. Albert, and the former Berlin art dealer Rene Halkett, allegedly a nephew of Colonel General Fritsch, who "wrote" the Delmer submarine song: "I was in St. Nazaire in a Buff... ", were represented here as well as the defectors and deserters.

Three airmen brought their latest Messerschmitt night fighters with the last measuring instruments, destined to put an end to the nightly British terror attacks, to England and delivered themselves and their machine to the enemy. They were not part of any resistance group. They were just traitorous deserters. Delmer gives their names as Sepp Obermeyer, Steiner and Wegely. Joyfully, after telling everything they knew to the Secret Service, they reinforced the Delmer team.

Another man of honor came from the Kriegsmarine. It was the submarine flotilla chief radio officer Eddy Mander. He handed over in the prisoner-

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Mander gave his U-boat code with the last ciphers, which he had not destroyed, to the English. Not enough with it, Mander radioed over an English naval station coded signals, by which two German U-boats were directed to a certain point in the Atlantic. There they fell victim to the English ships lying in wait for them. The U-boats were sunk. A Mander also found its place at Delmer.

Also listed: the son of a Bremen publisher, Frank Lynders, who headed the naval work. Today he is a representative of the Axel Springer publishing house in London; "Vicky", the sonorous announcer, was Agnes Bernelle, daughter of the Berlin theater man Rudolf Bernauer; the German troop support band under the conductor Harry Zeisel, who fell captive to the 8th Army in North Africa, provided the musical background for these devilish broadcasts.

All in all, only a handful of the 300 employees. Most of them will probably sit among us unrecognized. Their list of names is known only to the Secret Service and, to some extent, to the accomplices. Both will be careful not to disclose them.

After "Gustav Siegfried One" proved so successful, the "German Shortwave Transmitter Atlantic" was installed, finally the infamous "Soldier Transmitter Calais" and many others were launched. The villa in the village of Aspley Guire became much too small as a headquarters for Delmer and his gang. Delmer therefore had to move with his fraud team to a larger, more prestigious house. With prophetic foresight, the former owner of the house had christened this new headquarters of Delmer and his associates "the Rookery. In German: "die Gaunerherberge" ("the rogue's hostel").

Sefton Delmer and his deserters and emigrants now rolled over. A radio station was created for the Italians to incite the Duce's tired warriors against the Germans, the "Radio Livorno". Later, even the alleged "Fascist Republican Radio", in which speaker Randolph Imozzi, who came from Malta, insulted the Holy Father from England to such an extent that all Italy was upside down.

But Delmer could also do otherwise. A "Christian" diatribe was provided for him by a Father Andreas, who came from Styria and, it is claimed, had received special permission from his order to speak on Delmer's "Christ the King" station. Delmer himself reports how this went on:

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"Father Andrew usually began with a short piece of recorded music - Beethoven, Haydn, Bach or Monteverdi. With this he put his listeners in the desired contemplative mood. Then, after announcing the name of the station, he would hold another very short service of sacred music and then begin his address."

He described the cruel aspects of the treatment of Jews, the concentration camps, but according to Delmer's documents he also told his unsuspecting listeners the tall tale of the Lebensborn, "in which SS men were to be paired with unmarried girls", and much more.

There was so much lying and deception that it became too much even for British authorities who were not exactly squeamish. Ivonne Kirkpatrick, who represented the BBC's European service in the deliberations of the Political Warfare Committee, told Delmer to his face, "But if you also go on the medium wave with all your lies and distortions, you will undermine the reputation of British propaganda as a purveyor of truth."

He resisted Delmer's methods in vain. He was outvoted.

Everyone fell for Sefton Delmer, not only the small German black listeners, for some time even the SD, Minister Goebbels, British services, including, amusingly, the German service of the BBC, which had twice as many staff as Delmer. BBC employee Johnnie Kisch thought he had discovered a new German station. Today, by the way, Kisch is the London editor of the illustrated magazine "Quick."

However, whether Karl Eduard von Schnitzler, who moved from Camp No. 7 Ascot, where the British concentrated German prisoners of war selected by them, directly to the German Service of the BBC, fell for it seems questionable. The two red henchmen of the British atrocity propaganda, Schnitzler and Putlitz, were probably much too cunning for that. For the rest, they preferred not to return home to Germany, but moved hastily to the zone occupied by the Soviet troops, where they continue to play their old game of trickery, which the English taught them, with Walter Ulbricht and comrades.

But otherwise the deception succeeded perfectly.

Even Roosevelt had to be enlightened and laughed uproariously as if at a good joke organized solely for his amusement.

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Besides, it was by no means a coincidence that such essential communist propagandists as Schnitzler and Putlitz came from the stable of the Royal British War Propaganda. The clarification was provided by the 68-year-old Soviet parachutist Krut, who, together with another, parachuted over Holland and Belgium in 1943. His comrade had the misfortune of breaking his neck near The Hague and dying on the spot. Krut, who had no idea of this, landed happily near Liège and slipped in with spirit friends. Three days later, however, he was betrayed and arrested.

Krut, a Soviet jumper, was soon recognized as a former pastor of a rural congregation from the Dutch-German border region who had joined the Communist Party in 1931 and emigrated to Moscow via Berlin in 1933

Kruyt remained contemptuously silent in response to all the questions of the German interrogators. Only when the police commissioner told him that the second jumper had fallen to his death did the old man break down and confess that it had been his own son. He asked permission to see the dead man and finally to attend his funeral. Both were granted to him.

After the funeral, Kruyt made a full confession. He reported that he had been a teacher in Moscow at the so-called Lenin Library, which was in fact a school for agent training. Then in 1941, Kruyt and his son were picked up by a British submarine from Arkhangelsk and taken to England. The German interrogators were rigid: never before had they been able to establish that the Soviets had cooperated with the Western Allies in intelligence or agent service.

Kruyt reported that he had worked for the British "Office of Political Warfare." He revealed all the secrets about the decomposition work of the Sefton-Delmer transmitters and the other groups and agencies of the British confusion and lie offensive against Germany. Asked by the criminal investigators about the contradiction between his previous Soviet and present British activities, Kruyt replied calmly: "My comrades and I may well be working for the British Office of Political Warfare, but we get our instructions from the Soviet Embassy in London." Pastor Kruyt ended his adventurous life on the gallows.

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Delmer's lie remained the master of everything. Therefore, it also prepared the invasion "psychologically". Delmer reports about it:

"My main goal was to have the German troops in the West continue to lull themselves into security, thinking only of themselves and their comfortable "God-in-France existence." In this I followed the example of the German propagandists in France during the long phony war that preceded the German invasion of 1940.

At Soldatensender Calais, we already did our utmost to make the Germans think that the war in the West was really nothing but a "sit-down war" in which any military effort was pointless and silly. Worse than that: military ambition was downright dangerous.

"Units that prove particularly dashing and capable," Calais said, "will be detached to the Eastern Front. Promotion in France is a sure path to death in Russia's"

Towards the end, the severely disabled British Lieutenant General Gerald Templar was appointed chief of the German section of the SOE; a proof of the importance the British war leadership attached to Delmer's campaign of lies.

Delmer's "successes" did not give the Americans pause. They commissioned their military intelligence service OSS to stage their own black propaganda. Colonel Powell brought in Howard Becker and the story he wrote Polonski, and so "came into being" that appeal of the retired General Colonel Ludwig Beck, who had died in connection with July 20, to the German Wehrmacht. According to the will of his fraudulent life awakeners, the dead general addressed the German soldiers in September 1944 with the following words:

"I am Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, I am not dead, as was falsely and too hastily spread by the spokesmen of our rulers. When I was forced to point my pistol at myself on the night of July 20, I did not die from this shot - I was only wounded. Friends took away my alleged corpse and brought me to a hidden place where I was nursed back to health. And I would have remained hidden there until the end of the war, if the serious situation of my fatherland had not forced me to reappear and speak."

After this fantastic introduction, Ludwig Beck, whose name has been so shamelessly misused here, called on the German people, especially the soldiers, to rise up against the Reich government.

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Shortly thereafter, the "black" Americans even invented an entire uprising of the population of a Rhenish town, and all the details of this invented heroic struggle of the non-existent resistance in that town were communicated over Radio Luxembourg. However, despite all their efforts, the Americans could not compete with the frauds of Delmer's propaganda.

When the war was practically over and German military resistance was at a standstill, Delmer received orders

from the Allied High Command to see to it that the German civilian population did not remain in their cellars and quietly awaited the arrival of the Allies. His orders were to panic the German civilian population and chase them into the country roads.

He reports on this mission, which seems to have given Denis Sefton Delmer particular pleasure:

"We were lucky. Everything favored our first deployment of the Dicke Berta. Reichssender Köln, our target station, had behaved absolutely according to regulations. During the last few weeks, it had frequently interrupted its program to transmit air situation reports and official instructions to its listeners. We had recorded these intermittent broadcasts and added them to our record archive along with the "air situation reports" and special instructions from the other German stations. Now we took them out and listened to them again.

A man and a woman had read out the messages and instructions from Cologne. Excellent. I had a man and a woman who were capable of playing these roles. The man was Moritz Wetzold, a German prisoner of war who had been an announcer on German radio before he was drafted. He had joined our team six months ago, and I had saved him for just such an occasion. The woman was Margit Maaß, the wife of Alexander Maaß. She was an actress and could imitate any voice.

We also had some captured documents that showed that the areas on both sides of the Rhine had been divided into zones and placed under the control of defense commissars from the party leadership. We also already had a code name for our operation: Siegfried. We called the operation itself the R-Operation, with the letter R standing for the word "repatriation." These little details would add persuasive power to our instructions. Now Clifton Child, Stevens and Hans Gutmann sat down to write the text of our

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announcement to work out. I gave them the guidelines in broad strokes.

"The orders are issued in the name of the Gauleiter," I said. "It is to be declared therein that the enemy troops are approaching and that all women and children are to leave their homes immediately, this very night. They are to take with them only the bare necessities, not more than fifteen kilos of luggage per person. As far as possible, the leader of the local group must form and lead the columns. The men, of course, must stay behind with the Volkssturm and defend their localities. The women and children are to use handcarts, baby carriages, bicycles, and similar means of transportation. We must indicate to them Rhine crossings and assembly points on the other bank - as far inland as possible, I would suggest. Special trains will be used at these points to take them to the NSV evacuation camps in Bavaria. Families are told that they must take their papers with them. The children are to have a bag tied around their necks with their identity cards.""

After this ruse fully succeeded and hundreds of thousands of desperate people, especially women and children, wandered helplessly on the country roads, most of them under the hail of enemy artillery and battle planes, the success with Cologne did not let Delmer rest and rest, and he kept this record going.

"Our guest performance in Cologne was followed by others in Frankfurt and Leipzig over the next few nights. tried to lure citizens of the Frankfurt and Darmstadt area out of their homes with reports of special NSV relief trains. We claimed that these trains stopped at certain stations at certain times and that hot food, drinks and clothing would be distributed there. The Railroad Department of the Blockade Ministry and Stevens had worked out a quite convincing timetable and selected stations that were far enough away so that one had to make a regular trip there. In the name of Gauleiter Florian, we issued orders to the local cadres of National Socialist Party functionaries, according to which these men, as "the valuable element of the nation," were to remove themselves from the threatened areas so that they could survive and "pass on the torch of the National Socialist faith.""

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At 5:59 a.m. on April 14, 1945, "Soldatensender West," as Delmer's last black station was called after the fall of Calais, fell silent forever. Sefton Delmer took off his beard, which he had worn all the time during his lying offensive as a special camouflage. He describes this momentous incident with truly poignant self-knowledge:

"While my razor scraped the soap-soaked whiskers from my face, I stared into the mirror and felt all the horror

of a Dorian Gray stepping in front of his telltale image. The pale, slack face of an old crook looked back at me. Was this, I wondered, the effect of four years of "moonlighting" on Denis Sefton Delmer?"

It is not known whether his German accomplices also made the same decision. In any case, hardly anyone today wants to be reminded of their time with Sefton Delmer.

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Betrayed supplies for Rommel

The revelations of Antonio Trizzino - Late exposure of the role
of Major Dr. Hans Kemritz

The foolhardiness of General Erwin Rommel, the sacrifice and bravery of his officers and soldiers - all was in vain. The German tanks remained in the glowing sand, the guns fell silent. Whenever England's troops were at the end, the supplies failed. These supplies, brought in from Italian ports, reached the North African front either sparsely or not at all. Transporter after transporter, convoy after convoy, was systematically sunk by British submarines and Royal Air Force bombers. Tanks, guns, ammunition, rations and last but not least thousands and thousands of German soldiers were thus sent to the bottom of the Mediterranean. Here was a gigantic betrayal at work.

The Italian air force officer and war correspondent, Antonio Trizzino, published a book "Navi e poltrone" in Italy in 1952 and a second "Settembre nero" in 1956. These two books were published in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957, abridged in one volume under the title "The Betrayed Fleet". In this excellent work, the author also dealt with the betrayal of the supply for North Africa. He writes:

"The steamers had hardly left the ports when they were torpedoed. The enemy's warships and submarines, as well as his planes, were so conspicuously quick on our convoys that it could no longer be a coincidence. Occasionally a convoy remained unharmed, but always only when it took a course contrary to orders. Wasn't that revealing enough? The tankers were particularly threatened. When Rommel prepared his attack on El Alamein for the end of August 1942, he counted above all on the 12,000 tons of gasoline of the tanker "Pozza Ricca". But shortly before the arrival day, the tanker was torpedoed, managing to load part of the gasoline on another tanker, which left in great haste. But it too met the same fate, so that Rommel was forced to call off his attack after 24 hours "because the fuel supply failed.

Then, in September, the pace of sinkings increased tremendously. Hundreds of tanks, thousands of motor vehicles, tens of thousands of tons of fuel and food sank into the sea.

On October 9, Admiral Sansonetti, deputy chief of the admiral staff and Campioni's successor, reported to Marshal Cavallero that, because of the conspicuous circumstances of the sinking of our ships, there must be excellently informed spies at work. They were not to be looked for in the ports, they were in Rome."

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After the war, two significant books appeared, one penned by Italian Admiral Maugeri, titled "From the Ashes of Disgrace," and the other by American Frigate Captain Zacharias, "Secret Missions." Antonio Trizzino writes about Admiral Maugeri:

"There is no sea in Rome. Only the gentlemen of the ministries could therefore be aware of the arrival and departure times of the ships. Admiral Jachino drew the circle of his inquiries even narrower by writing; "During my command I have often had occasion for the almost certain conclusion that certain news could only have been spread by members of the Ministry. I do not mean to suggest that it was always deliberate. The Admiral's Staff and the Intelligence Bureau never wanted to admit that their organization was porous. They did everything they could to put the blame on outside agencies."

The Naval Information Office was undoubtedly acting against its better judgment when it tried to reassure Admiral Jachino. His boss, Admiral Maugeri, knew exactly how things stood. He himself admitted after the war, in his book From the Ashes of Disgrace, that the English Admiralty could count on loyal friends of the utmost reliability among their Italian colleagues and in the Ministry itself. These men had only one goal in mind, to end the war as quickly as possible in order to free Italy at last from fascism. Did he himself belong to the circle of people who wanted only one thing: End as quickly as possible and at any price? We cannot necessarily say so.

What is certain, however, is that Maugeri was honored with the American Legion of Merit award, which he wore as a token of recognition for his services during his post as chief of the Naval Intelligence Bureau."

About the publication of the frigate captain Zacharias, who chats very openly about his experiences in the Second World War, Trizzino records:

"This secret was later revealed by the American frigate captain Ellis M. Zacharias. He was then assigned to the "Office of Naval Intelligence," of which he then became vice chief in the second half of 1942. Zacharias was informed on a case-by-case basis of the intentions of the Axis admiral staffs as well as of the content of the discussions between the representatives of the German and Italian navies. Nor did he have any difficulty in his intercourse with men of the Italian naval high command, on whom he could rely, as well as on the fact that his agents landed on the Italian coast were working without hindrance

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could. He even succeeded in stopping ventures of our fleet,

When it suited the wishes and plans of the Allies."

But was it at all possible that Italian traitors alone were able to play almost the entire German supply to North Africa into the hands of the Allies? In the course of the affair surrounding the Berlin double agent and human trafficker Dr. Hans Kemritz, a small corner was uncovered in 1951 that can provide information about this.

This Dr. Hans Kemritz joined the German Abwehr as a Captain (ret.) at the outbreak of war in 1939 and was assigned to General Command III Berlin-Wilmersdorf at III H, Counterespionage and Secrecy Regulations. Promoted to major during the war, Kemritz also served with the Abwehr in Brussels and Paris. In 1945, Major Dr. Kemritz was taken prisoner by the Soviets and - although a staff officer and member of the Abwehr - was discharged "due to illness" in the fall of 1945.

In Berlin, he acted as a double agent for East and West and played a number of former comrades, mainly from the Abwehr, into the hands of the NKVD. One of them, Jürgen von Hake, died in a Soviet prison. Another, Wolf von Gersdorf, apparently took up the Russians' offer of an agent and, when he was released to spy in the West, packed it in. Now other relatives of those extradited to the NKVD by Kemritz began to stir, and a huge scandal broke out.

The comrade traitor and Soviet agent Dr. Kemritz was arrested by German authorities. His lawyer was none other than Dr. Robert Kempner, who had been the American prosecuting attorney in Nuremberg. To everyone's amazement, it was not the Soviets but the Americans who got Kemritz out of custody. The honorary court proceedings initiated against Kemritz, who had absconded from Berlin, by the Bar Association of Frankfurt (Main) had to be discontinued by order of the U.S. occupying forces.

The student body of the Free University of West Berlin protested in vain in writing to the American High Commissioner, the League for Human Rights demanded criminal proceedings against Kemritz from McCloy without success. The German Bundestag debated the Kemritz scandal on June 20, 1951, the Governing Mayor of Berlin, Reuter, and Berlin's Senator of Justice, Dr. Kielinger, demanded criminal proceedings against Kemritz.

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Meanwhile, a Berlin court ordered Kemritz to pay the widow Elly von Hake DM 11,640 and a monthly pension of DM 300.

This sentence was not even carried out. The American General Matthewson wrote on behalf of the US High Commissioner McCloy to the Governing Mayor Reuter trocken:

"I must request you to transmit the following instruction to the presiding judge of the District Court through the usual official channels: An entry is to be made in the records of the court that the decision of the court in the matter of von Hake v. Kemritz is null and void by virtue of Law No. 7 of the Allied Command. Please advise me by August 10 that all persons in question have complied with the foregoing instruction and send me a certified copy of the entry in the court records."

In a press conference in Berlin on August 7, 1951, the American High Commissioner McCloy stated that Kemritz had "made a valuable contribution to securing the West after the war." Further, Kemritz had "assisted the Allies in tracking down war criminals and Nazis as a double agent during his time in Berlin."

This massive use of the Americans - even more so in the hot time of the Cold War - for a man who -

demonstrably - also worked with the Soviet secret service, cannot be explained at first glance. It was only in the context of a series in the "Revue", written by Ferdinand Friedensburg, a member of the Bundestag, under the title "As long as there is a Kemritz case", that one could understand the background of the inexplicable American reaction. This series of revelations, which essentially deals with Kemritz's human trafficking operations to the East, also deals with the wartime activities of Abwehrmajor Dr. Kemritz.

Friedensburg wrote in the "Revue" of May 17, 1952:

"It is now proven that during the war Kemritz gave reports to the Allies via a secret transmitter about supplies for Field Marshal Rommel's Afrika Korps. This is also the key to answering the question why the American secret service covered up for the traitor and manhunter after 1945, evaded German prosecution and brought him to safety.

"Revue" possesses documentary evidence that Dr. Hans Kemritz committed treason before 1945, and hereby submits it in the

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Facsimile of the public. The original of this affidavit lies sealed in the armored cabinet of a prominent Berlin lawyer and notary public; it was given by a man who was able to speak to a number of the Kemritz victims in a dungeon cell of the GPU prison in Berlin-Weißensee. This GPU prisoner at the time, who is now at liberty again, was able to speak in the GPU cellar to that Abwehr officer who was put on the trail of Kemritz, the traitor to the country, during the war, at the time when the enormously high sinking figures of the Afrikanachschub suggested the suspicion of treason from within his own ranks. These investigations put Captain Wernicke on the trail of a spy ring whose headquarters in Paris, Avenue du Jena, in the immediate vicinity of the Arc de Triomphe, used a secret transmitter to radio data, locations, and tonnage of the Afrikanachschub to the other side.

Wernicke did not report on the results of his research until much later: When he was awaiting the death sentence in a basement cell of the GPU prison. In the face of death, in a situation where one no longer lies, he gave our informant the details in great detail.

Kemritz was working at a defense post in Paris at the time of the African campaign. At that time, when there was already no doubt about the outcome of the war, he once again thought of taking the side of the strongest. Rommel fought in Africa against superior enemy forces, to which he eventually succumbed. Moreover, he stood and fell with supplies across the Mediterranean. Insufficient supplies meant: lack of troops, fuel, means of transport and ammunition; ships that sank in the Mediterranean, airplanes that never reached Africa, comrades who drowned by the thousands in the floods of the Mediterranean, because the opposing side was informed in detail about all supply movements as soon as they were scheduled by the German command and could launch devastating strikes against the supplies for the German Afrika Korps from Malta and western Africa. Even Rommel's clever opponent, Field Marshal Montgomery, confirms this. In his war memoirs, "From El Alamein to the Sangro," he states: "My conviction is that Rommel could not take the fight at El Agheila because his supplies were insufficient."

One of the traitors who caused the death of many thousands of German soldiers in the floods of the Mediterranean Sea was already called Kemritz. He committed the betrayal of comrades for the basest reasons of personal self-interest.

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committed for the benefit of all; his contemptible, selfish treachery cannot be mentioned in the same breath as the deeds of the men who offered patriotic resistance to Hitler."

In the same issue of the "Revue", an excerpt was published in facsimile from a documentary declaration by the Berlin lawyer and member of parliament Dr. Paul Ronge, which has the following wording with regard to Kemritz's activities during the war:

"c) In the course of these conversations with me, Captain Wernicke reported that, as a counterintelligence officer, his main task had been to fight the traitors in his own ranks who were handing over important military secrets, troop and supply movements, etc., to the Allies. In 1944, he said, his investigative work in this context put him on Kemritz's trail. He said he had been close on his heels. (This verbatim, while I reproduce the other contents of the conversations mutatis mutandis). Kemritz, who also had business in Paris, had been a member of a large spy

ring (headquartered in Paris, Avenue du Jena) and had betrayed the German troops and supply transports going to Africa via the Mediterranean to the Allies on the Paris-Italy route.

He, Wernicke, had so much evidence against Kemritz in his hands that he could have seized it at any time. However, he had refrained from doing so in the confusion of the invasion, since he had considered the war lost anyway, and finally out of human considerations.

The foregoing proceedings, registered under No. 40/52 of the Register of Deeds, are hereby executed in extracts and this extract issued to the editorial office of "Revue" in Munich 9, Harthausen Strasse 50.

Berlin, April 24, 1952.

Dr. rer. pol. Paul Ronge

(Dr. rer. pol. Paul Ronge)

Seal notary"

Despite the illustrious lawyer Dr. Kempner, Kemritz never made any attempt to fight this account. The thousands of widows, mothers, and children of the officers and soldiers of the German Afrika Korps who fell or perished in this way now know who was partly to blame for the death of their loved ones. The Americans were compliant with the traitor to whom the Allies owed much of their victory over the German Afrika Korps. Even when he was working for the competition in the East. And they obviously had every reason to be grateful.

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Order Herbert Richard Wehner

Order from Moscow - Branch Holland - News for Wilhelm Pieck

On April 2, 1942, a man calling himself Svensson was arrested in Stockholm in the apartment of Mrs. Gustafsson, 76A Gotlandsgatan. His identity soon became clear: it was the 35-year-old German emigrant Herbert Richard Wehner. Shortly thereafter, his helper, 28-year-old Swede Solveig Signe Lucia Hansson, was also arrested. She had been in the Communist camp since the age of 17 and was a leader in the Swedish Communist Youth League.

Herbert Wehner had already joined the Social Democratic youth movement in 1923 and very soon published the left-opposition newspaper Revolutionäre Tat. In 1925 he joined the Syndicalist Workers' Federation and the International Red Aid. In 1926 Wehner left the syndicalists again, becoming a member of the KPD in 1927. By 1929 he was secretary of the KPD in Saxony, and in 1930 he moved into the Saxon state parliament as a Communist deputy.

In 1933 Herbert Wehner, like many leading Communists who had escaped imminent arrest, went underground and tried to expand the illegal KPD with KPD Reichstag deputies Pieck, Schehr, Ulbricht, Stamm, Rembte. In 1934, Wehner struggled to rally a united party in the Saar region against annexation to Germany. During this time, he held both a forged Czech and a forged Swiss passport. Wehner repeatedly traveled via Switzerland to the Saar region, France, and Czechoslovakia. There Wehner was also arrested by the Czech police in Prague in the spring of 1935, where he was supposed to meet with Stamm and Rembte, and was expelled from the CSR after four weeks in prison.

Herbert Wehner traveled from Prague to Moscow to attend the 7th World Congress of the Communist International as one of the representatives of the KPD. While Wehner was lecturing with Pieck in Moscow, Stamm and Rembte were tracked down by the Gestapo in Berlin, tried and executed as high and national traitors.

From Moscow, Wehner traveled on Pieck's behalf via the CSR, Austria, Switzerland, and France to Holland on a false Luxembourg passport. From there, Wehner arrived in the Ruhr region in February 1936, which he left again six weeks later after completing his assignments. Then he went via Holland to Paris, where he helped organize an office for German refugee aid. When the civil war broke out in Spain, Wehner took the initiative in setting up the Thälmann Battalion of the International Brigade and, in cooperation with the red-

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Spanish delegation in Paris in July 1936, the first hundred German brigadists to Barcelona. When the publicity had started, he transferred it to another comrade to hurry to Brussels in the fall of 1936, where he participated in Lord Cecil's peace conference. Returning to Paris, he took over the representation of German refugees with the emigrants Herz and Bernhard. In this capacity, Wehner traveled to London in 1936 to confer with the Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Malcolm. In the first days of 1937 he stayed in Brussels to continue to Amsterdam. Throughout the year, Wehner remained in Belgium and Holland, sending all reports he received from Germany to Comrade Pieck in Moscow every three weeks with illegal couriers via Paris.

In January 1938, Wehner was ordered by Pieck to Moscow, where he spent some time lecturing at the Lenin School for the training of higher communist functionaries. Under the pseudonym Kurt Funk, Wehner wrote a widely circulated pamphlet "Should the Working Class Capitulate to the War?" which appeared in German, French, Dutch and Danish. At the same time, he collaborated on the journal Communist International.

In May 1939, Wehner participated with Pieck, Ulbricht and Florian in a Comintern conference chaired by Dimitroff, at which it was decided to reorganize illegal Communist work in Germany. In the course of this conference, Wehner was given the task of establishing a unified illegal Communist leadership in Berlin, which would, among other things, pass on news.

In July 1939, Wehner traveled from Moscow via Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland to Paris. The financing of all these trips and organizations was, of course, borne by the Comintern. After a shorter stay in Paris, Wehner moved his headquarters to Amsterdam for the time being. From here he directed his 30 or so illegal collaborators in Germany by means of couriers. The information he received from Germany he forwarded to Wilhelm Pieck in Moscow as instructed.

In Amsterdam, Wehner was also overrun by the German attack and tried in vain, from his hiding place, to reestablish the wires of the organization that had been suddenly torn asunder by the war. He succeeded only in part in the Saar and in southern Germany.

In March 1941, Wehner sailed with a Dutch seaman on a freighter from Rotterdam to Oslo, where he was provided with 3,000 Swedish kronor for the time being and a port of call in Stockholm

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received. Norwegian comrades helped Wehner, who had now adopted the code name "Svensson," across the border into Sweden. He reached Stockholm via Karlstad on May 15, 1941. For the time being, the owner of the start-up apartment brought him to Erik Arvid Fritjof, who took him into his apartment at 19 Essingen Brogata. After a few days, Wehner was placed a few houses away at Essingen Brogata 22 with the sailor Knut Mineur. A few days later, near the bridge to Lilla Essinge, Mrs. Elsa Elisabeth Fritjof introduced Wehner to the journalist Söderman, whose cover name was "Gustav". Söderman had been a member of the Swedish Communist Party since 1922, stayed in Moscow from 1928 to 1931 and was in constant contact with the Soviet legation in Stockholm. His wife worked as a telephone operator for the Soviet trade delegation.

Elsa Elisabeth Fritjof then also put Wehner in touch with the 40-year-old German emigrant Charlotte Bischoff, whom he met for the first time on June 8, 1941, in front of the Lovö Church. For five hours, Bischoff gave Wehner a detailed account of the conditions within the German emigration in Sweden, especially in the Smedsbo and Långmora camps. Bischoff was employed as a domestic servant by the second head of the Soviet trade delegation.

Mrs. Fritjof finally arranged for Wehner to live permanently with her sister-in-law Mrs. Elvira Emilia Linnea Gustafsson at 76A Gotlandsgatan in early June 1941.

Herbert Wehner met with Bischoff regularly, and in the end she agreed to return to Berlin to carry out illegal Communist work.

At the same time, Wehner had been in contact with Mrs. Solveig Hansson, who provided him with various items, including all usable German newspapers. Solveig Hansson also provided courier services between Söderman and Wehner. She also tracked down the Swedish sailor who agreed to smuggle Mrs. Bischoff into Germany as a stowaway.

Wehner now furnished his agent Bischoff with 700 Reichsmarks, some microphotographed copies of the "History of the CP in Russia," the pamphlet "The Road to Peace," and a number of appeals. One of these was

addressed to the German people in case of an outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, which was now generally expected. One of the main tasks of Mrs. Bischoff was to
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to find out what possibility there was for Wehner's illegal return to Berlin. Wehner also agreed with Bischoff that she should place advertisements of certain content in the "Berliner Lokalanzeiger" from which he could see whether his return would be possible.

Presumably on July 10, 1941, Frau Bischoff sailed to Bremen on a Swedish freighter and was smuggled ashore. Five weeks later, Wehner received the first news of the Bischoff and gave Solveig Hansson the task of recruiting a new sailor who could restore Wehner's old connections with comrades in Holland. This, too, succeeded. Wehner now sent communist propaganda material and 10,000 Reichsmarks in hundred-mark bills from Stockholm to Holland. At the same time, he demanded that the Dutch comrades bring the 1,000 marks to Mrs. Bischoff in Berlin and establish connections with the industrial areas in West Germany.

In December 1941, the contact with Holland was perfect. Wehner now received detailed news about the German war industry, which he immediately forwarded to Pieck in Moscow. The news source on Holland worked, and Wehner was able to report continuously to Moscow.

Asked after his arrest by the Swedish police, who had been watching him for some time, what he used these messages from Germany for, he explained that he used them as a basis for his articles and also sometimes gave a compilation to Söderman, who was also a journalist.

The prosecutor who brought the charges against Wehner ruled, "These communications were of such a nature that they can be described as typical agent reports."

Wehner then described the financing of this extensive and costly activity in interrogations as follows:

In July 1941, a businessman had given him 5000 Reichsmark in Stockholm at the corner of Walhallaweg and Odenstraße for the work to overthrow the Nazi regime. 700 Marks of it had been taken by Bischoff, 2000 Marks he had sent to Holland and 2300 Marks he had given to Mrs. Hansson for safekeeping. Later, Wehner gave the money to another emigrant, who had the alias "Kalle".

Also in the further course the unknown businessman did not show stingy and donated Herbert Wehner in two installments 5000 Swedish crowns.

During the immediately conducted house search in Wehner's quarters

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the police officers found intelligence material, instructions on how to listen in on Moscow Radio, which was constantly broadcasting announcements for its agents, and a leaflet intended for the Ruhr. It stated, among other things:

"People of Westphalia and the Rhineland!

Worker! You have always solemnly vowed never to fight against the Soviet Union! Keep your word! Therefore, do the worst quality work in the world and work slowly! Worker! All wheels stand still when your strong arm wants it! Take care with all means of sabotage and strikes that Hitler's production must succumb.

Destroy the machines and looms. Workers in the armament industries: Every dud is a blow against Hitler and an aid to the Red Army. Feel like an essential part in this honorable army.

Soldiers! Do not shoot at the Red Army! Run over! Don't make a fuss with the reactionaries and fascist officers. Turn your weapons around. Desert and form guerrilla groups with workers and peasants of the Soviet Union.

Terrorize the German war power wherever you can. Put an end to the senseless war against the Soviet Union!"

"Kalle" could not be apprehended. He managed to disappear without a trace. Instead, the Swedish police arrested the emigrants who had been in contact with Wehner: Karl Mewis, Georg Henke and Max Seydewitz.

However, it was not until several months after Wehner's arrest.

Criminal Investigator Akerberg and Detective Lindberg interrogated Herbert Wehner in detail on February 20, March 9, and March 23, 1942.

Herbert Wehner defended himself before the police and in court by stating that the Comintern and the Soviet Union were not the same in nature. He had never worked for a foreign power, but only for the KPD, which was a

national party. And he stuck to that.

Solveig Hansson professed to be a convinced communist, but assured that she had merely made a few ways for Wehner as a favor.

The district court in Stockholm, represented by district judges Junker and Lech and assessor Brandt, did not grant Wehner's or Hansson's [162]

Statements Faith. The prosecutors Werner Ryhninger and A. Hasselrot brought charges of espionage for a foreign power.

On April 29, 1942, Wehner was sentenced to one year in prison under sections 1 and 2, ch. 4, of the Penal Code, partly under section 14a, ch. 8, of the Penal Code for unauthorized news activities, partly under section 39 of the Act of June 11, 1937, on the right of foreigners to reside in Sweden, together with section 38 of the Royal Decree of November 26, 1937.

Solveig Hansson was sentenced to six months' imprisonment under section 14a, ch. 8, of the Criminal Code, together with section 3, ch. 3, of the same Code, for unauthorized news activities. She was set free while Wehner remained in custody.

Both the public prosecutor's office and both convicts appealed against this verdict. The Royal District Court in Stockholm - consisting of the District Court Councillors Baron Nordenskjöld, Scherdin, Björklund and Assessor Löwenhjelm - now passed a new sentence on November 6, 1942. The punishments were tightened. According to this, Herbert Wehner now received one year of penal servitude instead of prison, and Mrs. Solveig Hansson nine months in prison instead of six.

The news line to Wilhelm Pieck in Moscow was interrupted, at least in this way. [163]

National Committee Free Germany

In the Service of the Red Army - Prussian Generals, Deserters and Communist

Emigrants - The Role of Colonel

von Seydlitz-Kurzbach - Illusion and Footfall

Those German Communists who emigrated to Moscow in 1933 led a miserable existence after the collapse of the Red-Spanish Civil War, where they were largely deployed in the International Brigade. They and those Austrian Social Democratic Schutzbündler who fled to the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia after the February putsch vegetated only tolerated in the red paradise of workers and peasants. Wherever they dared to invoke communist solidarity or even to criticize the miserable living conditions in which they were forced to exist, they were summarily dealt with. Either they "perished," like Max Holz, or they were "purged," like Heinz Neumann, August Kreuzburg, Hermann Schubert, Hugo Eberlein, Hermann Remmele, Alexander Kippenberger, and many others. Hundreds of German emigrants were shot in this way as "deviants" or even "mutineers and Trotskyists". Even the youth and children of these German-speaking emigrants were disadvantaged. They were deprived of their own school and transferred to Soviet Russian schools in September 1937.

The situation of these Communist emigrants became almost desperate when Stalin concluded the German-Soviet pact with Ribbentrop. Now they were simply a nuisance to the Kremlin. Group by group, they were imprisoned by the NKVD on all sorts of impossible charges. In 1940, the NKVD handed over more than 150 of them to the German Gestapo. The Soviet Russian comrades were glad to finally get rid of their German comrades.

The only people who remained in the Soviet Union were those who had managed over the years not to attract attention at all, and of course the opportunistic elements of the KPD functionaries of the ilk of Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht and Erich Weinert.

The situation of the rest did not change when the German-Soviet war broke out. The mass of German emigrants was forcibly transferred from Moscow to Karaganda on September 28, 1941. While the freight trains with the downed human cargo were still rolling toward Siberia, the Soviet protectors among the emigrants, especially Ulbricht, Pieck, and Mahle, drove to the camps where the first German prisoners of war had been brought in. They had orders from the Red Army High Command to carry out decomposition work among the German prisoners of war.

At the same time, Department VII of the Main Political Adminis-
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The Red Army's combat propaganda against the German Wehrmacht. Here the Communist émigrés were initially used as spokesmen on Moscow radio. The Communist Frieda Rubiner wrote the first appeals and pamphlets to the German prisoners of war, and a so-called German People's Radio was put into operation. The whole work, however, was so crude and primitive that the German POWs turned away in disdain and the Landsers in the HKL just laughed uproariously.

Nevertheless, with the help of their German collaborators Pieck, Ulbricht, Ackermann, Matern, Florin, Weinert, Bredel, Wolf, Erpenbeck, and Becher, the Bolsheviks gradually succeeded in capturing a handful of German prisoners of war.

in zone three of prisoner-of-war camp 27 northwest of Moscow in the winter of 1941/42 to concentrate into the first "prisoner school for Marxism". It was here that the first "anti-fascists" were recruited and formed into "actives". These actives had two tasks: to break down the comradely cohesion and unity of the prisoners of war in order to make them compliant for auxiliary services for the Red Army, and in addition the actives had to perform informer services for the NKVD.

The first anti-fascist group of officers was founded in the Jelabuga camp by Captain Dr. Ernst Hadermann, a student councilor from Kassel, in that winter of 1941/42. The aviation major Assi Hahn, who fell into Soviet captivity, names Dr. Schöne and a certain Kellert as special informers of the Grasowetzer Aktiv, who wrote in their evaluations for the commissars about their own German compatriots, if they did not allow themselves to be recruited: "He remains an enemy."

Captain Dr. Hadermann, eventually transferred to Camp 27 as well, was able to recruit a few dozen officers, among them the aviation lieutenant Heinrich Graf Einsiedel, a great-grandson of Otto von Bismarck, and the first lieutenants Reyher and Augustin.

The German prisoners of war, however, starved, froze and despised these "anti-fascists" as traitors and sneeringly called them "Kashists" because they were given preference in the customary rations, kasha porridge. These Kashists abruptly occupied all the good camp posts.

As the fateful battle for Stalingrad raged, Captain Hadermann, First Lieutenant Reyher and First Lieutenant Eberhard Charisius were brought to the Stalingrad front to use their propaganda to wear down the fighting strength of those trapped inside.

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In Ilyovka they met with the KPD emigrants Bredel, Weinert and Ulbricht and tried their luck in this way, without any success.

Such "German" combat propagandists of the Soviets also appeared at the Kessel of Velikiye Luki in January 1943. But even they, led by Lieutenant Augustin and Private Wolf, were denied any success.

All the effort of the Soviets and their German Hiwi was not worth it. Their efforts were not echoed by the German POWs or the Eastern Front soldiers.

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Then, on February 2, 1943, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus was forced to surrender with his last half-starved 120,000 men, most of whom had already run out of ammunition. This was the most horrific catastrophe that had befallen the German Eastern Army so far.

An inferno awaited the Stalingraders! For the survivors of this battle, only now the great dying really began. Of the 120 000, only about 6000 survived the treatment of rare their red defeaters. Surprisingly, among them is the majority of the senior officers of Stalingrad.

The last adjutant of General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, First Lieutenant Philipp Humbert, described in 1949 in the "Spiegel" what the German soldiers had to experience after the surrender of Stalingrad. He wrote, among other things:

"Alone on a truck, I was traveling southward. A short distance from our destination, we got stuck in snowdrifts.

On foot, we continued through ravines in the evening darkness. I had to lead the way, I couldn't miss it. It was marked by frozen, mutilated corpses. The Soviet officer with his two MP riflemen trudged behind me. At the end of each ravine I expected the sheaf, because what else should be the sense of this way. Later, in the Soviet Union, I got out of the habit of asking for the meaning. I first came to Kiselyakov, a poor collection of huts in the great arch of the Don. In the mostly open snow holes from the time of the battle, 13,000 prisoners of war lived for two weeks. They were already weakened when they were taken prisoner and had to walk the many kilometers to Kiselyakov. Only about 60 percent had survived this, I could now look at the corpses along my

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way. Here they froze and starved alive. There was practically nothing in the way of food. The dead who were not taken away and the wounds that were not dressed for weeks polluted the air and drove the people into a mad psychosis. I saw cases of cannibalism ...

From Moscow directly came the order that all officers had to march off. Non-marching officers and "all the rest" were left to fend for themselves. Hardly anyone got out of the camp alive. We had to march 120 kilometers in five days through the snowy desert without a night's lodging. What happened on this march would fill a book "Stalingrad II. Part". To describe the various methods of extermination would lead too far. Only a few highlights: We were driven forward with piston blows and dogs. Most of us were not up to the marching speed and collapsed. Those who collapsed were shot in the neck. We, the younger ones, dragged the older ones on and formed a final cordon to intercept the beatings and to slow down the marching speed. Many a young man was no match for these efforts and remained down himself. If the road was already marked by the bodies of those who had been shot on the way there, it now became a band of the dead. At night we were allowed to rest for four hours on the steppe. Like sheep we had to cram ourselves in. Those who lay on the outside and no longer had the strength to get up every half hour and warm themselves by moving around froze to death. Many could no longer muster this strength. Fires were not allowed to be made. For three days we marched along the railroad line. Empty trains rolled past us toward Beketowka. But we had to march. Only once during these days were we each given a handful of millet and told to cook ourselves some porridge. For this purpose we were pushed into a narrow ravine near Gumrak, where the main assembly point of the 295th Infantry Division had been. The bottom of the ravine was now littered with the former wounded. They had had their skulls bashed in with pistons, and their bodies were mutilated as well. Plaster bandages stared into the air. The snow in this field of corpses we scraped together to cook the porridge "

In this case, the senior German officers were treated quite differently by the Soviets. The Kremlin speculated on the severe shock that the troop leaders had suffered from the defeat at Stalingrad, and it did not speculate wrongly. The Communists took an exceedingly careful approach.

Jesco von Puttkamer, who later became a member and active collaborator of

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of the National Committee Free Germany, describes in a brochure "Error and Guilt" how the Soviet Russian proceeded:

"He knew quite well that this open-mindedness would immediately come to an end if these officers and above all the generals, on whom it now particularly depended, disappeared in the death inferno of the typhus and dysentery camps. He drew the only correct conclusion from this and put together a special train which, with its white-covered beds, friendly nurses, Viennese schnitzels and glasses of vodka, carried Paul and the 22 generals and a large number of staff officers directly to Moscow. This theatrical coup did not fail to have its effect. The other officers who had come out alive from the zone of death camps and were later gathered in the camp 97, 1000 kilometers away from Moscow, became the strictest opponents not only of the Russians, but also of the National Committee and the Officers' Association.

Inspired from Moscow, discussions and meetings were soon held in all the camps to decide whether the anti-fascist movement within the POWs should be united under a common leadership. The idea of making politics and propaganda from within the prison camp, especially since it was advocated by the émigrés and the anti-fascist students, met with strong opposition in the camps in the early days."

Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, who also made himself available to the Soviets, describes the entry of these chosen

ones in his memoir "Tagebuch der Versuchung":

"A medic enters our parlor and reports that the Stalingrad general and 300 officers of the 6th Army have arrived at the camp. I am too powerless to get excited about something I thought impossible four weeks ago. A parlor mate scrapes the inch-thick ice off the window pane with a knife. With the help of some comrades, I am able to stand up and take a look at the camp road. There I see a sight that is both eerie and grotesque - the generals moving into their quarters.

Flashing monocles and medals, fur coats and walking sticks, bright red general's lapels and wonderful felt boots trimmed with leather, energetic gestures, sweeping hand movements, radiant laughter. And only rarely in this colorful and elegant picture a gray spot: the

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bent figure of one of the old camp inmates in ragged Russian cotton jackets or tattered German uniforms, rags with string wrapped around their feet instead of footwear - the emaciated lifeless face constantly lowered to the ground.

We hear that the transport of the generals and those 300 officers from Stalingrad to Krasnogorsk took place in a special sleeper train with white-covered beds. With incredulous amazement we old prisoners hear about the condensed milk, butter, caviar and white bread that were available as rations on this transport. Nevertheless, some of the new arrivals are already infected with typhus.

My gaze catches another stack of huge pieces of luggage,

including some special tubular plate cases, such as were common in the Mercedes cars specially designed for higher commanders. The

pathetically scrawny figures of the prisoners who carried these pieces of luggage into the rooms of the generals, almost collapse under their load. - I sink back onto my cot.

A new attack of fever relieves me of the trouble of thinking about what I have seen."

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The Red Army had long planned the creation of a propaganda and decomposition organization of German prisoners of war, which would help the Soviets to weaken or even break the resistance of the German Eastern Front fighter, who doggedly and faithfully fulfilled his hard soldier's duty. Now, after Stalingrad, the Soviets went about carrying out their plan with all sophistication and also all consistency. While the mass of German soldiers and officers from Stalingrad perished miserably on the march to captivity and in the starvation camps, their generals were deliberately handled with ice-cream gloves. This was for a very specific reason.

Jesco von Puttkamer reports on this:

"Now the question had to be solved as to which generals would be willing to cooperate in the Free Germany Movement. It had become clear to such an extent that it was necessary to create a separate association within the captured officers. There had been the most heated discussions on this question, especially in Lunowo, because the communist enlisted men could not understand that a special unit was to be created again for the officers. In Lunowo then probably in the end

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a hint from the Russian side may have tipped the scales. The initiative group in Camp 27 was clear about the necessity of such a step from the very beginning. For them, it was only a matter of finding the generals who would place themselves at the head of such an officers' association.

Paul and the 22 Stalingrad generals had had only a short stay in Camp 27 after their comfortable journey in the hospital train, and then were transferred to General's Camp No. 48 via another short stopover. There they now sat in a former princely castle, surrounded by a large park, and spent their days playing cards and gardening and sometimes discussing politics."

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In January 1943, the Kashists circulated in all camps an appeal of the "Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a German National Committee", with the request to the prisoners of war to form a strong anti-fascist front and to create a German National Committee. The preparatory committee was headed by the emigrant communists: Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck, Erich Weinert, Johannes R. Becher, Hans Mahle and the prisoners of war: Theology student Jakob Eschborn, Captain Dr. Ernst Hadermann, Lieutenant Bernt von Kügelgen and Sergeant Herbert Stresow.

After long, careful preparation, the Soviets then took action on July 13, 1943. The meeting hall of the local Soviet of Krasnogorsk, where about 400 German prisoners of war and emigrant communists were gathered, was decorated with bright black-white-red flags. Originally, they wanted to choose the flag with black-red-gold colors. However, Hans Mahle, Wolfgang Leonhard tells us in his book "Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder", had explained to him that Manuilsky had opposed the black-red-gold flag because it was reminiscent of the Weimar period, the time of weakness, crises and mass unemployment. He said that the black-white-red flag was much better, as it would be more popular among the German officer corps.

The Soviets were represented at the founding meeting by Professor Arnold and Lieutenant Colonel Professor Janson. Under the chairmanship of the Communist émigré Erich Weinert, the founding congress began after two days of preliminary discussion. Hadermann, Bredel, Homann, Fleischer, Hetz and Weinert gave thunderous speeches against Adolf Hitler, the main-

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lectures were given by Heinrich Graf Einsiedel and First Lieutenant Frankenfels, who had defected to the Red Army not long before at Kursk.

"Cooperation with a revolutionary, socialist Russia must be much more positive for Germany than the Bismarckian friendship with the gendarme of Europe," Count Einsiedel concluded pathetically.

After all speakers had recited their slogans, Comrade Weinert read out the candidates for the committee. Of the 32 names, exactly one-third were German officers, one-third German crewmen. "All those in favor of the list, raise your hands."

Dutifully, the Kashists and their guests raised their hands. The election was unanimous. The presidium consisted for the time being of Erich Weinert, Major Hetz, Lieutenant Graf Einsiedel. In the appeal, which was issued at the same time, it was stated, among other things;

"For God and Fatherland! For a free independent Germany!"

The members of this first German National Committee by grace of the Red Army were:

Karl Hetz, Major, Staff 371st I.D., Engineer, Königsberg

Heinrich Homann, Major, 100th Jag. Div., professional soldier, Hamburg

Herbert Stößlein, Major, 44th I.D., Engineer, Enns

Carl Fleischer, Captain, 100th Jag. Div., political economist, Straubing

Dr. Ernst Hadermann, Captain, A.R. 152, Board of Studies, Kassel

Eberhard Charisius, First Lieutenant, II./K.G. 55, professional soldier, Düsseldorf

Friedrich Reyher, first lieutenant, I./Pi. 88, professional soldier, Dresden

Fritz Rücker, First Lieutenant, I./Sich.Btl. 343, Senior Student Councilor, Berlin

Heinrich Graf v. Einsiedel, Lieutenant, IIIrd Fighter Squadron "Udet" No. 3, professional soldier, Berlin

Ernst Kehler, Lieutenant, 4th/K.N.A. 428, Postal Inspector, Pillau

Bernt v. Kügelgen, Lieutenant, I.R. 418, 123rd I.D., Publisher, Berlin

Max Emendörfer, soldier, I.R. 2.11. I.D., shoe worker, Frankfurt/M.

Jakob Eschborn, Private, 4th /I.R. 212, student of theology, Heidenheim am Rhein

Reinhold Fleschhut, soldier, I.R. 276, 94th I.D., manager of textile factory, Plauen

Heinz Kessler, soldier, 134th I. D. machinist, Chemnitz

Mathäus Klein, sergeant, 8./I. R. 485, Protestant pastor, Bettingen/Baden

Erich Kühn, soldier, 5th /I. R. 368. I. D. Worker Berlin

Fritz Ludeneit, lance corporal, 6th/A. R. 293, forestry worker, East Prussia

Otto Sinz, private, 7th /I.R. 698, construction worker, Lörrach
Hans Zippel, Private, Staff III./I.R. 178, commercial employee, Berlin
Leonhard Helmschrott, private, 5th /I.R. 487, 267th I.D., farmer, Unterkührheim
Anton Ackermann, trade union leader, Chemnitz
Martha Arendsee, Member of the Reichstag, Berlin
Johannes R. Becher, writer, Munich
Willi Bredel, writer, Hamburg
Wilhelm Florin, Member of the Reichstag, Ruhr Area
Edwin Hoernle, Member of the Reichstag, Stuttgart
Hans Mahle, youth leader, Hamburg
Wilhelm Pieck, Member of the Reichstag, Berlin
Gustav Sobottka, miners' leader and member of the state parliament, Ruhr area
Walter Ulbricht, Member of the Reichstag, Berlin
Erich Weinert, writer, Berlin
Friedrich Wolf, physician and writer, Stuttgart
Gerhard Krausnick, Major, Lds.Btl.434, senior bank official, Berlin
Dr. Günter Kertzsch, Private, IS.Pz.D., Study Professor, Leipzig

Emil Krummel, private, I.R. 266, 72.I.D., locksmith, Duisburg
Herbert Stresow, sergeant, I.R. 312, 206th I.D. instructor, Berlin
Gustav Freiherr v. Wangenheim, Stage Manager, Berlin

Jesco von Puttkamer reports on this:

"After the meeting is closed, a grand piano is pushed onto the stage, and while people are having dinner downstairs in the hall, Mikhailov, the bass player from the great theater in Moscow, who is well known in Russia, recites Russian romances and German songs on the stage."

Heinrich Graf Einsiedel describes the situation as follows:

"A common meal and a few sips of vodka as well as the performance of a Moscow theater group formed the conclusion of the two days. From now on, our radio broadcasts to Germany will run on several waves. We chose the first bars of Arndt's freedom song "Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen ließ" (The God who made iron grow) as a break. The newspaper "Freies Deutschland" with a black-white-red header will replace the "Freie Wort" in the camps and will also be dropped as a leaflet over the front. An authorized representative of the National Committee is to be sent to each Soviet army group, called a front, in order to

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Organize the immediate front propaganda with leaflets, loudspeakers and people sent through the front."

With communist practice, there was an immediate move to create a plenum and the individual commissions. Captain Fleischer headed the Economics Section, Emendörfer the Social Policy Section, Major General Korfes the Culture Section, and the "Working Group for Church Questions" was headed by the Catholic clergymen Kayser, Ludwig and Mohr, the Protestant clergymen Schröder, Sönnichsen and Oberkonsistorialrat Dr. Krummacher.

The most important foundation, however, was the radio station "Free Germany," which was installed in Moscow at 34 Shablovka Street. After the beautiful, so shamefully abused old melody "Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen lassen" sounded through the ether for the first time, the emigrant communist Fritz Heilmann began: "Achtung! Attention! This is the station of the National Committee Free Germany. We speak in the name of the German people! We are calling for the salvation of the Reich."

Li Weinert, the president's daughter, and Wolf gang Leonhard acted as spokesmen, and the International Brigadist Bruno Schramm controlled the broadcasts, which were designed by the émigré communists Kurt Fischer, Fritz Erpenbeck, Max Keilson, Lore Pieck (daughter), Gustav Freiherr von Wangenheim, and Hans Mahle.

Leonhard names the prisoners of war who constantly participated in the lying and decomposition broadcasts:

Major General Dr. Otto Korfes, Major General Martin Lattmann, Colonel Hans-Günther van Hooven, Major Egbert v. Frankenberg and Proschlitz, Major Heinrich Homann, First Lieutenant Fritz Rücker, First Lieutenant Friedrich Reyher and Private Dr. Günter Kertzsch.

The entire work was under the direction and control of the émigré communist Anton Ackermann. The Soviets, however, did not rely on their comrades, so Wolfgang Leonhard had to submit all the material for the next broadcast to Colonel Braginsky of the VII Department of the Red Army's Main Political Administration for censorship after each editorial deadline.

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Still, what had been achieved seemed too little for the Kremlin. The plan was born to create an additional organization only from prisoners of war German officers. Jesco von Puttkamer writes about the preparations for this:

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"Soon after this meeting the newly-baked members of the National Committee leave the Anti-Fascist School and Camp 27 and are accommodated in a former railwaymen's recreation home in the little village of Lunovo. Lunovo is located near the great Moscow-Leningrad highway, about 40 kilometers from the city center. In Camp 27, the large group of staff officers and junior officers remained behind, who had participated in all the prepared meetings, but had not reached a final decision. Out of this group of officers a so-called initiative group was formed, which set itself the goal of gaining a connection to the National Committee in some form. To mention just a few names, this group included Colonels Luitpold Steidle and Hans-Günther van Hooven, Majors von Frankenberg, Bedily, Bechler, Büchler, Trenkmann, Major Krausnick, who died in the spring of 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Bredt, War Court Counselor von Knobelsdorff, and others."

The Soviets concentrated more and more on the person of General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach. In him they believed to have found the suitable man with whom they could break into the closed front of the German prisoners of war. They were not mistaken.

Jesco von Puttkamer:

"So then the decision was made, and the Russians unceremoniously brought Generals von Seydlitz, von Daniels, Schlömer, Lattmann, and Korfes from the generals' camp to Lunowo. Here a tough struggle began for these persons, and especially for Seydlitz. The discussions lasted through the night, and Seydlitz's temper often got the better of him. When he learned that the secretary of the National Committee, Private Zippel, formerly a member of the Communist Youth League, was a defector, his fist thundered on the table, and his commanding voice resounded through the closed door into the corridor: "I don't sit down at a table with deserters. "

But he ended up sitting down."

Count Einsiedel records in his diary under September 7, 1943:

"This morning I almost fell out of bed because Seydlitz suddenly roared out in the opposite room and banged his fist on the table so hard that the window panes rattled: 'As long as the Zippel and Gold cases exist, participation is out of the question for me. "

Zippel, who as a communist had already defected in June 1941, is

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in the meantime became the secretary of the National Committee. Gold, also a communist defector, took part in an attempt by the Russians to dig out the commander's bunker in Velikiye Luki while in German uniform. He was awarded a Soviet medal for this. The Soviets had also announced this award grandly in the prisoners' newspaper. Apparently, they believed that this would convince the prisoners of the internationalism of the Red Army. To pact with defectors, even those of political persuasion, is an unthinkable thought for the generals.

To the greatest surprise, however, the news spread around the house as early as noon that Generals von Seydlitz, Lattmann, Schlömer, Dr. Korfes and Edler von Daniels had decided to participate in the founding of the Officers' Association after all."

Lieutenant Augustin, a pilot, and Gold, a deserter, have the sad honor of being the first to fight German soldiers

at gunpoint in the service of the Red Army. In January 1943 they started their fratricidal mission. Erich Weinert reports about it in his records "The National Committee Free Germany":

"Disguised as a downed German aircrew, in new guises, he had come through the German lines at Velikiye Luki at the head of a handful of Russians to gut the command post of Lieutenant v. Saß. While he and his men were already at the front door of the regimental bunker and a company commander was conferring with Saß by telephone about the alleged German air crew, the shooting started. An officer, suspicious of the German airmen, had entered into conversation with them and soon discovered, since no one from the crew answered, that he had Russians in front of him. In the ensuing firefight, most of the Russians remained on the battlefield, but Augustin himself managed to escape again. For this "heroic deed" he, together with the defector Private Gold, was awarded the "Order of the Red Flag" at the beginning of 1944 at a theatrically staged ceremony in Moscow in the presence of many foreign diplomats. The newspaper "Freies Deutschlands" (Free Germany), the organ of the National Committee, dedicated pages of congratulatory articles to the "true patriot" Augustin.

These were the new "comrades" of General von Seydlitz, whom the Soviets used only because Marshal Paul refused to play this role.

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In Lunowo, on September 11/12, 1943, the "Bund deutscher Offiziere" was founded by about 100 delegates from five officers' camps. Earlier, General von Seydlitz, Erich Weinert, Major Hetz, Colonel van Hooven, Colonel Steidle and Major General Lattmann spoke. According to plan, a new appeal was made to the German front-line soldiers and prisoners of war. Count Einsiedel informed us about the milieu in which all this was going on in revealing terseness: "Seydlitz was so enraptured by his new role and also so drunk that he forgot his resentment towards those loners among the officers who had founded the committee and responded to the proposal with tears in his eyes. Demonstratively, he shakes hands for minutes with the deserter Zippel, whom he now addresses as Herr Gefreiter."

But the hopes that the Soviets placed in their new Hiwi were not fulfilled.

Jesco von Puttkamer writes:

"The conviction among Seydlitz and the other members of the Officers' Association that they had now found the right way was so great that they believed they could now win over the rest of the Stalingrad generals. A request was made to 'the Russians to be allowed to send a delegation to the general's camp. A few days after the foundation, Generals Seydlitz, Lattmann and Korfes, Colonels Steidle and von Hooven and Major v. Frankenberg traveled to Camp 48. But the disappointment for them was very great. The generals gathered in the dining hall, and even as the delegation entered the hall they were met by a wave of icy repulsion. This meeting, which, according to the old military rite, was supposed to take the form of a discussion of the situation, became a political gathering of the kind that would have been unthinkable for such a circle in the past. If General Lattmann already had trouble finishing his report on the situation, General v. Seydlitz's remarks were interrupted by loud heckling. Shouts of "fie" and the words "Landesverräten" and "Hochverräter" could be heard louder and louder in the hall. When, after Seydlitz, Colonel Steidle tried to speak, he could not even finish his speech, he was booed, and most of those present left the hall."

But in other camps, too, the emissaries of the National Committee were able to win over only a vanishing minority. The mass of German prisoners of war, soldiers and officers alike, remained in contemptuous rejection.

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Already on September 14, 1943, the leading members of the "League of German Officers" were admitted to the now expanded Presidium of the National Committee. Again, a manifesto to the Wehrmacht and to the German people was issued and signed by the following persons:

Dr. Otto Korfes, Major General and Commander of the 295th I.D.

Martin Lattmann, Major General and Commander of the 14th Pz Div.

Hans Günther van Hooven, Colonel and Army Intelligence Officer, 6th Army

Gerhard Krausnick, Major and Commander of Sich.Btl. 343

Egbert von Frankenberg and Proschlitz, Major and Commodore, Fighter Wing 51

Herbert Stößlein, Maj. (Ing.) and Div. Ing., 44th Inf.Div.
Heinrich Homann, Major and Commander IV. (mot)/A. R. 83
Isenhardus v. Knobelsdorff-Brenkenhoff, Court Martial Councillor, 295th I.D.
Johann Schröder, Lutheran military pastor, 371st I.D.
Josef Kayser, Catholic military priest, 76th I.D.

Dr. Ernst Hadermann, Captain and Commander, III./A.R. 152
Carl Fleischer, Capt., Staff. 100th Hunter Div.
Fritz Rücker, First Lieutenant, I./Sich. Vol. 343
Friedrich Reyher, first lieutenant and comp. leader, I./pi. 88,
Eberhard Charisius, First Lieutenant, II./K.G. 55
Heinrich Gerlach, First Lieutenant, Staff. 14th Pz. Div.
Ernst Kehler, Lieutenant, 4th/K.N.A. 428
Bernt v. Kugelgen, Lieutenant, I.R. 418, 123rd I.D.
Herbert Stresow, Sergeant, I.R. 312
Matthaeus Klein, Sergeant, 8th /I.R. 485
Gerhard Klement, Sergeant, 6th/6th SS-I.R.
Jakob Eschborn, Private, 4th /I.R. 212
Fritz Luddeneit, lance corporal, 6th/A.R. 253
Emil Krummel, Private, I.R. 266, 82nd I.D.
Hans Goßens, Private, Staff I./I.R. 184
Hans Zippel, Private, Staff III./I.R. 178
Leonhard Helmsdirott, Pvt. 5th /I.R. 487, 267th I.D.
Dr. Günter Kertzsdier, Private, 8th/S.R. 101, 18th Pz. Div.
Otto Sinz, Private, 7th /I.R. 698
Reinhold Fleschhut, Private I.R. 276, 94th I.D.
Theo Grandy, NCO, 7th Squadron, K.G. 76
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Heinz Keßler, soldier, 134th I.D.
Erich Kühn, soldier, 5th /I.R. 368, 281st I.D.

From the emigrants drew:

Anton Ackermann, trade union leader, Chemnitz
Martha Arendsee, Member of the Reichstag, Berlin
Johannes R. Becher, writer, Munich
Willi Bredel, writer, Hamburg
Wilhelm Florin, Member of the Reichstag, Ruhr Area
Rudolf Herrnstadt, Editor, Berlin
Edwin Hoernle, Member of the Reichstag, Stuttgart
Hans Mahle, youth leader, Hamburg
Hermann Matern, Member of Parliament, East Prussia
Wilhelm Pieck, Member of the Reichstag, Berlin
Theodor Plivier, writer, Berlin
Gustav Sobottka, miners' leader and member of the state parliament, Ruhr area
Walter Ulbricht, Member of the Reichstag, Berlin
Gustav Frhr. v. Wangenheim, Stage Manager, Berlin
Friedrich Wolf, physician and writer, Stuttgart

For the oathbreakers who unscrupulously disregarded their oath of allegiance, a new oath was created in no time.
It had the following wording:

"I, son of the German people, swear out of ardent love for my people, for my homeland and for my family: to

fight until my people are free and happy, the shame and disgrace of fascist barbarism is washed away, Hitler's fascism is eradicated.

I swear to act mercilessly against anyone who breaks this oath.

Should I break this oath and thus become a traitor to my people, my family, my homeland - my life shall be forfeit. I shall be hated and despised by all honest people, and I shall be judged by my comrades-in-arms as a traitor and enemy of the people.

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At the same time, German decomposition propagandists were deployed in the main battle line in a feverish rush.
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Peter Straßner describes some of these actions in his fundamental work "Verräter":

"In September 1943 the "Einsatzgruppe Kiev" left Moscow. It included Willi Bredel, Lieutenant Bemt v. Kügelgen, graduates of the I. course of the Central Anti-Fascist School Krasnogorsk and prisoner of war soldiers Rudi Scholz, Georg Schnauber, Alexander Lubik and Tromsdorf. "To the German field blouse with black-white-red armband everyone received a full Soviet uniform. To us, it was more than just functional clothing for being at the front. We wore it as a distinction, as a sign of confidence of the Soviet army, as an honorary dress in the fight against fascism" so v. Kügelgen proudly reports. After the capture of Kiev, the group was strengthened by another 22 German anti-fascists led by the communist emigrant Ruth Stolz. According to Weinert, twelve permanent plenipotentiaries of the NK and about 120 commissioned officers were already in action in November 1943. From August to October 1943, the front plenipotentiary Hans Goßens was active on the Bryansk front with Georg Wolff, Emmi Wolf, Anni Strich and the "comrade" Joseph Esch. Soviet Colonel Burzew, Soviet Lieutenant Colonel Unruh and Nemtschinow lead them. When the front officer Erich Kühn falls in the section of the I. Guard Army, Goßens replaces him. From now on he is "looked after" by the comrades of the Political Department there, Professor Lipski and Sasha Galkin."

"Front-line officers of the NK were assigned to almost every army. For example, with the 13th Army Ernst Herrmann, with the 60th Karl Ithaler, with the 38th Rudi Scholz and Heinrich Engelke, and with the I. Guard Army Hans Goßens, who transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front in August 1944. Luitpold Steidle, accompanied by Soviet Major Epstein, went to the 2nd Ukrainian Front, then south of Kremenchug, on 15 Dec 43. Among his co-workers were Major Büchler and First Lieutenant Röckl. They too worked in vain on the Korsun cauldron. According to his report, there was no personal contact with General v. Seydlitz and General Korfes during this period, not even with the group of the NK working on the northern front of the Kessel, which proves once again that these German prisoners of war were primarily subordinate to the specially commissioned Soviet commanders. The commanders were always accompanied by a Soviet companion. For example, the divisional commissioner Jochen Tannigel, while serving on the staff of the 60th Army (under the frontline commissioner Ithaler), was accompanied by the Soviet Ka-

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pitäns Solotnizki, and Divisionsbeauftragte Paul Brandenburg, who had previously proven himself as a "returnee" in the cauldron of Tarnopol, accompanied by Soviet Major Alchowski, to name only these examples. Steidle reports close cooperation with First Lieutenant Dubrowitzki, Major Ruban, and the German "comrade" Ruth Stolz, who were with the staff of the I. Ukrainian Front. His associates at that time (mid-1944) were Major Engelbrecht and Corporal Rudi Scholz. Herbert Stresow, who together with Kertzsch had been "delegated" from Camp 99 in Karaganda to the founding of the National Committee, acted as a front agent with the 4th Ukrainian Front."

In addition, the defectors Herbert Geschwill and Traugott Pastucha, accompanied by Soviet Captain Bugajenko, were also used as trench speakers.

General von Seydlitz himself went personally to the front to persuade the German soldiers to lay down their arms.

Jesco von Puttkamer describes this operation as follows:

"General Scherbakow had let it be known that Stalin himself had wished Seydlitz to undertake this journey. And one evening on the tracks to the west a salon train leaves the soft area of Moscow. In the dining car, at a richly laid table, sit the politician-general of the Watutti Army Group, which is fighting in the Ukraine, the chief of the prison service, and next to them General von Seydlitz, General Korfes, and two German escort officers. They talk about the chances of the Kessel battle, which now - deep in Ukraine - is approaching its climax on the model of the Stalingrad encirclement. They discuss once again the radio messages to the trapped German troops, the leaflets and the text of an offer of surrender. Seydlitz wrote two personal letters to Generals Lieb and Stemmermann, who were trapped there. Soon they are approaching Kiev. In the conversations with the Russian generals a certain skepticism, even impatience, emerges. The propagandists of the National Committee, who are deployed in many places on the front, are probably in contact with the soldiers behind the German line, but they cannot report any real success. Fresh prisoners are stunned when they see a German officer with the black-white-red armband, a "Frontbevollmächtigter." There is no doubt that over there the National Committee exists as a rumor, but its existence is denied.

From low altitude flutter the next day leaflets with a
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Call into the cauldron. A microphone is set up in a Ukrainian peasant's hut, and Seydlitz speaks - over there. The letters to Lieb and Stemmermann have been sent by prisoners into the cauldron. But there is no success. The cauldron does not surrender."

So how did these gentlemen live who labored in the service of the Red Army to wear down the German Eastern Front?

Again Jesco von Puttkamer gives us information about this from his own experiences:

"Already when we left the camp gate, we are about 12 officers, we are relieved to find out that it can't be that bad, because instead of the expected walk to the train station we are politely complimented into a big omnibus. The interpreter, who is saying goodbye, tells us, "You will have a very good time."

The manor house, in front of which our bus stops after a two-hour drive, was located in the northeast of Moscow and had probably been the country estate of a noble family before the revolution. Now the Moscow suburban railroads led out to here, the station was called Planernaya, which means glider airfield. In peacetime on the hills in the surrounding area practiced

the gliders. Something of the old park was still preserved. But the bandstand with the Soviet star and the plaster statues of Lenin were the signs of the new era. Neither furniture nor porcelain nor pictures had left a trace inside the two-story house. Pedestal inscriptions were embedded in the wall above the doors, once in Russian, once in Esperanto. In the early thirties there had been an Esperanto school in the building. Then in 1936 refugees from the Spanish Civil War had moved in here. At the beginning of the war it became a military hospital, and finally a special camp for German prisoners. On the ground floor, in addition to individual spacious rooms, there was a large hall, which with its staircase reached up to the second floor, and an attached dining room. The upper rooms served us only as accommodation. Spick-and-span parlors and white-covered beds aroused our astonishment, which was considerably increased when dinner, consisting of the usual chai and a plate of kasha, was served to us by white-shirted maids."

And so it was almost everywhere. Things were even better at the home of the National Committee.

Puttkamer writes:

"The first impression when I arrived was here, too: Barbed wire! A
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high, firmly locked gate and next to it the usual Russian guardhouse, the budka, with a heavily armed guard. The house itself was an elongated two-story box situated on the high precipitous banks of the Klasma River. The front garden was carefully manicured, the paths bordered with whitewashed stones and the flower borders planted with tulips, pansies and asters. The so-called park continued for a good 200 meters along the bank and had a fistball court in its rear part. From the back yard a staircase, which, as we counted exactly, had 180 steps, led to the bank of the little river and to the bathing place. Not far from the house was a dam, so that the river had

swollen here to a considerable lake. In the summer, people were eager to bathe here, and in the winter, they were happy to use the "terrain" newly gained by the ice cover of the lake for their extended walks. On the lower floor of the house, on one side, was the spacious dining room, where we took our meals at small tables of four. Behind it was a dining room for the Russian staff, and next to it was the kitchen where German cooks prepared the food. As is well known, in Russia all rations are standardized, and so all members of the household, whether general or soldier, received rations that were the norm for captured generals. For breakfast there was a plate of millet, semolina or oat porridge, 300 g of bread, 20 g of butter, some caviar or some cheese. Lunch consisted of soup, 100 g of bread, and a main course of meat or fish. For dinner there was another plate of porridge, 200 g of bread and 15g of butter. Per day 20 papyrus were given to the person and once a month a piece of toilet soap.

On the other side next to the dining room was a meeting room for the Russian staff, where we were shown a movie twice a week. On the other wing were the offices of the house commander, the administration and the political officer.

On the upper floor, apart from an outpatient clinic where a Russian and a German doctor worked, there was a conference room and our living quarters. The generals had single rooms, the other members of the house occupied the rooms in twos or threes. The furnishings of the rooms were the same everywhere, white-covered beds, a large closet and a work desk. The house was centrally heated and sufficiently warm in winter.

Despite this almost unimaginable com- for Russian captivity.

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The members and staff of the National Committee, as far as they were soldiers, always remained prisoners of war. At night we could hear the conversations of the guards and the barking of the guard dogs. We were repeatedly assured by the Russians that we should not feel like prisoners and that all guard measures were taken only for our protection. The latter may not have been a mere phrase of politeness. Apparently, the Russians actually believed in the need to protect us. On several occasions, just at the time I entered the house, the air officers present there were asked whether it was possible that airplanes or cargo gliders could land in the vicinity of the house. The Russians were probably thinking of Mussolini's abduction from Italy and were reckoning with the possibility that Hitler might order an SS commando to excavate the National Committee house. In the summer of 1944, there were even temporary detachments of troops in summer camps nearby." Finally, Jesco von Puttkamer became abundantly clear:

"In 1944, there was no wish that was not granted to a general who was a member of the National Committee."

The gentlemen of Seydlitz and comrades were even assigned a weekend house by their Soviet friends.

Puttkamer also provides information about this:

"The weekend house, already more of a small villa, was located in the middle of a villa resort far outside Moscow, where high party functionaries and foreign diplomats had their "bacha" - as these country residences are called in Russia. The house had formerly belonged to a film director, who bequeathed it to the NKVD after his death. The furnishings were quite elegant by Russian standards. There was a carpet in the salon, a large grand piano in one corner, and the club furniture was covered with white sheets according to Russian custom - and to the great displeasure of the German generals. There was a special study for Seydlitz, with a large diplomatic desk.

Russian girls and a German cook were there to serve. The administration was in the hands of a Russian colonel specially appointed for this purpose. In the wide garden there was a tennis court and a fistball court. Here Seydlitz and his "staff" used to spend the weekend, and here these men believed they could make their policy."

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But there were also many difficulties.

Peter Straßner knows about this:

"When, on the occasion of a political meeting in August 1944 in Camp 27, a lieutenant of the BDO regretted that the revolution of 1918 had not led to the victory of the proletariat in Germany, Captain Georg Engel contradicted

him by stating that at that time, thank God, order had triumphed over chaos. In a specially convened meeting, attended among others by General Lattmann, Czimatis and First Lieutenant Knausmüller, the latter in the uniform of a Soviet officer (!), Engel was then expelled from the BDO. A similar case is that of the Catholic clergyman Haller, now officiating in Lohr am Main, who at the time refused to comply with the demand to denounce German comrades as "war criminals" and was therefore also expelled from the BDO."

Puttkamer also experienced such mishaps:

"The board of the Officers' Association included a Captain of the Reserve Stolz. All that was known of him was that he had formerly been a government councilor. A man of middle age, with dark hair, glasses, and an otherwise unremarkable appearance. He was one of the most active in the work of the Board and in the meetings of the Executive Committee. He had a great general education and showed himself to be well versed in political issues. He had even succeeded in gaining a certain influence on that group which was closest to Seydlitz. These were Generals Lattmann and Korfes and Colonels Czimatis and van Hooven, as well as some younger officers. Two problems occupied the working committees of the National Committee at that time. One was the question of how to carry on political propaganda, since there had still been no serious response from the fighting front. From the Communist wing the thesis was put forward that now was the time to drive a propaganda wedge between officer and man and between upper and lower troop leaders. Naturally, this proposal initially met with strict rejection from the leadership of the Officers' Association. One of the most strident opponents was Regierungsrat Stolz.

The other question that preoccupied minds had probably been raised by Stolz and his circle of friends. It was a question of getting Seydlitz to obtain any concrete assurances for the future from the Russian side. And for this Stolz had intelligently-

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The question of Germany's eastern border was one of the issues he chose. Along with the Communist émigrés, he was probably one of the very few in the House who knew quite clearly that no statement would ever be made by the Russians on such questions. And he knew very well that if he deliberately raised this question again and again, it would inevitably lead to a split in the House. It almost came to that. In addition to a few younger officers, General Rodenburg, another Stalingrad commander who had been taken out of the general's camp like Lenski in the hope of winning him over to the Officers' Association, belonged to his inner circle of friends. He had been taken directly to Lunovo. The radio and newspaper editors had special difficulties with Regierungsrat Stolz, for he was one of the stubborn ones who would not put up with an editorial change in his manuscripts at any price. When this political tension in the house was approaching its climax - as I later found out for myself, it was only one of many - Stolz suddenly sought a command as a front plenipotentiary. And General Rodenburg expressed the wish to be allowed to visit a prison camp located near the front, in order to be able to personally convince himself of the mood of the new prisoners. He had also already departed.

Things had progressed that far when the machinery of the NKVD, which did not fail in this case either, intervened. Stolz was arrested, General Rodenburg was brought back from his trip. The following facts emerged: Regierungsrat Stolz was a Sturmbannführer of the SS and a member of the Gestapo, who had deliberately set himself the goal from the beginning of causing a split within the National Committee and the Officers' Association. His stubbornness in handing in his manuscripts also found its clarification. He had understood how to let certain news reach Germany by means of certain keywords. As further statements by the Russians revealed, he had won General Rodenburg over to his cause, and the latter had intended to attempt an escape from one of the prison camps near the front. Stolz had the same plan when he asked to be used as a front-line plenipotentiary. He was taken to prison by the Russians and served about a year, only to be released to a faraway labor camp. General Rodenburg first came to the house by the lake where Lenski and I had lived - and that was also the reason why we had to vacate so suddenly - here he was also formally

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von Seydlitz was expelled from the Officers' Association; his membership had lasted barely fourteen days. He was then sent to the isolation block of the Susdal camp, where Lieutenant General Schmidt, the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, was already sitting."

Assi Hahn tells of Majors Kleine and Poetsch, who were taken by surprise at first and joined the League of

German Officers, but later resigned. This was a sensation in the prison camp.

Hahn reports:

"Induced by the resignation of these two staff officers, it was decided by

Lunovo sent a delegation to our camp with the generals von Daniels and Lattmann and Colonel Czimatis, the former head of department in the Four-Year Plan. Lattmann denounced the two deserters who left a "conspiratorial" fighting community in the most difficult time

as deserters and criminals. Czimatis, with the German cross on his uniform and the shard in his eye - he was, by the way, the best horse in the Officers' Association stable - called for the removal of the national emblem. Poetsch subsequently atoned for his courageous behavior with three months' imprisonment in the "Budirka".

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The assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 electrified General von Seydlitz and filled him and his staff with illusionistic hopes. The jubilation in the National Committee knew no bounds.

But not only the collapse of the conspiracy in Berlin, especially the cold rejection of the whole action by the Soviets quickly dampened all hope and enthusiasm. We owe Heinrich Graf Einsiedel the communist analysis of July 20 under the entry of July 26, 1944:

"Herrnstadt came to visit from Moscow. He is also one of the ice-cold theoreticians. But his intelligence makes him more bearable than Ulbricht's. His cynicism, however, is astounding:

"This putsch was nothing other than an attempt by the ruling classes of Germany to rid themselves of their Praetorian Guard. To escape the threatening revolution, they had once called them in and had then become their prisoners. Now the generals were to overthrow Hitler on behalf of heavy industry in order to clear the way for an orientation toward capitalist democracy."

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Nevertheless, in view of the rapidly deteriorating overall military situation, many of the captured generals now gave up their resistance to the National Committee, including Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus. On December 8, 1944, fifty of the eighty or so captured German generals signed an appeal to the people and the Wehrmacht that had been drafted by the National Committee. They demanded the end of the war and the overthrow of Hitler. It was signed by:

"Paul, Field Marshal and former O.B. of the 6th Army.

v. Seydlitz, Gen.d.Artil. and former Kdr.Gen. of the LI.A.K.

Strecker, Superior General and former Kdr.Gen. of the XI.A.K.

Hell, Gen. of Artil. and former Kdr.Gen. of VII.A.K.

Völkers, Gen. of the Inf. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XXVII.A.K.

Gollwitzer, Gen. of the Inf. and former Kdr.Gen. of the LIII.A.K.

Schlömer, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XIV.Pz.K.

Postel, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XXX.A.K.

Müller, Vinzenz, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XII.A.K.

Hoffmeister, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XXXXI.A.K.,

Fhr. von Lützow, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XXXV.A.K.

Noble of Daniels, Gen.Lt. and Cdr. of the 376th I.D.

Müller, Ludwig, Gen. of the Inf. and former Kdr.Gen. of the XXXXIV.A.K.

Bayer, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr. of the 153rd Field Training Division.

Hitter, Gen. Lt. and former commander of the 206th I.D.

Buschenhagen, Gen. of Inf. and former Kdr.Gen. of LII.A.K.

Boehme, Gen. Lt. and former Kdr. of the 73rd I.D.

v. Kurowski, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr. of the 110th I.D.

v. Lenski, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 24th Pz.Div.
Leyser, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 29th I.D. (mot.)
Körfes, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 295th I.D.
Lattmann, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 14th Pz.Div.
Nedtwig, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 454th I.D.
von Drebber, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 297th I.D.
Weinknecht, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr. of the 79th I.D.
Tesdaer, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of LS Brig. 1
von Erdmannsdorff, Gen.Maj. and former Kdt. of Mogilow von Dewitz, gen. von Krebs, Gen.Maj. and former
Kdt. of Kishinev Brandt, Gen.Maj. and former Plenipotentiary in the Romanian Petroleum Area
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von Bogen, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 362nd I.D.
Conrady, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 36th I.D.
von Arenstorff, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 60th I.D.
Muller-Below, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 246th I.D.
Count von Hülsen, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 370th I.D.
Trowitz, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 57th I.D.
Frenking, Gen.Maj. and former cdr. of the 282nd I.D.
Lindemann, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 361st I.D.
Gehr, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 707th I.D.
Stingi, Gen. Maj. and former Kdt. of Jassy
Engel, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 45th I.D.
Tronnier, Gen.Maj. and former cdr. of the 62nd I.D.
von Lilienthal, General Director
Busch, Gen.Maj. and former WO. Romania
Traut, Gen.Lt. and former Kdr. of the 78th Storm Division.
Debol, Gen.Lt. and former cdr. of the 44th I.D.
Klammt, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 260th I.D.

Wulz, Gen.Maj. and former Artl.Kdr. of IV.A.K.
von Steinkeller, Gen.Maj. and Kdr. Div. "Feldherrnhalle
Dr. Raess, Surgeon General, former German Army Mission Romania
Gebb, Gen.Maj. and former Kdr. of the 9th I.D.

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On the fronts, however, the Einsatzgruppen of the National Committee intensified their efforts to break the will of the Landser to resist. The full extent of all these actions will probably never become known. One can only record the few examples, which were mainly confessed by those who were involved. In 1944, Sergeant Major August Hellwig, in German uniform, attempted to blow up the Fordon dynamite plant, where parts of the V2 were manufactured. He was caught by the guards and shot.

Count Einsiedel reports on the operation on the Kesselfront at Thorn:

"With Bediler and five other anti-fascists I continue to the Kesselfront of Thorn. But when we arrive there, the German occupation has already broken out. Army Group Rokossowski, with its left flank leaning against the Vistula, had turned north and entered East Prussia. Allenstein and Elbing had already been ge-

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fall. Southwest of the Vistula, Shukov rolled toward the Oder without any significant stop. Only a few divisions

from his army group had also turned north and were marching beyond the Vistula toward Danzig. Thus a gap had been created on the seam between the two army groups, with only a few Russian formations in it. Nevertheless, the situation of the wandering cauldron seemed hopeless. For between it and the main German front, apart from the Vistula, lay a wide belt of Russian-occupied territory. Graudenz was also already cut off. With a large loudspeaker truck, tens of thousands of leaflets and handwritten general's letters, I followed the Thorn units. Their escape route is strewn with fallen and shattered materiel for dozens of kilometers. The breakout followed the recipe known since Cherkassy: the general and the commanders with the tanks and the other still mobile weapons roll away in front. The supply train and the units relying on their feet can see where they are left.

But one night on the Vistula, the Germans are apparently stuck. At last I succeed in getting the Russians of my company, eager for loot and schnapps, and their leader, a major decorated with the Order of Lenin, to use the loudspeaker truck. Three or four times we try to get in touch with the German units to go through the lines and start negotiations with their leaders. Two men of a scattered field guard is all we find, though we wander for hours in what is supposed to be German-occupied space."

In the Graudenz Cauldron, a lieutenant of the National Committee was caught carrying letters from Seydlitz to the commanders of the trapped German units. He was shot instantly without even seeing a regimental commander.

If only somewhere the deceptive opinion could appear that the National Committee and its work had been a kind of resistance against the Hitler regime, it is cruelly destroyed by the former members and collaborators of the National Committee itself.

Jesco von Puttkamer states:

"While in general, the political work of the National Committee was the responsibility of the Chief of the Prisoner of War Service, the frontline officers fell within the competence of the chief officers of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and were appointed by the Chief of the

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7th Division, General Burtsev, was assigned. Each Russian front section had assigned such a plenipotentiary at its front staff. The majority of them were officers, mostly Antifa students.

Colonel Steidle, who had been in Ukraine for a long time, was an exception. The plenipotentiary did the propaganda work in his front section, and for this purpose he had several helpers at his disposal who were assigned to the lower units.... They generally wore Russian uniforms without insignia so as not to attract attention. Only when they came into contact with German prisoners did they put on German uniforms with the black-white-red armband."

In East Berlin, the Ministry of National Defense published a booklet in 1959 about the National Committee "Free Germany" and its work. It was entitled "They Fought for Germany." In it, the frontline officers in particular report.

One of them, Erwin Engelbrecht, states:

"The front work was directed in the closest agreement with our German comrades of the Communist Party of Germany in Moscow."

The former front representative Hans Goßens;

"Another comment on the statement that we would not have been constantly guided at the front. If one means this in the sense that the constant connection of the organizational structure from the National Committee in Moscow to the front apparatus forward was very loose, then this is true. But it must be noted that throughout the years we did not have to complain about too little information, too little advice, too little guidance. It was here that proletarian internationalism showed itself in action. We did our work in fraternal cooperation and agreement with the members of the CPSU, the comrades of the Red Army."

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The employees of this national committee were also present in East Prussia. Some of them now felt horror in the face of the horrors they had witnessed.

Again it is Count Einsiedel who openly confesses:

"In the last few days, since I have been back at the front staff, all our helpers at the divisions in East Prussia have arrived here one by one. They have witnessed the fall of East Prussia - the Hun storm. They saw the Russian soldiery raze towns and villages to the ground.

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burn. They saw them shoot prisoners and civilians, rape women, and turn military hospitals into death houses with pistons. They saw them drink out gasoline balloons and perfume bottles, loot, destroy, scorch and burn. They also saw the orders of the new occupation forces: all men between the ages of 16 and 55, all members of the Hitler Youth and the BDM over the age of 14, all members of the NSDAP or one of its branches must report immediately to the Kommandantur with rations for two days under penalty of being shot. And they saw the camps in which these people were crammed and from which they were deported to Russia. They saw refugee trains into which the German and Russian artillery fired simultaneously and which were then rolled into the ditch by the Soviet tanks.

They have experienced an orgy of extermination the likes of which no civilized region has ever had to endure. Only a few can hold back the tears when they tell about it.

I have always been afraid of the day when the Red Army would enter German soil fighting. But what has happened here is beyond anything I thought possible in my pessimistic hours.

Even the Russian officers confirm what their comrades report. They are no longer in control of their troops. Commanders who want to put a stop to the goings-on of their own units are simply shot. The savagery is so great that they fear for the fighting morale of the troops.

Today I hear from Bechler that we have been asked to hold a meeting with our 60 front-line helpers to talk to them about what is happening in East Prussia.

Silently, we make our way to the neighboring village where the men are housed. Silently they gather. Two Russian officers take part in the meeting, although I ask them to leave us alone to allow free discussion. Perhaps it is better that way. At least they can hear for themselves what is being said, and not through their agents, who are certainly practicing Bolshevik vigilance in this meeting, as was the case the National Committee and at the Antifa School and as is the case everywhere in the Soviet Union, because this activity of mutual surveillance is part of the natural duty of the party member

Once again, the reports of the comrades before us unroll the

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Picture of the horror that has befallen East Prussia. And suddenly it occurs to me that I have heard something similar before. Four weeks ago, when the Russian offensive had just begun, I had come across a young farmer's son from the Goldap area in a prisoner collection camp, an ensign in the Deutsches Jungvolk. We had been looking for volunteers for our front school and had given a lecture to a select group of twenty prisoners about our goals and intentions. Then we had asked each one if he wanted to join our work. With the exception of the boy, all had agreed to do so. But the boy had answered; "I was in the Hitler Youth until a few months ago. Perhaps you are right in what you say about the Third Reich and its leaders. Events seem to prove you right. But I cannot change overnight. And besides, do you think that the Soviets are better? What they did to the towns and villages they conquered in the fall and which we managed to regain is worse than death. We East Prussians prefer to go down fighting than to endure this without resistance. "

This statement, which the boy made in the presence of a Russian officer, could not have been more courageous and clear. But I overcame once again the terrible horror that this report about the behavior of the Red Army had given me by convincing myself that his words were only the result of the usual Nazi propaganda.

But now there is no more evasion. Now we have to face the fact that what the boy told us is the truth and only a small part of the whole front.

When our comrades have finished their report, Bechler stands up without prior consultation with me and makes an apparently prepared speech. Apparently he has instructions from Saposhdanski on how to behave.

"Comrades, the war of the fascist conquerors is coming to an end," he begins, "the Red Army, the army of the

most advanced country on earth, the army of socialism and internationalism, has entered German soil to liberate the German people and the world from fascist slavery." It continues in this key for about twenty minutes. Then come the concluding sentences: "Comrades, the way you have just spoken about the conduct of the Red Army on German soil shows that you are still thoroughly contaminated by the fascist poison, that you begin to lament snivellingly when the Nazi crimes that caused this catastrophe [194]

over Germany must finally be atoned for. It shows that you are ready to slander the Red Army and to construct an anti-Soviet agitation out of a few attacks which are unavoidable in war. Yes, it shows that you fall for fascist provocations, blaming the Red Army for the arsons and murders committed by the fascist werewolves. I must therefore, also on behalf of the National Committee and the representatives of the Red Army, issue a stern rebuke and a serious warning. I close the meeting."

The one who said this monstrosity, Bernhard Bechler, was a major, not of the Red Army, but of the German Wehrmacht, which was in its death throes!

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The staff of the National Committee was also present in Breslau. Still on May 2, 1945, 80 men under Lieutenant Horst Vieth in German uniforms were deployed in the west of the burning city. They went on standby at the street triangle Glogauer - Liegnitzerstraße. The 1. Platoon was led by Werner Pilz with the group leaders Anstadt and Schleuse, the 2nd Platoon by Feiten with the group leaders Herbst and Köstler, the 3rd Platoon by Stiegelmeier with the group leaders Klittich and Palm.

But the traitorous fratricides had little luck. On May 5, the 1st Platoon was able to take the guard in front of a battalion command post of the Waffen-SS by surprise, since the attackers were wearing German uniforms, but the SS men soon realized what was being played and fought back vigorously. Lieutenant Vieth and some of his accomplices were shot, the others took to their heels.

The 2nd platoon encountered a group of Ukrainian Waffen SS, who instantly threw themselves at the attackers, whereupon they fled.

The 3rd platoon became entangled, but also had some failures. By the time the dispersed elements were back at their initial positions, Breslau had already surrendered.

It is not known how many employees of the National Committee had to pay for their treason with their lives. From mentions in the communist press, the following additional names of fallen have become known: Erich Kühn, Otto Wormuth, Ewald Mai, Karl Pomp, Bernhard Voß, Kurt Zier, Willi Ruschel, Siewert Grube, Hans Jahn.

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The war was over. Germany had lost, its proud armies were defeated, millions of Germans paid with their lives for this defeat.

The first to get their well-deserved kicking were the German Red Army hives on the National Committee. While the chosen émigré communists were flown to the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany with Ulbricht and Pieck, the National Committee staff remained in the Soviet Union for the time being. Jesco von Puttkamer describes the end of all illusions:

"Following a banquet which had taken place in Lunowo on the occasion of May I, 1945, an enlightening conversation developed between Herr Herrnstadt and Major von Frankenberg. In a relaxed mood - the vodka they had consumed had done its part - they both went for a walk in the park after the meal. Frankenberg asked the question that had been raised a hundred times in those days: What will happen now? What will become of the National Committee? Are we really coming to Germany right away? And now he received an answer from the communist Herrnstadt that shook a man like Frankenberg, who still believed in the honesty of Pieck and Weinen, to the core. Herrnstadt, who took the opportunity to speak his mind openly without any of the more cautious

comrades being able to interrupt him, said quite laconically: "Do you seriously believe, Herr v. Frankenberg, that people of your class can still play a role in the new Germany? First of all, it is important for the Communist Party to gain ground in Germany. And we Communists cannot burden ourselves with you and your class comrades. Even if our policy should require cooperation with the bourgeois parties in the beginning, that can always remain only a temporary solution!"

Thus the shameful history of the National Committee "Free Germany" came to an ignominious end.

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Deserters in Turkey

The Vermehren affair - Cornelia Kapp reveals to Cicero

In the Middle East, in what was then the British powerhouse between the Nile and the Indus, things began to ferment with the outbreak of the Second World War. Not only in Palestine, but also in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq, the Arabs looked to Germany with sympathy. Even in Iran, in ancient Persia, Reza Shah Pahlevi did not conceal his open affection for Germany.

In March 1941, Arab nationalists in Iraq led by Rashid Ali el-Gailani revolted against the pro-British government of Emir Abdullah Illah, who was reigning for the minor King Faisal II, chasing him and his supporters out and seizing power in the country. Abdullah, disguised as a woman, fled to the American Embassy, and U.S. Ambassador Knabenshue and his wife smuggled him under a rug in his car to Habbaniya, where British troops were located.

Prime Minister Churchill, greatly concerned about Iraq's oil pipelines and oil wells, now threw an Indian brigade into Basra for reinforcements.

All that Rashid Ali el-Gailani and the Mufti of Jerusalem Amin el-Husseini, who had rushed over to help, needed were weapons and ammunition. Bedouins flocked by the thousands to fight England.

Germany, in the midst of preparations for the Eastern campaign, forced to invade Yugoslavia and Greece by the fall of the pro-German Stojadinovic government in Belgrade and the invasion of Greece by British troops, could not fragment. Ambassador Rudolf Rahn, instructed to support the Iraqis whenever possible, received no permission in Ankara to transport German war material through Turkey.

Major von Blomberg, as head of a German military mission to be set up, flew a plane to Baghdad to clarify the situation. The plane, flying low because of British fighters, was mistakenly fired upon by Bedouins. When the plane landed at the airfield in Baghdad, Major von Blomberg was dead. He had been shot in the head.

Valuable time was lost, which Churchill used. He pulled all the planes together, bombed Iraqi airfields and cities, and British troops entered Baghdad before the revolution had really taken hold.

In Iran, the British forced the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlevi, who had brought new splendor to the Persian peacock throne, in 1941. They deported the pro-German Shah to the island of Mauritius and from

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there to South Africa, where he died three years later. In his place they raised to the throne in Tehran the son Mohammed Reza Pahlewi, who was wax in the hands of the English, quite unlike his bold father.

Nevertheless, the situation in the Near East remained very unstable for England. In this situation, the German Embassy in Ankara, the only representation of the German Empire in the Near East, was of utmost importance. In Turkey itself, the German ambassador, Franz von Papen, and the British ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatschbull-Hugessen, were struggling for influence with the Turkish government. Sir Hughe wanted to drag Turkey into the war on the rare occasion of the Allies, von Papen wanted to keep it out at all costs.

In the end, this duel was decided in Germany's favor. This did not happen by chance.

Dr. Erich Vermehren was assigned to the head of the Istanbul office of the German Abwehr, First Lieutenant Paul Leverkuehn, with the rank of sergeant. He was friends with the representative of Abwehr III, Dr. Hamburger, a 23-year-old lieutenant. Both maintained good relations with the German journalist couple Kleczkowski living in Turkey.

Mrs. Vermehren was a born Countess Plettenberg, a distant relative of Franz von Papen. The somewhat older woman had great influence on her husband. She was not only very religious, but also a bitter opponent of

National Socialism.

In the first days of January 1944, Dr. Vermehren did not show up for duty. Investigations revealed that he and his wife had deserted to the British. This was not difficult in a neutral foreign country. All one had to do was report to the British Embassy.

What all Dr. Vermehren had brought to the English was never fully clarified. In any case, Vermehren had exact knowledge of the German diplomatic secret code and of all processes in the Orient, as far as people and groups there cooperated with the Germans.

Walter Schellenberg comments:

"This blow hit us all the harder because it meant that our work in the entire Near East has been called into question."

Vermehren was flown to London and spoke to the German people on the BBC's German Service in the service of British political warfare.

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A little later, Lieutenant Dr. Hamburger followed him and also deserted to the English. If the Vermehren couple - at least the woman - were political opponents of the German Reich government, Hamburger was the son of a Viennese National Socialist industrialist and wore the golden HJ badge himself.

Shortly thereafter, the Kleczkowski couple also defected to the English.

On April 6, 1944, the secretary of SD-Obersturmbannführer Ludwig C. Moyzisch, who was assigned to the German Embassy as an attache, Miss Cornelia Kapp, disappeared without a trace. She had requested Easter leave from her boss to visit her father, who was the German Consul General in Budapest. By chance, however, Moyzisch discovered on the same day that Cornelia Kapp had not left for Budapest.

Ludwig C. Moyzisch was not just any defense officer: he played the now world-famous Cicero game with the Turkish valet Elysea Bazna of the British ambassador Knatschbull-Hugessen, which was the greatest success of German espionage in the Second World War. Through "Cicero", Germans learned everything that was happening on the Allied side. By the time Elysea Bazna, who photographed the secret documents from the British ambassador's safe, delivered them, people in Berlin were in the know.

Cornelia Kapp knew about the existence of "Cicero", she knew that an employee of the British Embassy was a German master spy, she just did not know the name. Moyzisch searched feverishly everywhere for the missing Cornelia Kapp.

Only Elysea Bazna brought certainty.

"Do you know where your secretary is?" he asked nervously and immediately gave the answer himself, "With the English. She is still in Ankara."

He was dejected because he knew that his game was up. With presence of mind, he managed to leave the British Embassy at the last minute with a good exit.

The new desertion hit the German Embassy like a bomb. Cornelia Kapp had also deserted to the English with all available secret documents and her knowledge about the existence of "Cicero".

Cornelia Kapp, whose two brothers were on the Eastern Front, whose father was a dutiful civil servant, had long been in the service of the

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American intelligence agency OSS. She was one of the most dangerous collaborators of Allied espionage. Cornelia Kapp was very soon flown from Turkey to Cairo for interrogation and then taken to Washington via Cyprus and London, as she eagerly wished to come to America.

There she experienced a bitter disappointment. She was not released, but first locked up in a camp for suspicious persons. After all, she had betrayed everything she could. Now she had become worthless to the Americans. Even after her release, she remained under the special surveillance of the FBI for a long time.

The damage she had inflicted on Germany could not be foreseen.

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With the gun in hand
Immigrants as Allied Soldiers and British Paratroopers

-The Austrian Battalion of the Tito Partisans

Not only did the Red Army struggle to pit Germans against Germans; France, England, and Tito did as well. However, France tried it only once in the European theater of war. In the early morning hours of May 28, 1940, on the Narvik front near Djupvik, foreign legionnaires, who had previously been heavily alcoholized, were landed. The legionnaires, mainly Germans, were attacked with force by the fierce mountain fighters and sailors, who for days had had to endure defenselessly the fire of the heaviest Allied naval guns, and thrown mercilessly into the oil fjord.

In England, the European emigrants were divided into two groups; the Friendly Aliens and the Enemy Aliens. The Friendly Aliens were emigrants from allied countries, such as Poland, Yugoslavia, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, etc., while the Enemy Aliens were German and Austrian emigrants. While the Friendly Aliens were officially subject to British laws and had to join the army units of their governments in exile, such as the Polish Anders Army, the Enemy Aliens were allowed to enlist voluntarily in the British Army, where they were enlisted in the Pioneer Corps, a subordinate army division. This fact confronted especially the Sudeten German emigrants in England with a difficult decision. According to this regulation, they had to enlist in the Czech army in exile. As a result, the Sudeten German Social Democrats divided into two groups. Wenzel Jaksch, who led the "Loyal Community of Sudeten German Social Democrats", finally managed to get the Sudeten German Socialist emigrants to fight against Germany not under the Czech flag, but under the British flag. For this reason he was also fiercely opposed by the "Sudeten German Anti-Fascist Front". The members of this front were: Gustav Beuer and Karl Kreibich from the Communists, Josef Zinner and Josef Lenk from the Social Democrats, and Dr. Alfred P. Peres and Dr. Rudolf Popper from the German Democratic Freedom Party.

Apart from a number of propagandistic measures, these Sudeten German "soldiers" carried out some minor commando operations, the military value of which is disputed. One of these "heroes" in British uniform was Alfred Frenzel, who fought the National Socialist regime in Germany as a kitchen cop on a British airfield and later after the war in the German Federal Republic as a Social Democratic politician and informer for the Communist Cze! was active.

In addition, the British Army continually attempted to parachute armed Germans over Germany on agent missions. One die-
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ser British parachute agent, Albrecht Gaiswinkler, later described in his memoirs "Sprung in die Freiheit" (Jump to Freedom) how he and some accomplices had parachuted into the Austrian Hölleengebirge on April 8, 1945 and acted as "partisans" during the days of the collapse. However, there was no fighting here either, although Gaiswinkler was already operating in the shadow of the incoming American tank units. His competitor, Sepp Plieseis, a former international brigadist who had managed to escape from the concentration camp, made a name for himself primarily because in Ischl, when the German military resistance had already collapsed, he and his gang had the local NSDAP group leader Hollerwöger shot up in front of his family during lunch and had his deputy Neumann murdered while lying in bed.

The British achieved a real success only in the Czech Republic, where parachuted Czech volunteers Jan Kubis and Josef Gabčík succeeded in assassinating Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich. Alan Burgess in his work "Seven Men at Dawn" describes the assassination of Heydrich according to British and Czech sources and openly admits that Heydrich had to die because he was on the verge of achieving the reconciliation of the Czechs with the Germans. Heydrich had to die not because he had committed any crimes in the Czechs! but because he had done everything to reconcile the German and Czech people.

Alan Burgess soberly states:

"The leading men of the Czech army and government-in-exile in London, who had sent them here, believed it. Jindra believed in it, too. Heydrich was the architect to whom the Nazis owed the edifice of their success in Czechoslovakia. Once he was out of the way, the building had to collapse. Everything would change. The Reich would receive such a slap in the face that continuation of collaboration would become impossible and any reconciliation extremely difficult."

This intention was fully successful, Germany reacted to the murder extremely harshly; the village Lidice, where the murderers hid for some time, was destroyed, the men were shot, and in the whole Czechs! there was a sharp crackdown. There was no more talk of reconciliation.

Such success was denied to the English in the German-speaking world.

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says. All the experiments that were made here happened only in the period of collapse and were without serious significance.

The same happened to Tito, who only managed to convene a conference of so-called Austrian anti-fascists in Lower Carniola on October 16, 1944, in order to decide on the formation of an "Austrian battalion", which was to be recruited from deserters of the German Wehrmacht and prisoners of war. For this purpose, the conference requested the Soviet Red Army to send twenty to thirty German-speaking anti-fascists who came from Styria or Carinthia. The Austrian Mitja and the Slovene Ahac were entrusted with the organization for the formation of the battalion. For the armament of the battalion 300 Mauser rifles, 100 automatic rifles, 40 light machine guns, 10 light grenade launchers, 80 pistols and 600 hand grenades with appropriate ammunition were requested. The battalion was to be affiliated with the Yugoslav Liberation Army and receive orders from it. One of the political initiators was the Austrian communist leader Franz Honner.

On November 24, 1944, Yugoslav political commissars Boris Kidric and Lieutenant General Jaka Arsic signed the authorization for the formation of the battalion, which was to bear a red-white-red emblem on its left sleeve as a special mark. The cadre of the battalion included Austrian communists who had already fought in Spain in the International Brigades.

Roman Fuchsel took over the role of the commissar. It was not until the spring of 1945 that the battalion was ready for action with about 800 men under the command of one Leopold Stanzi. The formation of a second battalion was begun. The battalion was given the name "Austrijski bataljon". The leading officers were Yugoslavs by the bank.

A former partisan") describes in detail in his book "Gamsi na plazu" (Chamois on the Avalanche) the exploits of this troop, of which a platoon of 30 men under the leadership of the Slovenian Ladislav Grad-Kijev received orders to cross the Dräu and operate from the Saualpe in Carinthia against the Koralpe in Styria. The band had its base east of the Lavant Valley north of the Soboth municipality. The bandits murdered a number of civilians, including women, in the vicinity of Soboth and Rothwein, and terrorized farmers and citizens up and down the country. When these German-speaking partisans, like

1) Karel Pruänik-Gaäper

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near Glashütte on the Koralpe, they soon broke away. Allegedly, they suffered heavy losses in battles with Cetniks on April 6, 1945, and against a supply unit of the Volksdeutsche Waffen-SS Gebirgsdivision "Prinz Eugen" in Ferlach on May 12. Among others, the commissar Anton Leeb from Badgastein fell at that time. In this book are highlighted as for the Tito gangs particularly reliable fighters: Anton Schober, Fritz Bartschel, Johann Widder, a commissar Breining, Brunner, Moser, Färber, Mauerhofer, a commissar Alois Maurer, Brunnflicker, Repp, Rabitsch, Ernst Heininger, Lesnig, Schreiner, Rosegger, Klaber, Telsnik, Bucher, Fuchs, commissar Plank, commissar Tatschi.

On the whole, however, even these German-speaking Tito partisans did not undertake any decisive acts of war, but ran alongside the general development in the days of the collapse.

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Action magpie

Desperate Enterprise Against the Atomic
Gimpel at a Loss

In 1944, Amt VI, the foreign political intelligence service of the Reich Security Main Office, received more than disturbing news about the Manhattan Project underway in America. Very soon it was discovered that this was the preparation of a new destructive weapon, the production of atomic bombs. Although the American defense was trying hard to keep the atomic project secret, for its development the American atomic physicists needed uranium, some of which came from northern Canada, some from the Congo. The Germans knew very well that a new, almost deadly danger was brewing here.

Some time before, the German Abwehr had been offered the American William Curtis Colepough. Colepough had allegedly not been promoted to officer in the Navy because of sympathies for National Socialism and had eventually deserted to Germany.

So if this experienced man, who had mastered all the subtleties of everyday American life, was sent to America accompanied by a reliable German counterintelligence officer, it might be possible to obtain more detailed documentation on the Manhattan Project, perhaps even to disrupt it by sabotage or at least to delay its realization. Office VI swore by this William Curtis Colepough. He was the son of a German mother and an American father and, while still an ensign, had reported on convoy trips to England to the German consul, Dr. Scholz, in Boston. When war broke out between America and Germany, the consul had to leave the United States, and Colepough received a draft into the Army.

He fled from the USA to Argentina and reported to the German consul in Buenos Aires, hoping to be received with open arms. The consul, however, let him leave, but nevertheless sent a report to the Foreign Office, which, after questioning Dr. Scholz, ordered Colepough to be sent to Germany. The disappointed deserter alone had already left Argentina and had gone to New York as a steward, from where he sailed to Lisbon on the steamer "Gripsholm" as a kitchen assistant. There he registered with the German legation as a war volunteer for the German Wehrmacht.

He was brought to Germany and trained with the Waffen SS. The service description he got was miserable. For German terms

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he was a bad soldier. But there was no doubting his enthusiasm for Germany.

Amt VI selected as the German leader of the operation Erich Gimpel, who was given the cover name Captain Edward Green. The plan was given the cover name "Unternehmen Elster". The order to the two agents was: to find out how far nuclear production in the USA had progressed and whether and where an atomic bomb would be dropped on Germany. In addition to this mission, the order was to disrupt or delay the atomic bomb production by explosive attacks.

In late October, Gimpel and Colepough sailed for Kiel, where they reported to Captain Lieutenant Hilbig on submarine 1230, as ordered. In his luggage, Gimpel carried \$60,000 in cash and \$100,000 worth of diamonds, in addition to a shortwave transmitter. When U 1230 left Kiel, the city was ablaze after an Allied bombing raid.

It was oppressive. But it was these almost non-stop terrorist attacks on German towns and villages that underscored the purpose and seriousness of this foolhardy attempt to peek into the enemy's deadly cards. The U-boat 1230 was tasked with avoiding any enemy contact, and sailed underwater almost the entire time. On the fortieth day of the trip, which proved exceedingly arduous, Kapitänleutnant Hilbig received a radio message for Erich Gimpel that read: "We have reason to believe that the enemy has been informed of our undertaking. Act at your own discretion."

The days in which U 1230 usually sailed fifty miles in eighty meters of water had made a real nervous wreck out of Colepough, who was otherwise very brisk and acted extremely important. When Gimpel decided to land in the U.S. despite the radio message, he arranged for Captain Hilbig to make sure that Colepough did not learn of the radio message.

Finally, on the forty-third day of the torturous voyage, the submarine lay in Fundy Bay. Since a U.S. destroyer was keeping watch at the entrance to the bay, Captain Hilbig first laid his boat aground. Here he waited for nightfall and then - it was the night of November 29-30, 1944 - silently and slowly entered Frenchman Bay. The submarine drove so close to shore that not only could the dogs be heard barking, but even the headlights of the cars on the shore road endangered the whole enterprise. Hilbig had Ge-

gunner and machine guns ready and launch the rubber dinghy that had been provided. With a suitcase in one hand and a pistol in the other, the two men from the "Elster" company entered the beach.

They briefly said goodbye to the sailors and stumbled through a gloomy forest in a thick snow flurry. Everything had been thought of, except winter coats. They therefore wore only light trench coats. But what was even worse, they had not taken any hats with them.

At last they reached the road and began to walk in the direction of Bangor. Cars sped past them. No one was paying attention to them. Only a fifteen-year-old Boy Scout who encountered the two agents on bicycles, Jonny S. Miller, bristled, for he noticed that the men were not wearing winter coats, had no hats, although that is almost impossible in the United States, and were also hauling suitcases. He turned back, examined the footprints with his flashlight, and promptly traced them in the snow to the spot where they had landed. Young Miller drove to the nearest police station in the greatest excitement and was guffawed at by the sergeant there. The local FBI office also advised the angry boy scout to read fewer crime stories.

Meanwhile, a cab driver had overtaken them and stopped. Colepough told them by appointment that they had driven their old car into the ditch, and hired the cab to the Bangor station. He paid six dollars for it. When they entered the waiting room, they were pleased to find that a train was coming in four minutes. Colepough solved the tickets to Portland, also there they did not stay, but again blurred their track and went on to Boston, where they finally checked into the Hotel Essex. Completely exhausted, they both slept until the next noon. Then they hurriedly bought hats and thick winter coats. The next day they continued by train to New York and got off at Grand Central Station. They dropped off their suitcases at the railroad storage for twenty cents. If the workers had guessed that there was \$160,000 in the one, they probably never would have gotten it back. On 33rd Street in Manhattan, they got a double room at Kennmore Hall.

Very soon Gimpel was shocked to discover that Colepough was throwing the money around wildly. Gimpel had given him \$5,000 in spending money. In three days Colepough spent 1500 dollars. All the exhortations were to no avail. It was exasperating.

Erich Gimpel immediately set about assembling the shortwave transmitter,

and went to a radio store to get some more spare parts. When he returned in the evening, Colepough had gone out. Gimpel now also went out, ate, and visited a movie theater. Colepough still had not returned. All that was available of him was a slim note on which he had written, "Went out for another drink. Hope you don't mind. I'll be back in two hours." Erich Gimpel went back to the hotel and went to sleep. When he awoke again, the bed next to him was still empty. Gimpel pulled himself up. The clock showed three o'clock. The German hastily dressed and ran out into the street.

Had Colepough fallen into the hands of the FBI in the end? In his haste, Gimpel had left both the transmitter and the money and diamonds in the room. He did not know now what to do. He hid in a hallway across the street and watched the hotel entrance, heart pounding, but nothing moved. Colepough came and did not come.

At about the same time, on December 3, 1944, at 5:37 a.m., U 1230, already about 160 miles from the American coast, encountered the 15,000-ton steamer "SS Comwallis," which was carrying grain. Captain Hilbig could not resist the temptation. The torpedo hit right amidships. Only 12 men of the 59-man crew could be saved.

At last Colepough staggered up in the company of a female, fully drunk. She, too, was heavily loaded. Outside the hotel, the two said goodbye. Gimpel followed the woman for another ten minutes or so, but apparently she was not tailed. Then he made his way into the hotel. Colepough was already undressed in bed. He was unable to speak.

The next morning Gimpel tried again to reproach his bad comrade. It seemed that he was listening to him.

Gimpel had been given the address of a New York businessman who had worked for the German Abwehr a few years earlier and, according to the receipts Gimpel was able to see, drew the round sum of \$64,293 and 60 cents from 1938 to 1942. This was the man Gimpel wanted to see. He was to help him clear up the Manhattan Project. The American had been described to Office VI as a skilled and reliable agent. Gimpel was unlucky: he did not meet him. He decided to come back the next day and returned to the hotel.

The doorman asked him in amazement, "Have you forgotten anything else?"

Gimpel had no idea what the man meant. Finally he understood what was going on. Colepough had paid the bill and told the hotel-

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that they were both leaving. He had taken everything with him, the transmitter, the guns, the \$60,000 and the diamonds.

Erich Gimpel still had about \$300 in his pocket. If he didn't find Colepough, he was lost.

But how was he supposed to look for a man who had landed around \$160,000 in a city of millions like New York? His inquiries at the nearby cab stands got him nowhere. Gimpel thought feverishly. Probably Colepough would want to leave New York. Like a flash, the German remembered Grand Central Station! He took the next cab there, but far and wide there was nothing to be seen of Colepough. Then he approached the counters where the luggage could be stored. There, too, he discovered no trace. Thousands of people surrounded the desperate bullfinch, who crept again and again to the baggage hall and after hours suddenly discovered the two suitcases a few meters away from the ramp next to other pieces of luggage. His heart almost stopped. His suitcase in particular had a false bottom.

After Gimpel had waited for a long time as if on pins and needles and Colepough did not show up, he bluffed and claimed that he had lost the dispatch bill. Since he was in possession of the suitcase keys and could describe the contents, his suitcase was opened and they handed them over to him without any fuss. Gimpel disappeared in the next cab and checked into the Pennsylvania Hotel.

Gimpel struggled to carry out his orders on his own. Through the American businessman he blackmailed, he received the information that the atomic bomb itself would be ready for use in a few minutes, but would be so heavy that a special machine would have to be constructed. In California the first tests already took place. Allegedly one had already two to three atomic bombs. Only if Germany and Japan had them, they would not be used. Gimpel transmitted this information in code from his new hotel room 1559. The reception was confirmed to him. He had thus fulfilled the first part of his mission. Sabotage attacks were never to occur.

Colepough was blindsided when he found no more suitcases at the baggage claim counter at Grand Central Station and was told that a Mr. Green had already picked them up. He knew that he had now gambled away. Then he remembered an old friend, Tom S. Warren, who lived in Richmond Hill. The two, equally addicted to alcohol

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done, squandered Colepough's last dollars, and then Colepough was overcome with howling misery and he told his friend everything.

The latter, again, did not think twice and notified the FBI on Dec. 26. Colepough was picked up drunk by the officers and sobered up first. Then he told everything he knew and claimed that he had only come to America to hand over the German spy Green to the army.

The officers listened boredly at first, but when routine consultation in Boston revealed that they were dealing with a deserter, they suddenly became interested.

The assistant director of the FBI, Conelly, who had led the investigation against the "Pastorius" people, took over the case personally. A short time later, the secret manhunt against Eduard Green, alias Erich Gimpel, was underway at all American police departments. Colepough eagerly supplied the exact description of his person and his peculiarities. Most importantly, he revealed that Gimpel had a habit of buying Peruvian newspapers from a newsstand at the Times Square subway station. Colepough also drew the FBI officers' special attention to the fact that Gimpel used to put the change in the breast pocket of his jacket.

On New Year's Eve, the FBI agents who had taken over guarding the newsstand watched as a man who matched the description given by Colepough to a tee observed a Peruvian newspaper. He reached into the breast pocket of his jacket to pull out a bill. Seconds later, Erich Gimpel was arrested.

The FBI officials laughed as he desperately tried to prove that he was not the wanted man. One of them calmly said, "You made one mistake, you should have shot your comrades between the eyes as soon as you landed."

Everything else was just routine. The officers found the suitcases with all the documents in the Pennsylvania hotel. In a lineup, Colepough heavily incriminated Gimpel. Disgusted, Mr. Conelly said, after the traitor had brought up everything he knew against Gimpel, "You're a pig, Billy, go back to your cell."

Erich Gimpel was taken to Fort Jay and closely guarded. Three weeks later, Majors Reagin and Haigney came forward to take over his defense. They could not give him much hope. Pre-

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sident Roosevelt had personally ordered that the trial of Gimpel take place as soon as possible.

Even before the trial, two officers from the OSS, Office of Strategy Service, the US military spy organization, visited him. They tried to turn Gimpel, as it is called in the jargon of the intelligence service, and guaranteed him that in this case there would be no trial against him. Gimpel refused.

In early February 1945, as is the rule in the United States, Major Robert Carry read him the indictment in private and told him that he would soon stand trial.

On February 6, Erich Gimpel was brought before his judges by the MP. Commanding General T. A. Terry had advertised the trial. The judges were Colonels Clinton, J. Harrold, Lathrop, R. Bullene, and John B. Grier, with a lieutenant colonel and three majors still sitting on the jury. Major Robert Carry and First Lieutenant Kenneth F. Graf acted as prosecutors.

The Attorney General of the United States, Tom C. Clark, attended the trial as an observer and counsel, which was held in a government building on Governor's Island. The prosecutor charged Gimpel not only with espionage and sabotage against the United States, but also accused him of being guilty of the death of the 47 sailors of the "SS Cornwallis," which was torpedoed by the returning submarine.

For nine days the tedious trial ran, with testimony from everyone who had come in contact with the two, from 15-year-old Boy Scout Miller, now brilliantly vindicated, to Mr. Conelly, who had led the interrogations.

Both were sentenced to death by hanging. - President Roosevelt rejected Gimpel's plea for clemency. - Just in the last moment before the execution, the American president died. During four weeks of continued national mourning, no sentence may be carried out.

But even after that time had expired, Gimpel was not executed and was still awaiting the executioner at Leavenworth Penitentiary. In 1945, President Truman pardoned Gimpel to life in prison. Erich Gimpel spent almost eleven years in American prisons. Then he was released on parole and finally transported back to Germany.

What happened to Colepough further was not disclosed. But he, too, has been pardoned to life in prison.

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